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we use words without having clear and diftinct ideas, we talk like children; who being questioned what fuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this fatisfactory answer, that it is fomething: which in truth fignifies no more, when fo ufed either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diftinct idea of at all, and fo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name fubftance, being nothing but the fuppofed, but unknown fupport of thofe qualities we find exifting, which we imagine cannot fubfift, "fine re fubftante," without fomething to fupport

• folid, extended fubftances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones. So that, I think, the being of fubftance is not fhaken by what I have faid: and if the idea of it fhould be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being of fubftance would not be at all fhaken by my faying, we had but an obfcure imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accuftoming ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum; or indeed, if I fhould fay, we had no idea of fubftance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example: it cannot be doubted but there are diftinct fpecies of feparate fpirits, of which yet we have no diftinct ideas at all: it cannot be queftioned but fpirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.

The being then of fubftance being fafe and fecure, notwithstanding any thing I have faid, let us fee whether the idea of it be not fo too. Your lordship afks, with concern, And is this all, indeed, that is to be faid for the being (if your lordship pleafe, let it be the idea) of fubftance, that we accuftom ourselves to fuppofe a fubftratum? Is that cuftom grounded upon true reafon or no? I have faid that it is grounded upon this, That we cannot conceive how fimple ideas of fenfible qualities ⚫fhould fubfift alone; and therefore we fuppofe them to exist in, and to ⚫ be fupported by fome common fubject; which fupport we denote by the ⚫ name fubftance.' Which, I think, is a true reafon, because it is the fame your lordship grounds the fuppofition of a fubftratum on, in this very page; even on the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and accidents fhould fubfift by themselves. So that I have the good luck to agree here with your lordship: and confequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the substratum to modes or accidents, which is our idea of fubftance in general, is founded in this, that we cannot ⚫ conceive how modes or accidents can fubfift by themselves."

* B. 2. C, 23. §. 4.

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them,

them, we call that fupport fubftantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, ftanding under or upholding (1).

Of the forts of fubftance.

§. 3. An obfcure and relative idea of fubftance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular forts of fubftances, by collecting fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are by experience and obfervation of men's fenfes taken notice of to exift together, and are therefore fuppofed to flow from the particular internal constitution,

or

(1) From this paragraph, there hath been raifed an objection by the bishop of Worcester, as if our author's doctrine here concerning ideas, had almost discarded fubftance out of the world: his words in this paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the gentlemen of this new way of reafoning, that have almost discarded fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. To which our author replies: This, my lord, is an accufation, which your lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not underftand what it is almoft to difcard fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. If your lordship means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any fuch thing as fubftance, that your lordship will acquit me of, when your lordship looks again into this 23d chapter of the fecond book, which you have cited more than once; where you will find thefe words, §. 4. When we talk or think of any particular fort af corporeal fubftances, as horse, ftone, &c. though the idea we have of ⚫ either of them, be but the complication or collection of thofe feveral • fimple ideas of fenfible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horfe or ftone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they • fhould fubfift alone, nor one in another, we fuppofe them exifting in, and fupported by fome common fubject, which fupport we denote by the name fubftance; though it is certain, we have no clear or distinct • idea of that thing we fuppofe a fupport.' And again, §. 5. • The fame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, • reafoning, fearing, &c. which we confidering not to fubfift of them• felves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think thefe the actions of fome other fubftance, which we call fpirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other ⚫ idea or notion of matter, but fomething wherein thofe many fenfible qualities, which affect our fenfes, do fubfift, by fuppofing a fubftance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. ⚫do fubfift, we have as clear a notion of the nature or substance of fpirit, as we have of body; the one being fuppofed to be (without knowing what it is) the fubftratum to thofe fimple ideas we have from

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* In his first letter to that bishop.

or unknown effence of that fubftance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horfe, gold, water, &c. of which fubftances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain fimple ideas co-exiftent together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities obfervable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of thofe fubftances, which a fmith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philofopher; who, whatever

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5.without: and the other fuppofed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the fubftratum to thofe operations, which we experiment in our felves within. And again, §. 6. Whatever therefore be the fecret ⚫ nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular dif tinct fubftances, are nothing but feveral combinations of fimple ideas, co-exifting in fuch, though unknown caufe of their union, as makes the whole fubfift of itfelf. And I farther fay in the fame section, that ⚫ we fuppose these combinations to reft in, and to be adherent to that ⚫ unknown common fubject, which inheres not in any thing elfe. And 9.3. That our complex ideas of fubftances, befides all thofe fimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confufed idea of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift; and therefore, when * we speak of any fort of fubftance, we fay it is a thing having fuch and fuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; fpirit, a thing capable of thinking.

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Thefe, and the like fafhions of fpeaking, intimate, that the fub⚫ftance is fuppofed always fomething befides the extenfion, figure, foliAdity, motion, thinking, or other obfervable idea, though we know not what it is.'

Our idea of body, I fay, is an extended, folid fubftance; and our idea of foul, is of a fubftance that thinks.' So that as long as there is any fuch thing as body or fpirit in the world, I have done nothing towards the difcarding fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any fimple idea or fenfible quality left, according to my way of arguing, fubftance cannot be difcarded; because all fimple ideas, all fenfible qualities, carry with them a fuppofition of a substratum to exift in, and of a fubftance wherein they inhere: and of this that whole chapter is fo full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have almoft, or one jot, difcarded fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world. And of this, man, horfe, fun, water, iron, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned of distinct forts of fubstances, will be my witneffes, as long as any fuch things remain in being; of which I fay, ✦ That the ideas of fubftances are fuch combinations of fimple ideas as are taken to represent diftin&t particular things fubfifting by themselves,

• B, 2. C. 23. §, a2,

+ B. 2. C. 12. §. 6,

fubftantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of thofe fubftances, than what is framed by a col lection of those fimple ideas which are to be found in them; only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, befides all thofe fimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift. And therefore when we fpeak of any fort of fubftance, we fay it is a thing having fuch or fuch qualities; as body

in which the fuppofed or confused idea of substance is always the firft and • chief."

If, by almoft difcarding fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world, your lordship means, that I have deftroyed, and almost discarded the true idea we have of it, by calling it a substratum, a fuppofition of we know not what fupport of fuch qualities as are capable of producing fimple ideas in us, an obfcure and relative idea: + That without knowing what it is, it is that which fupports accidents; fo that of substance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused, obfcure one of what it does: I must confefs, this and the like I have faid of our idea of fub ftance: and fhould be very glad to be convinced by your lordship, or any body elfe, that I have fpoken too meanly of it. He that would fhow me a more clear and diftinct idea of substance, would do me a kindness I should thank him for. But this is the best I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians: for their account or idea of it is, that it is ens, or res per fe fubfiftens, & fubftans accidentibus; which in effect is no more, but that fubftance is a being or thing; or, in fhert, fomething, they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is fomething which fupports accidents, or other fimple ideas or modes, and is not fupported itfelf, as a mode, or an accident. So that I do not fee but Burgerfdicius, Sanderfon, and the whole tribe of logicians, muft be reckoned with the gentle. men of this new way of reafoning, who have almost discarded fubftance out of the reasonable part of the world.

But fuppofing, my lord, that I, or these gentlemen, logicians of note in the school, fhould own that we have a very imperfect, obfcure, inadequate idea of fubftance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with difcarding fubftance out of the world? For what almost discarding, and reafonable part of the world, fignifies, I must confess I do not clearly comprehend: but let almoft and reasonable part fignify here what they will, for I dare fay your lordship meant fomething by them; would not your lordship think you were a little hardly dealt with, if, for acknowledging yourself to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of feveral other things which in this very treatife you confefs our under + B. 2. C. 13. §. 19.

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 1. §. 2. §. 3.

ftandings

body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; fpirit, a thing capable of thinking; and fo hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we fay, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. Thefe, and the like fashions of fpeaking, intimate, that the subftance is fuppofed always fomething befides the extenfion, figure, folidity, motion, thinking, or other obfervable ideas, though we know not what it is. §. 4. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular fort of corporeal fubftances, as horfe, ftone, &c. though the idea we

No clear idea. of fubftance in general.

have

ftandings come fhort in, and cannot comprehend, you should be accufed to be one of thefe gentlemen that have almost discarded God, or those other mysterious things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate ideas, out of the reasonable world? For I fuppofe your lordship means by almoft difcarding out of the reasonable world, fomething that is blameable, for it seems not to be inferted for a commendation; and yet I think he deferves no blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obfcure ideas, where he has no better; however, if it be inferred from thence, that either he almoft excludes thofe things out of being, or out of rational difcourfe, if that be meant by the rafonable world; for the first of thefe will not hold, because the being of things in the world depends not on our ideas: the latter indeed is true in fome degree, but it is no fault: for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confufed, obfcure ideas, we cannot difcourfe and reafon about thofe things fo well, fully, and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear, and distinct ideas.

Other objections are made against the following parts of this paragraph by that reverend prelate, viz. The repetition of the ftory of the Indian philofopher, and the talking like children about fubftance: to which our author replies:

Your lordship, I muft own, with great reafon, takes notice, that I paralleled more than once our idea of fubftance with the Indian philofo pher's he-knew-not-what, which fupported the tortoife, &c.

This repetition is, I confefs, a fault in exact writing; but I have acknowledged and excufed it in these words in my preface: I am not ignorant how little I herein confult my own reputation, when I knowingly let my effay go with a fault fo apt to difguft the most judicious, who are always the niceft readers.' And there farther add, That I did not publish my effay for fuch great masters of knowledge as your lordship; but fitted it to men of my own fize, to whom repetitions might be fometimes ufeful.' It would not therefore have been befide your lordship's generofity (who were not intended to be provoked by this repetition) to have paffed by fuch a fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower rank of writers. But I fee your lordship would have VOL. I.

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