But let men, according to their diverfe hypothefes, refolve of that as they pleafe, this very intelligent being, fenfible of happiness or misery, muft grant, that there is something that is himself that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this felf has existed in a continued duration more than one instant, and therefore it is poffible may exift, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be fet to its duration; and may be the fame felf, by the fame consciousness continued on for the future. And thus, by this confciousness, he finds himself to be the fame felf which did fuch or fuch an action fome years fince, by which he comes to be happy or miferable now. In all which account of felf, the fame numerical fubftance is not confidered as making the fame felf; but the fame continued confcioufnefs, in which feveral substances may have been united, and again separated from it; which, whilft they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then refided, made a part of that fame felf. Thus any part of our bodies vitally united to that which is confcious in us, makes a part of ourselves: but upon feparation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment fince was part of ourfelves, is now no more fo, than a part of another man's felf is a part of me: and it is not impoffible, but in a little time may become a real part of another person. And fo we have the fame numerical fubftance become a part of two different perfons; and the fame perfon preferved under the change of various fubftances. Could we fuppofe any spirit wholly ftripped of all its memory or consciousness of paft actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and fometimes of them all; the union or feparation of fuch a fpiritual fubftance would make no variation of perfonal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any fubftance vitally united to the prefent thinking being, is a part of that very fame felf which now is: any thing united to it by a consciousness of former actions, makes also a part of the fame felf, which is the fame both then and now.

Perfon a fo

renfick term.

§. 26. Perfon, as I take it, is the name for this felf. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there I think another may fay is the fame perfon. It is a forenfick term appropriating actions and their merit; and fo belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and mifery. This perfonality extends itfelf beyond prefent existence to what is past, only by consciousnefs, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself paft actions, juft upon the fame ground, and for the fame reafon that it does the prefent. All which is founded in a concern for happinefs, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is confcious of pleafure and pain, defiring that that self that is confcious fhould be happy. And therefore whatever paft actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that prefent felf by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: and to receive pleasure or pain, i. e. reward or punishment, on the account of any fuch action, is all one as to be made happy or miferable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For fuppofing a man punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no confcioufnefs at all, what difference is there between that punishment, and being created miferable? And therefore conformable to this the apoftle tells us, that at the great day, when every one fhall "receive according to his

doings, the fecrets of all hearts fhall be laid open." The fentence fhall be juftified by the confcioufnefs all perfons shall have, that they themfelves, in what bodies foever they appear, or what fubftances foever that confcioufnefs adheres to, are the fame that committed thofe actions, and deserve that punishment for them.

§. 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this fubject, made fome fuppofitions that will look ftrange to fome readers, and poffibly they are so in themselves. But yet, I think, they are fuch as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as ourfelves. Did we know what it was, or

how

how it was tied to a certain fyftem of fleeting animal fpirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is: and whether it has pleafed God, that no one fuch spirit fhall ever be united to any one but fuch body, upon the right conftitution of whofe organs its memory fhould depend: we might fee the abfurdity of fome of thofe fuppofitions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these matters) the foul of a man, for an immaterial fubftance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the nature of things be no abfurdity at all to suppose, that the fame foul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man: as well as we fuppofe a part of a fheep's body yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow, and in that union make a vital part of Melibus himself, as well as it did of his ram.

The difficulty from ill

ufe of names.

during the

§. 28. To conclude: Whatever fubftance begins to exift, it must, during its exiftence, neceffarily be the fame: whatever compofitions of substances begin to exift, union of thofe fubftances the concrete muft be the fame: whatsoever mode begins to exift, during its existence it is the fame: and fo if the composition be of diftinct fubftances and different modes, the fame rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obfcurity that has been about this matter, rather rifes from the names ill used, than from any obfcurity in things themselves. For whatever makes the fpecifick idea to which the name is applied, if that idea be steadily kept to, the diftinction of any thing into the fame and divers will eafily be conceived, and there can arife no doubt about it.

Continued

existence makes iden

tity.

§. 29. For fuppofing a rational fpirit be the idea of a man, it is eafy to know what is the fame man; viz. the fame spirit, whether feparate or in a body, will be the fame man. Suppofing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man, whilft

that

that rational fpirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting fucceffive body, remains, it will be the fame. But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain fhape; as long as that vital union and fhape remain, in a concrete no otherwife the fame, but by a continued fucceffion of fleeting particles, it will be the fame. For whatever be the compofition, whereof the complex idea is made, whenever exiftence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the fame exiftence, continued, preferves it the fame individual under the fame denomination. (1)

CHAP.

(1) The doctrine of identity and diverfity contained in this chapter, the bishop of Worcester pretends to be inconfiftent with the doctrines of the Christian faith, concerning the refurrection of the dead. His way of arguing from it, is this; He fays, The reafon of believing the refurrection of the fame body, upon Mr. Locke's grounds, is from the idea of identity. To which our author answers: Give me leave, my lord, to fay, that the reafon of believing any article of the Chriftian faith (fuch as your lordship is here fpeaking of) to me, and upon my grounds, is its being a part of divine revelation: upon this ground I believed it, before I either writ that chapter of identity and diverfity, and before I ever thought of thofe propofitions which your lordship quotes out of that chapter; and upon the fame ground I believe it ftill; and not from my idea of identity. This faying of your lordship's, therefore, being a propofition neither felf-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your foundation failing, all your large fuperftructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

But, my lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to reprefent to your lordship, that I thought you undertook to make out that my notion of ideas was inconfiftent with the articles of the Chriftian faith. But that which your lordship inftances in here, is not, that I yet know, an article of the Chriftian faith. The refurrection of the dead I acknowledge to be an article of the Chriftian faith: but that the refurrection of the fame body, in your lordship's fenfe of the fame body, is an article of the Chriftian faith, is what, I confefs, I do not yet know.

In the New Teftament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the Chriftian faith) I find our Saviour and the apoftles to preach the refurrection of the dead, and the refurrection from the dead," in many places: but I do not remember any place where the refurrection of the fame body is fo much as mentioned, Nay, which is very remarkable in the cafe, I do not remember in any place of the New Teftament (where

In his 3d letter to the bishop of Worcester,

the general refurrection at the last day is fpoken of) any fuch expreffion as the refurrection of the body, much lefs of the fame body.

I fay the general refurrection at the laft day: becaufe, where the refurrection of fome particular perfons, presently upon our Saviour's refurrection, is mentioned, the words are, The graves were opened, and many bodies of faints, which flept, arofe, and came out of the graves after his refurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appeared to many: of which peculiar way of speaking of this refurrection, the paffage itself gives a reafon in thefe words, appeared to many, i. e. thofe who ept appeared, fo as to be known to be rifen. But this could not be known, unless they brought with them the evidence, that they were those who had been dead; whereof there were these two proofs, their graves were opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the fame to those who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been those who had been dead fo long, that all who knew them once alive, were now gone, thofe to whom they appeared might have known them to be men; but could not have known they were rifen from the dead, because they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was, that they were so many living ftrangers, of whofe refurrection they knew nothing. It was neceffary therefore, that they should come in fuch bodies, as might in nake and fize, &c. appear to be the fame they had before, that they might be known to thofe of their acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable they were fuch as were newly dead, whose bodies were not yet diffolved and diffipated; and therefore, it is particularly faid here (differently from what is faid of the general refurrection) that their bodies arofe; because they were the fame that were then lying in their graves, the moment before they rofe.

But your lordship endeavours to prove it must be the fame body: and let us grant that your lordship, nay, and others too, think you have proved it must be the fame body; Will you therefore fay, that he holds what is inconfiftent with an article of faith, who having never seen this your lordship's interpretation of the fcripture, nor your reafons for the fame body, in your fenfe of fame body; or, if he has feen them, yet not understanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the fcripture proposes to him, viz. That at the laft day the dead fhall be raifed, without determining whether it shall be with the very fame bodies or no?

I know your lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpreta tions of fcripture into articles of faith. And if you do not, he that bo lieves the dead fhall be raised, believes that article of faith which the fcripture proposes; and cannot be accused of holding any thing inconfiftent with it, if it fhould happen, that what he holds, is inconfiftent with another popofition, viz. That the dead fhall be raised with the fame bodies, in your lordship's fenfe, which I do not find propofed in Holy Writ as an article of faith.

But your lordship argues, It must be the fame body; which, as you explain fame body t, is not the fame individual particles of matter, which were united at the point of death; nor the fame particles of maiter, that the finner had at the time of the commiffion of his fins: + zd Anf

• Matt. xxvii. 52, 53..

but