ftill, and not fet our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; or, on the other fide, queftion every thing, and difclaim all knowledge, becaufe fome things are not to be understood. It is of great ufe to the failor, to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bot-: tom, at fuch places as are neceffary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon fhoals that may ruin him. Our bufinefs here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that fome other things escape our knowledge. Occafion of this effay. 6.7. This was that which gave the firft rife to this effay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards fatisfying feveral enquiries, the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a furvey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and fee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I fufpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought for fatisfaction in a quiet and fure poffeffion of truths that moft concerned us, whilft we let loose our thoughts into the vaft ocean of being; as if all that boundlefs extent were the natural and undoubted poffeffion of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decifions, or that efcaped its comprehenfion. Thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into thofe depths, where they can find no fure footing; it is Do wonder, that they raife queftions, and multiply dif putes, which, never coming to any clear refolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at laft in perfect fcepticifm. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well confidered, the extent of our knowledge once difcovered, and the horizon found, which fets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between B 3 what what is, and what is not comprehenfible by us; men would perhaps with lefs fcruple acquiefce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and difcourfe with more advantage and fatisfaction in the other. What idea ftands for. §. 8. Thus much I thought neceffary to fay concerning the occafion of this enquiry into human understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this fubject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent ufe of the word "idea, which he will find in the following treatife. It being that term, which, I think, ferves beft to ftand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantafm, notion, fpecies, or whatever it is which the mind can be emploved about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently ufing it (1). ་ I prefume (1) This modeft apology of our author could not procure him the free ufe of the word idea; but great offence has been taken at it, and it has been cenfured as of dangerous confequence: to which you may here fee what he aufwers. The world, faith the bishop of Worcester, hath ⚫ been ftrangely amufed with ideas of late; and we have been told, that ftrange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet these ideas, at laft, come to be only common notions of things, which we must make ufe of in our reafoning, You, (i. e. the author of the Effay concerning Human Underftanding) fay in that chapter, about the existence of God, you thought it most proper to exprefs yourfelf, in the most ufual and familiar way, by common words and expreffions. I would you had done fo quite through your book; for then you had never given that occafion to the enemies of our faith, to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) against the myfteries of the Chriftian faith. But you might have enjoyed the fatisfaction of your ideas long enough before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing mischief." To which our author (+) replies, It is plain, that that which your, lordship apprehends, in my book, may be of dangerous confequence to the article which your lordship has endeavoured to defend, is my introducing new terms; and that which your lordship inftances in, is that of ideas. And the reafon your lordship gives in every of thefe places, why your lordship has fuch an apprehenfion of ideas, that they may be of dangerous confequence to that article of faith, which your lordthip has Anfwer to Mr. Locke's First Letter. endeavoured I prefume it will be easily granted me, that there are fuch ideas in men's minds; every one is confcious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will fatisfy him that they are in others. Our first enquiry then shall be, how they come into. the mind, СНАР. endeavoured to defend, is becaufe they have been applied to fuch purpoles. And I might (your lordship fays) have enjoyed the fatisfaction of my ideas long enough before you had taken notice of them, unlefs your lordship had found them employed in doing mifchief. Which, at laft, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, viz. That your lordship fears ideas, i. e. the term ideas, may, fome time of other, prove of very dangerous confequence to what your lordship has endeavoured to defend, because they have been made ufe of in arguing against it. For I am fure your lordfhip does not mean, that you apprehend the things, fignified by ideas, may be of dangerous confequence to the article of faith your lordship endeavours to defend, because they have been made ufe of against it: For (befides that your lordship mentions terms) that would be to expect that those who oppofe that article, fhould oppofe it without any thoughts; for the things fignified by ideas, are nothing but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking: fo that unless any one can oppofe the article your lordship defends, without thinking on fomething, he muft ufe the things fignified by ideas; for he that thinks, muft have fome immediate object of his mind in thinking, i.e. must have ideas. But whether it be the name, or the thing; ideas in found, or ideas in fignification; that your lordship apprehends may be of dangerous confequence to that article of faith, which your lordship endeavours to defend; it feems to me, I will not fay a new way of reasoning (for that belongs to me), but were it not your lordship's, I fhould think it a very extraordinary way of reafening, to write against a book, wherein your lordship acknowledges they are not ufed to bad purposes, nor employed to do mifchief; only because you find that ideas are, by thofe who oppofe your lordship, employed to do mischief; and fo apprehend, they may be of dangerous confequence to the article your lordfhip has engaged in the defence of. For whether ideas as terms, or ideas as the immediate objects of the mind fignified by those terms, may be, in your lordship's apprehenfion, of dangerous confequence to that article; I do not see how your lordship's writing against the notion of ideas, as stated in my book, will at all hinder your oppoters, from employing them in doing mischief, as before, However, be that as it will, fo it is, that your lordship apprehends these new terms, these ideas, with which the aworld bath, of late, been fo ftrange-, by amused, (though at laft they come to be anly common notions of things, as your lordship owns) may be of dangerous confequence to that article. My lord, if any, in anfwer to your lordship's fermous, and in other pamphlets, wherein your lordship complains they have talked fo much of ideas, have been troublefome to your lordship with that term; it is not Arange that your lordship should be tired with that found: but how B natural natural foever it be to our weak conftitutions, to be offended with any found, wherewith an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, my lord, I know your lordship has a better opinion of the articles of our faith, than to think any of them can be overturned, or fo much as shaken, with a breath formed into any found, or term whatsoever. Names are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions; and fo they be fufficiently appropriated to them in their ufe, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of eafy or difficult pronunciation, and of a more or lefs pleasant found; and what particular antipathies there may be in men to fome of them, upon that account, is not eafy to be forefeen. This I am fure, no term whatsoever in itself bears, one more than another, any oppofition to truth of any kind; they are only propofitions that do or can oppofe the truth of any article or doctrine and thus no term is privileged for being fet in oppofition to truth. There is no word to be found, which may not be brought into a propofition, wherein the most facred and most evident truths may be oppofed but that is not a fault in the term, but him that ufes it. And therefore I cannot eafily perfuade my felf (whatever your lordship hatli fid in the heat of your concern) that you have bestowed fa much pains upon my book, because the word idea is fo much used there. For though upon my faving, in my chapter about the existence of God, That I fcarce ufed the word idea in that whole chapter,' your lordship withes, that I had done fo quite through my book: yet I must rather look upon that as a compliment to me, wherein your lordship wifhed, that my book had been all through fuited to vulgar readers, not used to that and the like terms, than that your lordship has fuch an apprehenfion of the word idea; or that there is any fuch harm in the use of it, instead of the word notion (with which your lordfhip feems to take it to agree in fignification), that your lordship would think it worth your while to fpend any part of your valuable time and thoughts about my book, for having the word idea fo often in it; for this would be to make your lordship to write only against an impropriety of fpeech. I own to your lordship, it is a great condefcenfion in your lordship to have done it, if that word have fuch a fhare in what your lordship has writ against my book, as fome expreffions would perfuade one; and I would, for the fatisfaction of your lordship, change the term of idea for a better, if your lordship, or any one, could help me to it; for, that notion will not fo well ftand for every immediate object of the mind in thinking, as idea does, I have (as I guess} somewhere given a reafon in my book, by fhewing that the term notion is more pecuTiarly appropriated to a certain fort of thofe objects, which I call mixed nodes and I think, it would not found altogether fo well, to say, the notion of red, and the notion of a horfe; as the idea of red, and the idea of a horje. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no fondnels for, nor an antipathy to, any particular articulate founds: nor do I think there is any fpell or fafcination in any of them. But be the word idea proper or improper, I do not fee how it is the better or the worse, because ill men have made ufe of it, or because it has been made ufe of to bad purposes; for if that be a reason to condemn, or lay it by, we must lay by the terms, fcripture, reafon, perception, diftinct, clear, &c. Nay, the name of God himfelf will not efcape; for I do not think any one of thefe, or any other term, can be produced, which hath not been made ufe of by fuch men, and to fuch purposes. 9 And And therefore, if the unitarians in their late pamphlets have talked very much of, and frangely amufed the world with ideas; I cannot believe your lordfhip will think that word one jot the worse, or the more dangerous, because they use it; any more than, for their use of them, you will think reafon or fcripture terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your lordfhip fays, that I might have enjoyed the jatisfaction of my ideas long enough before your lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them em ployed in doing mischief; will, I prefume, when your lordship has confidered again of this matter, prevail with your lordship, to let me enjoy till the fatisfaction I take in my ideas, i, e. as much fatisfaction as I can take in fo fmall a matter, as is the ufing of a proper term, notwithstanding it should be employed by others in doing mischief. For, my lord, if I fhould leave it wholly out of my book, and fub ftitute the word notion every where in the room of it; and every body elfe do fo too (though your lordship does not, I fuppofe, fufpect, that I have the vanity to think they would follow my example) my book would, it feems, be the more to your lordship's liking; but I do not fee how this would one jot abate the mifchief your lordship complains of. For the unitarians might as much employ notions, as they do now ideas, to do wifchief; unless they are fuch fools to think they can conjure with this notable word idea; and that the force of what they fay, lies in the found, and not in the fignification of their terms. This I am fure of, that the truths of the Chriftian religion can be no more battered by one word than another; nor can they be beaten down or endangered by any found whatfoever. And I am apt to flatter myself, that your lordship is fatisfied that there is no harm in the word ideas, becaufe you fay, you should not have taken any notice of my ideas, if the enemies of our faith had not taken up my new way of ideas, as an effectual battery against the mysteries of the Chriftian faith. In which place, by new way of ideas, nothing, I think, can be conftrued to be meant, but my expreffing myself by that of ideas; and not by other more common words, and of ancienter ftanding in the English language. As to the objection, of the author's way by ideas being a new way, he thus anfwers; my new way by ideas, or my way by ideas, which often occurs in your lordship's letter, is, I confefs, a very large and doubtful expreffion; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole effay; becaufe, treating in it of the understanding, which is nothing but the faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty of the mind, which confifts in thinking, without confidering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call ideas and therefore in treating of the underftanding, I guess it will not be thought ftrange, that the greateft part of my book has been taken up, in confidering what thefe objects of the mind, in thinking, are; whence they come; what use the mind makes of them, in its feveral ways of thinking; and what are the outward marks whereby it fignifies them to others, or records them for its own ufe. And this, in fhort, is my way by ideas, that which your lordship calls my new way by ideas: which, my lord, if it be new, it is but a new hiftory of an old thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that men always performed the actions of thinking, reafening, believing, and knowing, juft after the fame manner they do now; though whether the fame account has heretofore been given of the way how they performed these actions, or wherein they confifted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your lordship, I fhould have been fafe from that gentle reprimand of your lordship's, for thinking my way of |