The only point in this case which can affect a bona fide purchaser, if defendant can be called one, is, that Reaborne the trustee, and Mrs. Opry were both present at the sheriff's sale, and did not forbid it; and her saying the deed of trust was a sham deed, and her receiving money from Teasdale, in part satisfaction of her claim. These circumstances, they thought, created some suspicions on the subject, and were sufficient to justify the court in sending the case back to a jury, to have these matters more fully investigated. BAY and TREZEVANT, contra, thought there were no legal grounds to impeach this verdict. Rule for new trial made absolute. N. B. This case was tried a second time, when the jury found again in favour of the plaintiff. Teasdale ads. Reaborne. RICHARD BOLAN against. WILLIAMSON and CHAPMAN. Columbia, 1804. is liable for SPECIAL action on the case, tried in Richland district. A postmaster Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial. money contained in a let ter lodged in which is lost the postoffice, or purloined after he re ceives the let This was a special action on the case against defendants, for 450 dollars, lost out of a letter lodged in the post-office in the town of Columbia, addressed to a mercantile house in Charleston. Mr. Williamson was postmaster in Columbia, and Chapman was his deputy. The plaintiff proved on the trial, the lodging of the letter in the post-office on the morning of the post day, by a witness who counted shall be liable ter. But if such letter is de livered to his deputy, he for his own neglects, and not the principal. The payment of a premium is not necessary to make either of them liable; the general undertaking to deliver safely is a sufficient cause of action. V. Bolan the bank bills, and saw the letter folded up and sealed. It Williamson & was further proved, that the letter covering these bills with Chapman. the post marks on it, duly arrived by the mail in Charleston, but the bank bills had been taken out. 1 Salk, 17. Upon this testimony the jury gave a general verdict for the amount of the money lost, against the postmaster and his deputy, jointly. It however came out from the witnesses who were present when the letter was lodged in the post-office, that Williamson, the principal, was absent, and that Chapman received the letter. In support of this motion, it was argued, on the part of the defendants, that the postmaster was not liable as the principal in the office, because a post-office is not an office of insurance, but an office of intelligence; they do not know the contents of letters and packages put into the postoffice, nor are they paid like common carriers, a premium equal to the risk. The duty of a postmaster is to convey intelligence and news from one part of the country to another, with all convenient despatch, and that too through a great variety of hands and offices, all of whom are equally concerned in like manner in forwarding this intelligence, public and private, over which he has no control. It was admitted, that if any person having the immediate care of such an office, is guilty of omission or neglect in the office, or if due care is not taken of a letter or packet, such person is liable, on the ground that every man who undertakes a public trust, ought to execute it faithfully; and if it ap pears that he does not exercise due care and diligence, then he is liable. But it did not appear in the present case, whether this accident happened while this letter lay in the post-office at Columbia or on the road, or in any other postoffice or place after the mail was closed at Cokimbia. The letter itself went safe and in due time, according to the regulations of the post-office, though it unfortunately happened the money or contents had been purloined somewhere, but where was the question. If while the letter lay in the office at Columbia, then it was admitted Chapman was liable; but as there was no proof of that fact, it was said he was not liable. Against this motion it was strongly urged, that the office of postmaster was an office of high trust and confidence, as a great portion of the commerce of the world was carried on through the medium of post-offices; and if they were to be exempted from responsibility, innumerable frauds might be committed. They have the appointment of all their own deputies and inferior officers, and should appoint none but such as were trust-worthy; and if they turn out otherwise, they are answerable for it. Every principal was liable for the misconduct of his deputy, in every public department. In answer to the argument," that a post-office is only an office of intelligence, and not of insurance, and that no premium was paid," it was said, that the payment of a premium is not necessary to create a responsibility, for that every man who undertakes to carry goods or money, was liable to an action, be he common carrier or not; and whether a premium is paid or not. the law makes him liable is, that reposed in him, to which he has And the reason why a particular trust was concurred by his as Bolan V. Williamson & 909. 3 Will sumption, or taking upon him to execute it; and if any injury arises by his neglect, he is liable in damages. And for this purpose, the case of Coggs and Barnard was re- 2 Ld. Raym lied on as strong in point; where it was held by all the 447. Judges, who delivered their opinions separatim, that if a man acts by commission gratis, and in the execution of it behaves himself negligently, he is answerable; as he puts a fraud upon the plaintiff by being negligent, and that it was a breach of trust undertaken voluntarily, which is a good ground of action. The Judges, after considering this case, felt and acknowledged it was an important one to the community. V. Bolan That a post-office was an office of great trust and confidence, Williamson & in which the commercial interests of the union were deeply Chapman. concerned; and unless great punctuality was observed, the inconveniences and injuries to the public would be beyond all calculation. But important as the case was, this and every other of the like kind must be governed by its own circumstances. Wherever a postmaster is guilty himself of any negligence or misbehaviour, he ought to be made liable in damages; but it would be hard and unreasonable to make him responsible further than for his own misconduct, especially where such a number of persons are necessarily concerned in the post-office department. In the present case, it appears from the evidence offered, that Williamson was from home when the letter in question was lodged in the post-office; that he knew nothing about it. It would not, therefore, be very consistent with justice to make him liable for a thing he knew nothing about, or had no knowledge of. The letter enclosing the money was delivered to Chapman, the deputy in the office, who took charge of it; and it has not appeared that the money was taken out of the letter after it left the postoffice at Columbia, or that the mail was robbed, or that any accident happened on the road to Charleston. The presumption is, therefore, that the money must have been taken out of the letter by some one who had access to the office before the mail was closed, as the money was not in the letter when delivered out of the post-office in Charleston; and although there is no imputation against Chapman's honesty, yet by his negligence it might have been lost or taken out by some dishonest person who got admission by some means into the post-office. Deputypostmasters are subsisting substantial officers, and are liable for all their nonfeasances, and misfeasances, and an action may be maintained against them for all omissions and neglects in office. And the case cited from Salk. 17. is strong in point; where it is expressly laid down, that a deputy is Bolan V. liable; so also in 3 Will. 447. And it is not necessary that a premium should be paid to make him liable; for whether Williamson & Chapman. it be paid or not, the law will charge him, upon his general undertaking to carry it safely, as was determined in 2 Ld. Raym. 909. after solemn argument, by all the Judges; likewise, 3 Will. 446. They were, therefore, all of opinion, there was no evidence in this case to charge Williamson, the principal in office, but there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff from going on against Chapman, the deputy, if he thought proper. Rule for new trial made absolute. All the Judges present. DUNCAN M'FARLANE against WILLIAM HENRY HARRINGTON. Columbia, 1804. SPECIAL action on the case, commenced in Chester- Where papers purporting to field district, for causing plaintiff to be imprisoned and be records and tried for murder, without probable cause of prosecution, in in a cause in North Carolina. North Carolina, are trans mittedwithout the seal of the court in which they are pending, or a cer tificate that court they cannot To this declaration there was a plea in bar, setting forth that there was a suit depending in North Carolina, by the plaintiff against defendant, for the same cause of action, which was still undetermined; and in support of this plea, such sundry papers and certificates, purporting to be the record hath no seal, of the proceedings of one of the supreme courts of record be received or in that state in the said cause, were produced and offered to the court. To these papers and proceedings, Mr. Falconer, as counsel for the plaintiff, took several exceptions, of a judge on a and contended that they should not be read, as, among of paper, and read in any of the courts of South Caroli na. A certificate separate piece not On the proceedings themselves, is irregular. |