fion will follow that we are the happiest people under the Sun, for when our breaches are repair'd, then may that of Deuteronomy the 4th. be truely faid of us. What Nation is there fo great that hath Statutes and Judgments fo righteous; -Government has as it were extracted the golf all other conftitutions, having avoided the two Extreams of Tyranny and an unbounded Liberty, no Government under the fun being fo exact a piece of Symetry having fo equally poized the prerogative and property that they are mutually affiftant of each other, whereby the administration is renderd fo very eafie, he who fits at the helm having nothing more to do to make himself the happyest Prince in the World, than to maintain a good understanding betwixt himself and his People; and when that is wanting England is like a Ship that has loft her Rudder. This Correfpondence is feldom broak, but by things that do apparently portend, an utter eradication of our Antient LandMarks: As when through inadvertency or defignedly any of our Neighbours are fuffer'd to grow bigger than is confiftent with the ballance of Christendom; though the effects of it are not foon felt, nor early forefeen but by difcerning People: Yet the Nation has always declined to give any affiftance in it, because they had no profpect of any advantage that would fall to their fhare; and in a little time it has given great caufe of difcontent, because they law it did manifeftly tend to break the ballance of the Government, and could be of no other ufe, than to serve the defigns of a Prince who is defirous of Arbitrary Rule. But the diffatisfactions betwixt the King and the People, do not fo ufually proceed from this as

D. 3

from

from fome other occafions, and more obvious at first fight. As when Parliaments are not fuffer d to meet and fit according to the ufual times that the Law or neceffity of Affairs do require: For the Government cannot long continue well when Parliaments are neglected, which is the only Phyfick to purge out thofe Peccant Humours, that are contracted by time or accident; and is as neceffary to the well-being of it, as the Means ufually made ufe of to preferve the good Estate of a Natural Body: And the difufe of Parliaments can no more be juftified; than to have recourse to -Force and Violence, when right may more eafily and certainly be had by the ufual methods of Law Parliaments are the Medium, whereby the King is reprefented to the People in a true Light, and if it is wanting, it is no wonder, if he appear to them in a pofture of Offence, rather than of Defence: For when Parliaments are difcontinued that mutual Complacency is loft, which otherwife the conftitution of the Government does naturally produce betwixt King and People. Changes feldom happen for the better, and therefore the People will not be much delighted with the discontinuance of Parliaments, because a more mild and equal way of governing has not yet been found out than what is prescribed by Magna Charta; and though in this Change of Government the advantage fhould fall on the Peoples fide, yet they may fufpect that there is Death in the Pot, till it has proved it felf by its effects, because by how much the advantage is on their part, by fo much muft the Kings Inches be pared; and a defire to advance rather than reftrain their Power, is an Infirmity to which Kings as well as other

Men

Men are fubject: And thofe Arbitrary Symptoms which ever do precede the laying afide of Parlia ments are no lefs than fo many demonstrations, that it must end in a Defpotick Power. For there åre feveral things which are only Cognizable in Parliament, and then this Dilemma will follow either that there must be a failer in Justice, or if any other Court or Authority do hold Jurifdiction of them, the whole proceeding would be Arbitrary, As for Example, The giving of Money, the Repeal of Old Laws, or Enacting of new Statutes, and the laft refort of Juftice in Cafe of Appeals or Impeachments; for fhould those or any of them be treated of but in Parliament the Government would thereby become intirely Defpotick.

When a King attempts to find out a new way of governing, its an undeniable Argument that he is weary of the Old one; and that King of England who is uneafie with the Ancient way of governing will never be pleased with any, but what gives up all into his hands. When any King of England has try'd the Experiment he has found in the Iffue, that he had better to have let it alone: For whenever he has Wrestled with the People, has in the Conclufion got the fall, and often been crufhed by it.

Then next to this like a younger Brother of the fame ill Family, and bears the fecond ill Character to the laying afide of Parliaments, is when the Privy Council is turned into a Cabinet, the former being only kept up for a fhew, and to give a Reputation to the Advices and Proceedings of the latter. A Cabinet Council may at firft feem but a fmall Evil, yet it conceives and brings forth many Ugly Con

D 4

fequences:

fequences: For it is ever the fore-runner of the neglect of Parliaments, which thing alone is fuificient to give the People an utter diflike of it. And befides the King does hereby forbid all others but thofe of the Cabinet either to come near him, or give him any Advice: For what incouragement has any other of the Privy Council to offer their Sence, confidering that if it does not jump with that of the Cabinet, their Advice fhall not only be rejected, but every thing that fell from them will be improved as much as it can bear to their difadvantage; and therefore in a fhort time they will as much undervalue the Attendance at the Council-Eoard, as the King does their Advice, unlefs they are more fond of the bare Name of a Privy Councillor, than they are of their Reputation; for what greater flight can be put upon Men of Senfe and Honour, than to be used only as a Foil to fet off the Tranfactions of other Ferfons not fo deferving and worthy as themselves.

A Cabinet Council keeps the King in the dark, he can hear but one fide, and that the wrong one too, for honest Men feldom come there, for if any fuch thing be propofed unto them, unless they are lets Wife than Honeft, Their Answer will be, That in the multitude of Councillors is the King's fafety: When a King has entered a Cabinet Council, he'll hardly come out the fame Man,his very Nature and Difpofition will be changed by the conftant Converie and Infinuations of thofe that he calls into that place, and fo of a hopeful Succeffor may become a very indifferent King. So great is the force of frequent and private Converfation.

He

He was a Wife Man, who faid, That in governing the way as well as the end, ought to be clear. From whence no Argument can be rais'd for a Cabinet Council; the methods of that being obfcure and uncertain, and in no fort confiftent with the honest and plain way of this or any other popular Government, for reafon of State is not found in our Law Books or Statutes, and the Arcana imperii mentioned by fuch as write of the Politicks are adapted for Governments where will rather than any known and certain Law is the measure of it; for though the King of England may be never fo well appized in the use of them, yet he is never fo much out of his way as when he puts that knowledge into practice, and therefore plain and open Councils are the least fufpected, beft underftood and approved; an honeft man after he has told his Story, is not afraid to let any man elfe be heard, what he fays is like true Mettal that will abide the touch. Whereas the Advice of Knaves, like Thieves or Beifts of Prey lurks in holes, and Throuds it felf under the Darkness; is afraid to come near the Light because it will not indure the day. And there is this further difference betwixt open and private advice, for the former feldom fails, and the latter as feldom meets with fuccefs.

210

This clefe way of giving and taking advice is ever attended with the Kings retiring from the fight of his People; being seldom feen, and more difficult to be fpoke with: For it is the Policy of fuch as have him in their hands, to keep him as much as they can within their own Circle, because its the fureft way to maintain the ground they have got, and to gain what they want: But when a King thus hides himself, it is because he is either

afhamed