Christian doctrine as a manifestation successively of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (c) The Federal method of Cocceius, Witsius, and Boston treats theology under the two covenants. (d) The Anthropological method of Chalmers and Rothe; the former beginning with the Disease of Man and passing to the Remedy; the latter dividing his Dogmatik into the Consciousness of Sin and the Consciousness of Redemption. (e) The Christological method of Hase, Thomasius and Andrew Fuller treats of God, man, and sin, as presuppositions of the person and work of Christ. Mention may also be made of (ƒ) The Historical method, followed by Ursinus, and adopted in Jonathan Edwards's History of Redemption; and (g) The Allegorical method of Dannhauer, in which man is described as a wanderer, life as a road, the Holy Spirit as a light, the church as a candlestick, God as the end, and heaven as the home; so Bunyan's Holy War, and Howe's Living Temple.

See Calixtus, Epitome Theologiæ; Leydecker, De Economia trium Personarum in Negotio Salutis humanæ; Martensen (1808-1884), Christian Dogmatics; Cocceius, Summa Theologiæ, and Summa Doctrinæ de Fœdere et Testamento Dei, in Works, vol. vi; Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants; Boston, A Complete Body of Divinity (in Works, vol. 1 and 2), Questions in Divinity (vol. 6), Human Nature in its Fourfold State (vol. 8); Chalmers, Institutes of Theology; Rothe (1799-1867), Dogmatik, and Theologische Ethik; Hase (1800-1890), Evangelische Dogmatik; Thomasius (1802–1875 ), Christi Person und Werk; Fuller, Gospel Worthy of all Acceptation (in Works, 2:328-416), and Letters on Systematic Divinity (1:684-711); Ursinus (1534-1583), Loci Theologici (in Works, 1:426–909); Dannhauer (1603-1666) Hodosophia Christiana, seu Theologia Positiva in Methodum redacta. Jonathan Edwards's so-called History of Redemption was in reality a system of theology in historical form. It "was to begin and end with eternity, all great events and epochs in time being viewed 'sub specie eternitatis.' The three worlds-heaven, earth and hell-were to be the scenes of this grand drama. It was to include the topics of theology as living factors, each in its own place," and all forming a complete and harmonious whole; see Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 379, 380.

2.

The Synthetic Method, which we adopt in this compendium, is both the most common and the most logical method of arranging the topics of theology. This method proceeds from causes to effects, or, in the language of Hagenbach (Hist. Doctrine, 2:152), "starts from the highest principle, God, and proceeds to man, Christ, redemption, and finally to the end of all things. In such a treatment of theology we may best arrange our topics in the following order:

1st. The existence of God.

2d. The Scriptures a revelation from God.

3d. The nature, decrees and works of God.

4th. Man, in his original likeness to God and subsequent apostasy. 5th. Redemption, through the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. 6th. The nature and laws of the Christian church.

7th. The end of the present system of things.

V. TEXT-BOOKS IN THEOLOGY, valuable for reference

1. Confessions: Schaff, Creeds of Christendom.

2. Compendiums: H. B. Smith, System of Christian Theology; A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology; E. H. Johnson, Outline of Systematic Theology; Hovey, Manual of Theology and Ethics; W. N. Clarke, Outline

of Christian Theology; Hase, Hutterus Redivivus; Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik; Kurtz, Religionslehre.

3. Extended Treatises: Dorner, System of Christian Doctrine; Shedd, Dogmatic Theology; Calvin, Institutes; Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology; Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics; Baird, Elohim Revealed; Luthardt, Fundamental, Saving, and Moral Truths; Phillippi, Glaubenslehre; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk.

4. Collected Works: Jonathan Edwards; Andrew Fuller.

5. Histories of Doctrine: Harnack; Hagenbach; Shedd; Fisher; Sheldon; Orr, Progress of Dogma.

6. Monographs: Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin; Shedd, Discourses and Essays; Liddon, Our Lord's Divinity; Dorner, History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ; Dale, Atonement; Strong, Christ in Creation; Upton, Hibbert Lectures.

7. Theism Martineau, Study of Religion; Harris, Philosophical Basis of Theism; Strong, Philosophy and Religion; Bruce, Apologetics; Drummond, Ascent of Man; Griffith-Jones, Ascent through Christ.

8. Christian Evidences: Butler, Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion; Fisher, Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief; Row, Bampton Lectures for 1877; Peabody, Evidences of Christianity; Mair, Christian Evidences; Fairbairn, Philosophy of the Christian Religion; Matheson, Spiritual Development of St. Paul.

9. Intellectual Philosophy: Stout, Handbook of Psychology; Bowne, Metaphysics; Porter, Human Intellect; Hill, Elements of Psychology; Dewey, Psychology.

10. Moral Philosophy: Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality; Smyth, Christian Ethics; Porter, Elements of Moral Science; Calderwood, Moral Philosophy; Alexander, Moral Science; Robins, Ethics of the Christian Life.

11. General Science: Todd, Astronomy; Wentworth and Hill, Physics; Remsen, Chemistry; Brigham, Geology; Parker, Biology; Martin, Physiology; Ward, Fairbanks, or West, Sociology; Walker, Political Economy.

12. Theological Encyclopædias: Schaff-Herzog (English); McClintock and Strong; Herzog (Second German Edition).

13. Bible Dictionaries: Hastings; Davis; Cheyne; Smith (edited by Hackett).

14. Commentaries: Meyer, on the New Testament; Philippi, Lange, Shedd, Sanday, on the Epistle to the Romans; Godet, on John's Gospel ; Lightfoot, on Philippians and Colossians; Expositor's Bible, on the Old Testament books.

15. Bibles: American Revision (standard edition); Revised GreekEnglish New Testament (published by Harper & Brothers); Annotated Paragraph Bible (published by the London Religious Tract Society) Stier and Theile, Polyglotten-Bibel.

An attempt has been made, in the list of text-books given above, to put first in each class the book best worth purchasing by the average theological student, and to arrange the books that follow this first one in the order of their value. German books, however when they are not yet accessible in an English translation, are put last, simply because they are less likely to be used as books of reference by the average student.

PART II.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

God is the infinite and perfect Spirit in whom all things have their source, support, and end.

On the definition of the term God, see Hodge, Syst. Theol., 1: 366. Other definitions are those of Calovius: "Essentia spiritualis infinita"; Ebrard: "The eternal source of all that is temporal"; Kahnis: "The infinite Spirit"; John Howe: "An eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, that hath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatsoever other supposable excellency, in the highest perfection, in and of itself"; Westminster Catechism: "A Spirit infinite, eternal and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth"; Andrew Fuller: "The first cause and last end of all things."

The existence of God is a first truth; in other words, the knowledge of God's existence is a rational intuition. Logically, it precedes and conditions all observation and reasoning. Chronologically, only reflection upon the phenomena of nature and of mind occasions its rise in consciousness.

The term intuition means simply direct knowledge. Lowndes (Philos. of Primary Beliefs, 78) and Mansel (Metaphysics, 52) would use the term only of our direct knowledge of substances, as self and body; Porter applies it by preference to our cognition of first truths, such as have been already mentioned. Harris (Philos. Basis of Theism, 44-151, but esp. 45, 46) makes it include both. He divides intuitions into two classes: 1. Presentative intuitions, as self-consciousness (in virtue of which I perceive the existence of spirit and already come in contact with the supernatural ), and sense-perception (in virtue of which I perceive the existence of matter, at least in my own organism, and come in contact with nature); 2. Rational intuitions, as space, time, substance, cause, final cause, right, absolute being. We may accept this nomenclature, using the terms "first truths" and "rational intuitions" as equivalent to each other, and classifying rational intuitions under the heads of (1) intuitions of relations, as space and time; (2) intuitions of principles, as substance, cause, final cause, right; and (3) intuition of absolute Being, Power, Reason, Perfection, Personality, as God. We hold that, as upon occasion of the senses cognizing (a) extended matter, (b) succession, (c) qualities, (d) change, ( e ) order, (ƒ ) action, respectively, the mind cognizes (a) space, (b) time, (c) substance, (d) cause, (e) design, (ƒ) obligation, so upon occasion of our cognizing our finiteness, dependence and responsibility, the mind directly cognizes the existence of an Infinite and Absolute Authority, Perfection, Personality, upon whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible.

Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 60—“As we walk in entire ignorance of our muscles, so we often think in entire ignorance of the principles which underlie

and determine thinking. But as anatomy reveals that the apparently simple act of walking involves a highly complex muscular activity, so analysis reveals that the apparently simple act of thinking involves a system of mental principles." Dewey, Psychology, 238, 244-"Perception, memory, imagination, conception - each of these is an act of intuition. . . Every concrete act of knowledge involves an intuition of God." Martineau, Types, 1: 459-The attempt to divest experience of either percepts or intuitions is "like the attempt to peel a bubble in search for its colors and contents: in tenuem ex oculis evanuit auram"; Study, 1: 199-"Try with all your might to do something difficult, e. g., to shut a door against a furious wind, and you recognize Self and Nature-causal wili, over against external causality"; 201-"Hence our fellow-feeling with Nature"; 65-"As Perception gives us Will in the shape of Causality over against us in the non-ego, so Conscience gives us Will in the shape of Authority over against us in the non-ego "; Types, 2: 5—"In perception it is self and nature, in morals it is self and God, that stand face to face in the subjective and objective antithesis"; Study, 2: 2, 3-"In volitional experience we meet with objective causality; in moral experience we meet with objective authority,—both being objects of immediate knowledge, on the same footing of certainty with the apprehension of the external material world. I know of no logical advantage which the belief in finite objects around us can boast over the belief in the infinite and righteous Cause of all"; 51—“In recognition of God as Cause, we raise the University; in recognition of God as Authority, we raise the Church."

Kant declares that the idea of freedom is the source of our idea of personality,-personality consists in the freedom of the whole soul from the mechanism of nature. Lotze, Metaphysics, 244—"So far as, and so long as, the soul knows itself as the identical subject of inward experience, it is, and is named simply for that reason, substance." Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, 32 — “Our conception of substance is derived, not from the physical, but from the mental world. Substance is first of all that which underlies our mental affections and manifestations." James, Will to Believe, 80"Substance, as Kant says, means 'das Beharrliche,' the abiding, that which will be as it has been, because its being is essential and eternal." In this sense we have an intuitive belief in an abiding substance which underlies our own thoughts and volitions, and this we call the soul. But we also have an intuitive belief in an abiding substance which underlies all natural phenomena and all the events of history, and this we call God. Among those who hold to this general view of an intuitive knowledge of God may be mentioned the following: - Calvin, Institutes, book I, chap. 3; Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, 15-26, 133-140; Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 1: 78-84; Ulrici, Leib und Secle, 688-725; Porter, Human Intellect, 497; Hickok, Rational Cosmology, 58-89; Farrar, Science in Theology, 27-29; Bib. Sac., July, 1872: 533, and January, 1873: 204; Miller, Fetich in Theology, 110-122; Fisher, Essays, 565-572; Tulloch, Theism, 314-336; Hodge, Systematic Theology, 1: 191-203; Christlieb, Mod. Doubt and Christian Belief, 75, 76; Raymond, Syst. Theology, 1:247-262; Bascom, Science of Mind, 246, 247; Knight, Studies in Philos. and Lit., 155-224; A. H. Strong, Philosophy and Religion, 76-89.

I. FIRST TRUTHS IN GENERAL.

1. Their nature.

A. Negatively.-A first truth is not (a) Truth written prior to consciousness upon the substance of the soul- for such passive knowledge implies a materialistic view of the soul; (b) Actual knowledge of which the soul finds itself in possession at birth - for it cannot be proved that the soul has such knowledge; (c) An idea, undeveloped at birth, but which has the power of self-development apart from observation and experience-for this is contrary to all we know of the laws of mental growth.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1: 17-"Intelligi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogitationes habemus." Origen, Adv. Celsum, 1:4-"Men would not be guilty, if they did not carry in their minds common notions of morality, innate and written in divine letters." Calvin, Institutes, 1:3:3-"Those who rightly judge will always agree that there is an indelible sense of divinity engraven upon men's minds." Fleming, Vocab. of Philosophy, art.: "Innate Ideas -"Descartes

is supposed to have taught (and Locke devoted the first book of his Essays to refuting the doctrine) that these ideas are innate or connate with the soul; i. e., the intellect finds itself at birth, or as soon as it wakes to conscious activity, to be possessed of ideas to which it has only to attach the appropriate names, or of judgments which it only needs to express in fit propositions-i. e., prior to any experience of individual objects." Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 77-"In certain families, Descartes teaches, good breeding and the gout are innate. Yet, of course, the children of such families have to be instructed in deportment, and the infants just learning to walk seem happily quite free from gout. Even so geometry is innate in us, but it does not come to our consciousness without much trouble"; 79-Locke found no innate ideas. He maintained, in reply, that "infants, with their rattles, showed no sign of being aware that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other." Schopenhauer said that "Jacobi had the trifling weakness of taking all he had learned and approved before his fifteenth year for inborn ideas of the human mind." Bowne, Principles of Ethics, 5"That the rational ideas are conditioned by the sense experience and are sequent to it, is unquestioned by any one; and that experience shows a successive order of manifestation is equally undoubted. But the sensationalist has always shown a curious blindness to the ambiguity of such a fact. He will have it that what comes after must be a modification of what went before; whereas it might be that, and it might be a new, though conditioned, manifestation of an immanent nature or law. Chemical affinity is not gravity, although affinity cannot manifest itself until gravity has brought the elements into certain relations."

Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, 1 : 103 —"This principle was not from the beginning in the consciousness of men; for, in order to think ideas, reason must be clearly developed, which in the first of mankind it could just as little be as in children. This however does not exclude the fact that there was from the beginning the unconscious rational impulse which lay at the basis of the formation of the belief in God, however manifold may have been the direct motives which co-operated with it." Self is implied in the simplest act of knowledge. Sensation gives us two things, e. g., black and white; but I cannot compare them without asserting difference for me. Different sensations make no knowledge, without a self to bring them together. Upton, Hibbert Lectures, lecture 2-"You could as easily prove the existence of an external world to a man who had no senses to perceive it, as you could prove the existence of God to one who had no consciousness of God."

B. Positively. A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed upon occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observation and reflection,—a knowledge on the contrary which has such logical priority that it must be assumed or supposed, in order to make any observation or reflection possible. Such truths are not, therefore, recognized first in order of time; some of them are assented to somewhat late in the mind's growth; by the great majority of men they are never consciously formulated at all. Yet they constitute the necessary assumptions upon which all other knowledge rests, and the mind has not only the inborn capacity to evolve them so soon as the proper occasions are presented, but the recognition of them is inevitable so soon as the mind begins to give account to itself of its own knowledge.

Mansel, Metaphysics, 52, 279-"To describe experience as the cause of the idea of space would be as inaccurate as to speak of the soil in which it was planted as the cause of the oak-though the planting in the soil is the condition which brings into manifestation the latent power of the acorn." Coleridge: "We see before we know that we have eyes; but when once this is known, we perceive that eyes must have preëxisted in order to enable us to see." Coleridge speaks of first truths as "those necessities of mind or forms of thinking, which, though revealed to us by experience, must yet have preexisted in order to make experience possible." McCosh, Intuitions, 48, 49 - Intuitions are "like flower and fruit, which are in the plant from its embryo, but may not be actually formed till there have been a stalk and branches and leaves." Porter, Human Intellect, 501, 519-"Such truths cannot be acquired or assented to first of all." Some are reached last of all. The moral intuition is often developed late, and