the blue ones with the feeling that they had come from afar and taken much pains to meet such a fate. It was but little akin to compassion, for war hardens men-especially when their country, their homes and firesides are invaded and laid waste."

All the troops most confidently expected a hotly contested battle with the sunrise, and, like England's naval heroes, every man was prepared to do his duty. With the dead and dying around, an occasional fusillade along the lines, and the groans of wounded men sounding beseechingly in their ears, many a comrade exchanged messages to be transmitted home by the survivors.

But before day-break the Missouri troops were withdrawn, and by sunrise were on the road of retreat, slowly following the baggage train. And yet, although in General Moore's brigade of Maury's division, a brave Missourian brought up the rear-was still at the post of honor.

Captain Bledsoe's battery, supported by the Second Texas, occupied the position necessary to check the advance of the enemy. The rear was annoyed by his cavalry, some ten miles from Iuka, when Bledsoe's battery and the Second Texas and McCullough's cavalry were placed in ambush upon the edge of a low, dense piece of woods through which the road ran. Their column soon came on, advancing in an unguarded manner, being in marching order upon the road. Bledsoe suffered the head of the column to come within eighty yards of his pieces, when he opened upon it simultaneously with all four of his guns, and poured a perfect whirlwind of iron hail upon it, which swept with deadly effect through the ranks, and threw the entire regiment into confusion. McCullough and the Second Texas immediately charged and fired, and the road was cleared. The flying squadrons did not draw rein until out out of sight and some distance in our rear. There was no further disturbance during the retreat, and, after four days' march, the army reached Baldwin.

The total loss on the Southern side was four hundred and eighty-nine killed, wounded and missing, mostly in Hebert's brigade. The enemy acknowledged a thousand killed,

and of course many more were wounded; the latter, who fell into our hands, outnumbered ours four to one. The disabled on our side were left in hospital in charge of our two most able and skillful surgeons, Drs. B. G. Dysart and L. McDowell.

General Price succeeded in carrying off all the captured property, consisting of every article of army use, so much needed by his men, and amounting in value to near two million dollars.

The brave hearts that beat in the bosoms of the members of the First Brigade, pulsated with sadness and sorrow as they pursued this retrograde march. Their leader and first brigadier had fallen. To the noble dead of Missouri another illustrious name had been added. He fell in the line of duty and with his harness on. In Henry Little our brigade lost its main stay and support, and the army its best subordinate general. He did more, both while belonging to the Missouri State Guard and in the Confederate service, towards organizing and disciplining the Missouri troops than any man connected with them. To him it owed its proficiency, steadiness in danger and excellency of drill, and to his labors it was greatly indebted for the high rank it achieved among the armies of the South. His death was an irreparable loss to the army, to his State and to the Confederacy.

T

CHAPTER XV.

THE BATTLE AT CORINTH, OCTOBER 3D-4TH, 1862.

HE retreating army went into camp at Baldwin on the

night of the 22d, where it remained until the 26th, when it was moved to Ripley to form a junction with Van Dorn's forces. While at Baldwin the Missourians received four months' pay.

I once more acknowledge my great indebtedness to General Maury. I have taken the liberty to quote entire his account of the battle of Corinth, given in a published letter to General Joseph E. Johnston, Vice President of the Southern Historical Society. His thorough knowledge and accurate recollection render his memoir invaluable:

"In my narrative of the battle of Iuka, I related how General Price, acting on information received from General Bragg, and from our scouts, had moved as far as Iuka on his way to prevent Grant's forces in Mississippi from effecting a junction with Buell's in Tennessee; how at Iuka we had been attacked by Rosecranz; how we had repulsed him, capturing nine cannon and many prisoners, and had next morning returned to our proper base upon the railroad, with purpose to join our forces to Van Dorn's and make a combined attack on Corinth.

"This attack had for some time occupied Van Dorn's mind. Several weeks before General Price moved upon Iuka, General Van Dorn had sent a staff-officer, Colonel Lomax, of Virginia, (since Major General Lomax) to invite and urge General Price that they should combine their forces in an attack upon Corinth. The plan was wise, while it was bold and characteristic of Van Dorn's aggressive temper. The enemy occupied West Tennessee and the Memphis and Charleston railroad at Memphis, Bolivar, Jackson, Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto, Iuka and Bethel, with garrisons aggregating forty-two thousand men, and was preparing with extraordinary energy to reduce Vicksburg by a combined attack of land and naval forces.

"To prevent this, his expulsion from West Tennessee was a military necessity, while it was our obvious defensive policy to force him across the Ohio, occupy Columbus, and fortify the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. This policy induced General Bragg to move his army into Kentucky, and Van Dorn felt that he could force the enemy out of West Tennessee and contribute to its success.

Corinth was the enemy's strongest and most salient point. Its capture would decide the fate of West Tennessee; and the combined forces of Price and Van Dorn in the month of August could have captured Corinth, and have cleared West Tennessee of all hostile forces. When Van Dorn first invited General Price's co-operation in this enterprise, his command embraced two large divisions under

Breckenridge and Lovell, numbering about twelve thousand infantry, with over one thousand cavalry under Jackson; and he expected to receive about five thousand veteran infantry just exchanged from the Fort Donelson prisoners, in time for the movement. This force, added to General Price's army, would have given an effective active force of over thirty thousand veteran troops; and it is most unfortunate that General Price could not then have consented to unite with General Van Dorn in a movement so auspicious of great results.

"But, as I have told you, Price was constrained by his orders to decline all part in that enterprise until he made his movement to Iuka, after which Price's forces were greatly reduced by the results of the battle, while Van Dorn's were diminished by the detachment of Breckenridge with six thousand men, and by the unexpected delays in fitting out the 'Donelson prisoners' for the field; so that when on the thirtieth of September we marched from Ripley against Corinth, our combined forces were but a little over half of what Van Dorn had justly calculated upon when he first proposed the enterprise. The disastrous results which ensued brought censure upon Van Dorn, and have left a cloud upon his military reputation which I hope the publication of this narrative will aid to dispel. There are few of those who criticised his conduct who knew the great objects he sought to accomplish, or the means with which he proposed to march to a certain and brilliant victory by which the State of Mississippi would have been freed from invasion, and the war would have been transferred beyond the Ohio. Such results justified unusual hazard of battle, and after Van Dorn's forces were reduced by near one-half, he still felt he ought to strike a bold and manly blow for his native State, and did not hesitate to attack the enemy with all the energy and force he could bring to bear upon him.

"We marched from Baldwin to join Van Dorn at Ripley on the morning of the 27th, and our whole effective force was made up of-Maury's division, 4,800; Hebert's division, 5,000; Armstrong's cavalry, 2,000; light artillery, 42 guns.

"We reached Ripley on the evening of the 29th. General Van Dorn, with his staff, was already there. He had sent his cavalry forward to cover our front, and his infantry and artillery, under General Lovell, were close at

hand and marched into Ripley in fine order the day after our arrival.

"On the morning of October 1st our combined forces moved from Ripley to attack the enemy in Corinth. We marched with a total force of nearly nineteen thousand effectives, viz. Maury's division, about 4,800; Hebert's division, 5,000; Lovell's, 6,000; Armstrong's cavalry, including Jackson's brigade, 2,800.

"Van Dorn threw his cavalry foward so as to mask his movements, and marched directly with his infantry by way of Davis' bridge upon the enemy in Corinth.

"On the evening of October 2d we bivouaced at Chewalla, on the railroad, eight miles west of Corinth. At dawn of the 3d of October we moved from Chewalla to the attack. Jackson had been sent towards Bolivar, where he captured a large regiment of cavalry, and our advance was covered by Armstrong's brigade alone, Wirt Adams' brigade having been detached towards Davis' bridge.

"General Van Dorn was assured that the whole force of the enemy in the works at Corinth numbered about twelve thousand men, and he resolved to assault with all his forces. His purpose was to dismount his cavalry and attack with the whole army, and had he executed this intention in the spirit in which he conceived it, there is not ground for a reasonable doubt of his success.

"Soon after daylight our cavalry became engaged with the enemy's advanced pickets, and forced them back, until, just after crossing to the north side of the railroad, we formed in line of battle. We were then more than three miles from Corinth. Our line was perpendicular to the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Lovell's division was formed on the right (south) of the railroad; Maury's division was formed on the left (nortl:) of the railroad, Moore's brigade touching the left of Lovell's division on the railroad; Cabell's brigade was formed as a reserve behind the left of Maury's division; the Missouri division touched Maury's left; and in this order we moved forward at ten A. M., and soon found ourselves confronted by the enemy's line of battle, which occupied the defences constructed by General Beauregard during the previous spring against the army of Halleck. All the timber covering the slopes which led up to the works had been felled and formed an obstructing abattis to our advancing line; but, at the signal to advance, our whole line moved forward, under a heavy fire of artille