statesmen should be perturbed by the suggestion of a British Diplomatic Mission such as was now proposed, or that they should protest against it, in which course they were supported by other Allies, not one of whom is believed to have applauded this gaffe. Nevertheless, our Amateur Diplomats persisted, and accordingly, as the Times announced several weeks after the event, General Smuts was deputed to meet von Kühlmann's Austrian confederate —that snake in the grass Count Albert Mensdorff, one of the most false and treacherous of Pan-German agents. General Smuts, though a man of acumen and ability, is not an expert, nor would he pretend to be an expert, on any question that concerns Austria. Anyhow, no good could possibly come from the tour, which made a deplorable impression in Italy and upon more than one other Ally, who realized that if anything came of it they, rather than we, would pay the piper. General Smuts was presumably selected for this invidious task because as a Colonial and a guest in this country he might rely on a " better Press," whenever the incident was divulged, than any of his colleagues. His Mission had not even the chance of achievement it might have derived from the assistance of a trained diplomat familiar with Austro-Hungarian questions. Let us hope, if we do not expect, with our Italian Allies, that Downing Street at last realizes that the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns are all one, and that to detach Vienna from Berlin is, in common parlance," outside the range of practical politics." It should, anyhow, be some time before any British Minister is persuaded to embark on a similar wild-goose chase, which was no less perilous than futile, because, taken in conjunction with the manœuvres of Lords Lansdowne, Loreburn, Buckmaster, etc., it helped to convince Wilhelm II and his advisers that the will to win of Great Britain was weakening. The Smuts Mission to Switzerland added at least a cubit to the stature of the Pan-German Party, and was a cause of unfeigned rejoicing to all the "wild men " from Tirpitz to Houston Chamberlain.

THAT the German Government is no longer constrained to pretend that a virtuous, peace-loving, inoffensive Fatherland which never said "Bo" to a goose was wickedly and wanLichnowsky tonly attacked by British, French, and Russian bandits in 1914-against whom it has been "defending" itself

ever since-is evident from the elaborate "indiscretion" which has given the Lichnowsky Memorandum to the world at the psychological moment. We would beg our readers' particular attention to this suggestive incident, which has hocussed several people in this country who by now might have been expected to know better, though we understand that in their weariness of Teutonic tricks they should occasionally be caught napping. Prince Lichnowsky, it will be remembered, became German Ambassador in London in 1912 on the death of Baron Marschal von Bieberstein, who had replaced Count Paul Wolff Metternich after the Agadir fiasco of 1911. It was thought that a Polish nobleman of decent manners and a sense of hospitality, with a pleasant wife, might be more useful in "nobbling" London Society than the usual harsh and offensive Prussian official, who had nothing but his rudeness to recommend him. It does not, however, seem to be generally known among the commentators on the Lichnowsky Memorandum that the last German Ambassador was a convinced Anglophobe who was already on record in that sense in his own country before he came to London, where it must be admitted that his "dinner diplomacy was conspicuously successful in a world which only asked to be deceived. The heads of many more or less wellmeaning journalists who had never previously dined with an ambassador were entirely turned, while the conversion of doubters was completed by the ambassadorial confederate Herr von Kühlmann, who likewise posed as an Anglophil. There is futile discussion as to the exact rôle and mutual relations of these two astute diplomats at the crisis of 1914, since which time von Kühlmann has remained in high Imperial favour, while his former chief has ostensibly been left out in the cold. It would be safer to distrust both agents of Wilhelm II, who, we may be sure, are playing their allotted part in a community where everything is organized, especially the opinions of officials, none of whom are in the habit of circulating memorandums displeasing to the Powers-that-Be, while there would be even less chance of such documents reaching the outside world except with official connivance.

We therefore demur to the statement of the Times' leading article (March 15) that Prince Lichnowsky's "revelations"

A Trap?

were never meant for the public ... still less were they meant for the eyes of the Wilhelmstrasse, and least of all for those of Herr von Kuhlmann. They were intended to be sacred to a few trusted friends before whom the confiding author desired to explain and justify his position. But he misplaced his trust or forgot his keys-and now the text is being published by an advanced Socialist organ in Sweden.

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This journal, Politiken, according to the Times," naturally" does not say how it procured the memorandum, "but the internal evidence of authenticity is so strong that we may accept it till the Prince pledges his honour that it is none of his." Should we equally accept von Kühlmann's word of honour, or Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's or Prince Bülow's, or any other German'sfor instance, the Crown Prince or his father? Have we learned nothing from the war?-and is the German's word still to be regarded as equally good with his bond, although he boasts that obligations are nothing in his eyes, and that a treaty, however solemn, is but a scrap of paper "? We do not for one moment question the authenticity of Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum, even though he denied it a hundred times. It is a plain statement of incontrovertible facts, but so far from its publication causing "scandal" at the Wilhelmstrasse, it was probably the Wilhelmstrasse which arranged its publication through the innocent medium of a Swedish Socialist newspaper, presumably with the object of helping the Lansdowne Party in this country (upon whose co-operation German diplomacy sets great store) by showing that the Fatherland is not without its "moderate men ❞— to wit, Prince Lichnowsky-who are capable at once of weighing and condemning their own unscrupulous national policy and of rendering justice to the honesty and integrity of Great Britain. We are all for making the maximum capital out of a demonstrably genuine document-so long as we place no more confidence in Lichnowsky than in von Kühlmann or Hertling or any other German fraud and recognize that the publication may be a trap for the Right Honourable Simpleton. The Westminster Gazette thus intimated that it had fallen into it: "When Germany seeks peace with a contrite heart, she may even yet turn to Prince Lichnowsky as the spokesman whose personality is most likely to find favour in the camp of her enemies." Precisely. But these spurious Moderates are infinitely more dangerous from the British point of view than the Wild Men. Even Lord Landsdowne could not negotiate with Tirpitz or Hoffmann.

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"My London Mission"

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY in this Memorandum, entitled My London Mission, 1912 to 1914, recites the circumstances which led to his appointment as Ambassador after many years' retirement from diplomacy, though, not having the original before us, we cannot say whether he refers to the publication of the anti-English article which preceded his appointment. The time was ripe, in his judgment, for a new attempt to get on a better footing with England. Our [i.e. Germany's] enigmatical Moroccan policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition and aroused the suspicion that we were not quite sure what we wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense and, when occasion served, to humiliate the French.

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An Austrian colleague who had long been in Paris said to the Prince: "If the French begin to forget revanche, you regularly remind them of it by treading heavily on their toes." After rejecting M. Delcassé's effort to settle the Morocco question while declaring that we had no political interests there, which was fully in accordance with the Bismarckian policy, we [i.e. Germany] suddenly recognized in Abdul Aziz a Kruger No. 2. To him also, like the Boers, we promised the powerful support of the German Empire at the same cost, and with the same result." Both affairs ended, as was inevitable-unless Germany was "already then resolved to undertake a world-war-namely, in withdrawal.” Thus German diplomacy promoted the Russo-Japanese and the Russo-British rapprochement, as "in the face of the German peril all other conflicts fell into the background and the possibility of a new Franco-German war had become evident." After describing Germany's future Moroccan policy, Prince Lichnowsky makes an interesting remark about the notorious Haldane Mission to Berlin, which, it will be remembered, was represented at the time as an unclouded success both by Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, who gave us to understand that a new era had opened in AngloGerman relations, while Lord Haldane himself went from platform to platform minimizing the German danger and advertising that country's abiding affection for ourselves and her profound love of peace, which enabled him, from his intimate knowledge of German policy, to declare at the beginning of 1914 that there was no risk worth considering of a European war. But according to Prince Lichnowsky the Haldane Mission, as was suggested by the National Review at the time, was a failure. He tells us :

When I arrived in London, in November 1912, public opinion had calmed about the Morocco question. Mr. Haldane's Mission had certainly failed [our italics], since we [Germany] had demanded a promise of neutrality instead of satisfying ourselves with a compact which would secure us against a British attack, or an attack with British support.

The Fatal
Flaw

HOWEVER, Sir Edward Grey was still striving for an Anglo-German agreement. "With Herr von Kühlmann as expert intermediary, an exchange of views took place concerning the renewal of the Portuguese Colonial Agreement and the Bagdad Railway, the object of which was to divide the aforesaid colonies, as well as Asia Minor, into spheres of interest." This makes cheerful reading. According to Prince Lichnowsky the British Foreign Minister desired, since the old disputes with France and Russia were settled, to reach a corresponding agreement with us. His aim was not to isolate us, but to get us to take part in the already established Concert. Having succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Franco-British and Russo-British divisions, he wished also, as far as possible, to remove the causes of friction between England and Germany, and, by a network of agreements -to which might well eventually have been added an agreement on the unfortunate naval question-to secure the peace of the world.

Such is the considered and conclusive judgment of the German diplomat in closest touch with events at the time. Were Sir Edward Grey's personal integrity and honour alone concerned, we should hail this vindication with unreserved satisfaction, affording as it does a complete and crushing answer to the campaign of slander conducted against him from Berlin throughout the civilized world with the assistance of "the friends of Germany in this country, headed by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, who gave the cue by his wicked falsehood in August 1914 that the war had been made in the British Foreign Office and Admiralty. Messrs. Macdonald and Co. will now have to be much more German than the Germans, or withdraw all their charges against Sir Edward Grey, and make the amende which has long been due from the Pacifist Party to the Pacifist Minister. The fatal flaw in Sir Edward Grey's policy was that he imagined Germany to be another England, and German rulers to be animated by his own pacifist proclivities. He, in fact, committed the unforgivable offence, in a statesman who is a trustee of the national interests, of completely misreading the policy of the national enemy. It is not enough for governments to be inspired by good intentions when dealing with Powers which are so obviously on the war