was to divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights of the Sultan.” In consultation with the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha," all economic questions concerning German undertakings were settled in the main according to the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important concession Sir E. Grey made to me personally was the continuance of the railway as far as Basra." This surrender would have placed Pan-Germany astride Asia Minor with no possibility of disturbance, thus realizing one of her most ambitious schemes, and providing her with an irresistible jumping-off place for subsequent aggrandizement in the Middle East. The ex-Ambassador tells us:

We had dropped this point in favour of the connexion to Alexandretta; up to that time Bagdad had been the terminal point of the railway. An International Commission was to regulate navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have a share in the harbour works at Basra, and received rights for the navigation of the Tigris, which had hitherto been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

As good Liberal Imperialists the Lynch family should appreciate a policy which would have resulted in the establishment of a German naval base and a submarine yard in their midst.

By this Treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra was included within our sphere of influence (without prejudice to already existing British navigation rights on the Tigris and the rights of the Wilcox Irrigation Works) as well as the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian Railway. The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin Railway were recognized as the British economic sphere, Syria as the French, and Armenia as the Russian.

Had "both Treaties "-i.e. for the dismemberment of Portuguese possessions and the appropriation of Mesopotamia by Germanybeen published, in the Prince's words " an agreement with England would be reached which would preclude all doubts about the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.'" Indeed it would, and on the usual terms. Once more, however, Berlin came to our rescue, and another shameless compact failed to materialize. The Pan-Germans are the only serious bulwark against the Defeatists of Downing Street.

It will be remembered that throughout this period of back-stairs intrigue, the British public, who in the eyes of Ministers exist to be made fools of, were continually fobbed off with assurances that a new era was opening in Anglo-German relations inspired by a prospective slackening of naval competition. From Prince Lichnowsky we

Another Disillusionment

now learn that no Naval agreement was so much as discussed. The subject was never mentioned by the British Foreign Minister, a circumstance on which the ex-Ambassador plumes himself. This "friend of England" confined his diplomacy to matters on which all the concessions came from this country.

Notwithstanding the Fleet, it would be possible to arrive at a friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not introduce a new Navy Bill and our policy were indubitably pacific. . . . I also avoided mention of the Fleet and the word never passed between Sir E. Grey and me. On one occasion Sir E. Grey said at a meeting of the Cabinet, The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the Fleet to me."

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This statement makes not a few people look supremely foolish, though by this time they should be accustomed to the process. Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, importuned the Ambassador on "a Naval holiday," which the latter thought to be prompted by financial reasons" and probably also to meet the pacific wishes of his Party." Prince Lichnowsky declined to budge on the Navy, pointing out that any scheme of reduction would be difficult, " for technical reasons." Once more Germany saved us from ourselves. For many years we dreaded lest Berlin might pretend to consent to a limitation of navies, which would not have bound Germany, while providing our Government with a pretext for reducing our Fleet to such a point that she would automatically have acquired the Freedom of the Seas" without even the necessity of fighting for it. "Through interviews with Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's principal Private Secretary, I managed to have the question removed from the Agenda without causing any ill-feeling, although it was again referred to in Parliament, and to prevent any official proposal being made." This was a genuine service to our innocent country, however unwitting, and the end of the "Naval holiday." The writer describes Sir Edward Grey's influence "in all matters of foreign policy" as "almost unlimited. On important occasions he used, indeed, to say, 'I must first bring it before the Cabinet'; but this always agreed to his views. His authority was undisputed." After describing Sir Edward's severely simple and attractive private life, his dislike of show, his love of country, his devotion to birds and fishing, the Prince remarks, "Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him. . . . This is a true picture of the man who is decried as 'Liar-Grey' and instigator of the World War."

5th July, 1914

COMING to the Great War, the ex-Ambassador explains that soon after arriving in London "I obtained the conviction that under no circumstances had we [Germany] to fear a British attack or British support for any foreign attack, but that under any circumstances England would protect the French" (our italics). Englishmen will be gratified by this testimony, while regretting that it was not made plainer to the Fatherland that aggression upon France would bring us into the field, which would have spared us the humiliation to which we were reduced in August 1914, of attributing our intervention exclusively to the Belgian Treaty, allowing the world to believe--a legend patronized by Mr. Lloyd George-that had France been attacked from the East instead of from the North, Great Britain would have remained neutral. Prince Lichnowsky repeatedly reported his view of our attitude to Berlin," with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain any credence. . . . I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European Powers, England as a commercial State would suffer enormously, and would therefore do her best to prevent a conflict," but," she would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of France; because of the necessity of maintaining the European balance of power and of preventing a German superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people had expressed themselves in the same sense.' Unfortunately, Germany never believed that we meant business, probably owing to our conspicuous lack of preparations, while she was piling up armaments, and to the conviction that the Pacifists would predominate in the Cabinet, as proved to be the case from July 31, 1914, until August 2, 1914, when the intervention of His Majesty's Opposition, of which the full story has never yet been told, turned the tide, saved the honour of England, to say nothing of Civilization from Kultur. The Prince admits that he was not greatly alarmed by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, although he was told "that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia in order to put an end to an impossible situation . . . subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive Conference at Potsdam on July 5, the Vienna inquiry received the unqualified assent of all the leading people, and with the rider that no harm would be done if a war with Russia should result.

Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the Austrian Protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London."

As the Prince points out, If Russia and England had wanted the war in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and the unprecedented Note [Austria to Unteachable Serbia] would not have been answered." Sir E. Grey discussed the Serbian reply with him, pointing out its conciliatory character.

Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula aceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal was that a Committee, consisting of M. Cambon [French Ambassador in London], the Marquis Imperiali [Italian Ambassador in London], and myself, should assemble under his Presidency, and it would have been an easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the points at issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in Belgrade.

The German Ambassador strongly backed this proposal, knowing that " a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success, and to accept the Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the contrary, they urged in the direction of war." While we criticize Sir Edward Grey's attitude towards Germany between Agadir and Armageddon as disastrous, because calculated to defeat the very object he had in view, i.e. the preservation of peace-if you kotow to a bully you only infuriate him-we have always recognized his singleminded strenuous efforts to avoid war when the storm burst: though here again, the Germans being what they are, he would have done better had the fortiter in re been combined with the suaviter in modo, which is always misunderstood in Berlin, though that elementary fact has not yet dawned on our Greys, Balfours, Bonar Laws, Milners, Lloyd Georges, Lansdownes, Loreburns, Parmoors, Buckmasters, McKennas, Runcimans, Curzons, Hendersons, Austen Chamberlains, Haldanes, Asquiths, Newtons, or, indeed, any public men likely to have any say in any dealings with the Boche. It is this which is at once stupefying and disheartening. Our Statesmen have no lack of brains, but they cannot penetrate German psychology, and continue making speeches which, if intelligible before the war, are nowadays intolerable. We hardly dare hope that they will learn anything from the Lichnowsky Memorandum. They move about in worlds unrealized, animated by amiable regrets, not that the Boche is so bestial, but that he should have been found out by the

British public, which makes their future graceful concessions more difficult.

The
"Warning"

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PRINCE LICHNOWSKY tells us in terms, speaking of the German refusal to respond to Sir E. Grey's invitation to put forward any pacific proposal, we insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply [from Berlin] but that Austria had shown an exceedingly' accommodating spirit' by not demanding an extension of territory from Serbia." Naturally

the impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude, on a question which did not directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent requests and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed by the Tsar's positively humble telegram, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be massacred. On July 29, 1914, the German Ambassador received the famous warning from Sir E. Grey that Great Britain would support France. "I replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister said to me: If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.' Thereafter events followed each other rapidly until at last Count Berchtold, "who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin, played the strong man, decided to come round, we [Germany] replied to the Russian mobilization after Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in vain, with the Ultimatum and the declaration of war." Sir Edward persisted in trying to avoid the catastrophe, apparently suggesting that Germany and France might remain neutral even if AustriaHungary and Russia fought, which was impudently misrepresented in Berlin as an attempt to separate France from Russia. We also appear to have proposed that Germany and France might mobilize against one another without attacking. Then followed President Poincaré's letter to the King (July 31), Mr. Bonar Law's letter to Mr. Asquith (August 2), King Albert's telegram to Great Britain (August 2). "The waverers in the Cabinet-excepting three members who resigned-were converted." Prince Lichnowsky tells us that until "the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting attitude." We can all remember that terrible time of doubt, hesitation, and pain.

Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I heard from a private source.