serious student of war. One may leave aside General Smuts, who is an honoured guest among us, whose counsel should be invaluable upon all African and Oversea problems, and who has had practical experience of Colonial warfare, in which he has distinguished himself, though it has little or nothing in common with European warfare and would hardly help a soldier to tackle the portentous problems confronting General Foch, General Haig, General Pétain, or General Diaz. There is no man in the War Cabinet who has ever thought about war, or read about war, or whose opinion upon war possesses the smallest value, nor is there a Minister who could be quoted throughout the prolonged incubation of the Potsdam Plot as having made one intelligent remark concerning Germany, while several could be quoted for observations bordering on idiocy on the German Danger which stared them in the face. No one for a moment disputes Mr. Lloyd George's verve or success on the platform. Von Hindenburg would not have a dog's chance against him in debate, any more than General von Ludendorff could compete against Mr. Bonar Law's amazing verbal memory. But unfortunately we are at war, and the issue will be decided on the stricken field, in which other qualities are required than eloquence. Lord Curzon is admittedly an able man, a specialist on various Asian problems and a master of polished and dignified diction, while Lord Milner possesses indefatigable industry and a constructive capacity as regards the many subjects he understands, while his avoidance of limelight has always offered an agreeable contrast to the besetting sin of our public men generally. Unfortunately Germany was never among the subjects that Lord Milner had made his own, and he has no instinct for war, while he shares Lord Curzon's intellectial contempt for military opinion even on purely military matters, nor has he the faith that carries some men through a great cause, and is at least as needful as competence. Mr. Barnes, who is the least pretentious member of the War Cabinet, is for that very reason probably its most useful member. He does not suffer from the obsession of most Mandarins that because they can make speeches they can do everything. While these pages were being printed the War Cabinet has been reinforced by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, who would be admirable at any other time.

Such are the handful of men who have been trying to manage the war, with the results we know because they are writ too large to be ignored. The wreckage of amateur strategy is strewn across the Western Front. They have brought the enemy within striking distance of the heart of the British Empire, and even though the blow be averted, as we devoutly hope, through skilful generalship and the superhuman staunchness of our Fighting Men, it will always threaten us so long as empty eloquence is permitted to

dominate our Councils. That the War Cabinet does not even listen to those "professional advisers," of whom much is said when things go wrong, is self-evident from the immortal gaffe of Mr. Bonar Law, who in reviewing the military situation at the close of the last Session in terms expressed his "scepticism" concerning the impending Offensive. The passage is worth preserving, not for the sterile pleasure of putting Mr. Bonar Law in the wrong, or even as a vindication of the superiority of military over civilian judgment, but as conclusive evidence that the War Cabinet even now cannot grasp the war.

As already pointed out, the French Government in January was absorbed in the war generally, particularly on the coming attack in the West, which M. Clemenceau refused to regard as arguable because it was inevitable. Sir Henry Wilson, the British Military representative at Versailles, and an able Staff were of the same opinion, while Sir William Robertson, as we know, fell out of favour at home for riveting his attention on the West as the decisive point. He had been unable to teach this elementary strategic lesson to Ministers or to persuade them to prepare against it. They were more interested in Jericho, which lent itself to imaginative oratory. Mr. Bonar Law consequently allowed the House of Commons to suppose (March 7) that nothing serious was to be expected in the West. In all probability the Peace talk cunningly spread at the time by German agents in London preoccupied Downing Street, and as we know not a few inspired newspapers actually published "terms " alleged to have emanated from Germany, though as a matter of fact they were "made in London" and were but a piece of clever camouflage. Some men, including most Ministers, were born to be bamboozled by the Boche. After informing his unsophisticated audience:

At the present moment, from the information which is available to us, I believe I am justified in saying with certainty that both as regards men and guns we have, if anything, a slight superiority,

which he subsequently qualified by the alternative statement:

As regards guns, it is obvious that the Germans have taken so many in Russia that we may find that they have a distinct and even possibly a great superiority, but I do not think there is any cause for serious alarm. The power of artillery is limited, not only by the number of guns, but by the supply of ammunition.

Mr. Bonar Law made this prediction:

This Offensive ought to be coming. The Germans have advertised it. They have advertised it to such an extent that if it is not carried out it will be rather difficult to justify their inaction to their people. They have also sent the troops to carry it out. But I am myself still a little sceptical about it [my italics].

There speaks the true Parliamentarian who still imagines that the German General Staff conducts war on the inspiration of the

Man in the Street in Berlin, and that his main object is to justify himself in the latter's eyes! Mr. Bonar Law is as unteachable upon Germany as he is about war. By way of "interest " to the House of Commons he mentioned that

A member of the Government who has been with our troops in France, who saw not only the Headquarters, but also subordinate Commanders, told me this, that while the Headquarters expected an attack in a short time, when it got lower down to the Brigadiers, to the Battalion Commanders, still more to the Company Commanders, and to the men who had been in daily conflict with the Germans, they were so confident of their superiority that they did not believe the Germans would dare to attack. That is in the future.

On such a matter one might have imagined that the opinion of Headquarters would prevail, but Mr. Lloyd George and his friends are alleged to prefer the judgment of any junior lieutenant to that of the Higher Command. When the storm burst, however, on March 21 Mr. Bonar Law hastened to inform the House (March 21):

I should like also to say that there is absolutely nothing in the nature of a surprise in connexion with what has happened. Our Staff and the Versailles Council have naturally been considering what would happen in the event of an attack taking place, and I may tell the House that this attack has been launched on the very part of our line which we were informed would be attacked by the enemy if an attack were undertaken at all.

Moreover:

Only three days ago we received information at the Cabinet from Headquarters in France that they had now definitely come to the conclusion that an attack was going to be launched immediately.

This was confirmed by Mr. Lloyd George, who, however, had not the generosity to pay honour where honour was due by crediting Sir William Robertson, the discarded Chief of the Imperial General Staff, for his almost uncanny foresight in warning the War Cabinet-upon whom all his warnings were wasted-of what was in store for us. The Prime Minister preferred to credit everything to "Versailles," which naturally and necessarily came to the same conclusion as the Imperial General Staff in London. This was Mr. Lloyd George's effort to efface the lamentable impression made by the earlier utterance of his colleague.

I think it is right in justice to them [the Military Staff at Versailles] to point out that, after very close study of the German position and of the probabilities of the case, they came to the conclusion, and they stated their conclusions to the Military Representatives and to the Ministers in the month of January or the beginning of February, that the attack would come south of Arras, that it would be an attack on a very wide front, that it would be an attack on the widest front that has ever yet been assailed, that the Germans would accumulate ninety-five divisions for the purpose of making that attack, that they would throw the whole of their force and their strength into breaking the British line at that point, that their objective would be the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and the French forces-that was the conclusion that Sir Henry Wilson came to, and which was submitted at that time-two or three months ago

--and I think it is one of the most remarkable forecasts of enemy intentions that has ever been made.

But what, one may ask, is the use of "forecasts," however prescient, if those to whom they are addressed remain unmoved? Sir Henry Wilson seems to have made as little impression on Mr. Bonar Law's "scepticism" as Sir William Robertson, though he would have the advantage of having his views enforced by the picturesque eloquence of the Prime Minister. In other words, we have a War Cabinet which is not merely fundamentally ignorant of war, but despises the judgment of its chosen professional advisers. Such is the tragedy of the times in which we live. The remedy is not, as some imagine or pretend, to send for Lord Lansdowne with his White Flag, or for Mr. Asquith and his Runcimen, but to entrust the management of the war to men who know something about it. With the fate of Kerensky and the fall of Russia before us we dare not hesitate, or we shall be lost.

L. J. MAXSE

A DESTROYER ON ACTIVE SERVICE*

April 7 [1917]

WELL, I must confess that, even after war has been declared, the skies haven't fallen and oysters taste just the same. I never would have dreamed that so big a step would be accepted with so much equanimity. It is due to two causes, I think. First, because we have trembled on the verge so long and sort of dabbled our toes in the water, that our minds have grown gradually accustomed to what under other circumstances would be a violent shock. Second, because the individual units of the navy are so well prepared that there is little to do. We made a few minor changes in the routine and slipped the war-heads on to the torpedoes, and, presto! we were ready for war. One beauty of a destroyer is that, life on board being reduced to its simplest terms anyhow, there is little to change. We may be ordered to strip," that is, go to our navy yard and land all combustibles, paints, oils, surplus woodwork, uniforms, etc.; but we have not done so yet.

،،

We were holding drill yesterday when the signal was made from the flagship, "War is declared." I translated it to my crew, who received the news with much gaiety but hardly a trace of excitement.

April 13

There is absolutely no news. We are standing by for what may betide, with not the faintest idea of what it may be. Of course, we are drilling all the time, and perfecting our readiness for action in every way, but there is a total absence of that excitement and sense of something impending that one usually associates with the beginning of war. Indeed, I think that the only real anxiety is lest we may not get into the big game at all. I do not think any of us are bloodthirsty or desirous of either glory or advancement, but we have the wish to justify our existence. With me it takes this form-by being in the service I have sacrificed my chance to make good as husband, father, citizen, son, in fact, in every human relationship, in order to be, as I trust, one of the nation's high-grade fighting instruments. Now, if fate never uses me for the purpose to which I have been

VOL. LXXI

* Copyright in U.S.A. by the Atlantic Monthly.

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