he sought an interview with Lord Stratford, the renowned representative of the Court of St. James's with the Sublime Porterather a tough customer for the soldier from Algeria to cross rapiers with. The Great Elchi was courtesy itself, drew his visitor blandly on, and then suddenly produced a copy of the tripartite treaty in which it was distinctly laid down that each of the three armies was to be independent. Foiled at this first attempt, and remembering that Raglan was only a general, the marshal naïvely proposed to his British colleague that when British and French troops were alongside each other the senior should command; the suggestion was worded as if the project only affected detachments. But Lord Raglan was not to be bluffed, for he produced his instructions which directed him only to take orders from the Secretary of State in London. Fortunately Saint-Arnaud was a sportsman. He took his rebuffs in excellent part, and co-operated loyally with his partners up to the time of his death. There were some differences of opinion between the commanders in the Crimea; but there was very little friction, and the only serious contretemps that arose was when Napoleon III endeavoured to impose a crack-brained scheme of his own

upon the allied chiefs. This interrupted the conjunct FrancoBritish undertaking against Kerch when it was in full swing, and thereby wrecked what might have proved a highly effective combination of war.

Experience in many campaigns seems to indicate that the generalissimo plan can only be advantageous if two conditions hold good. The first condition is complete unity of political purpose on the part of the governments concerned. The second condition is that the soldier to be invested with supreme responsibility possesses a military reputation unquestionably superior to that of any other commander in the combined forces.

Thus Marlborough, who continued to have several contingents under his immediate orders while his army worked in concert with that of Eugene in the Low Countries, had little trouble with the Dutch or other foreign generals after his first four campaignsBlenheim and the Lines of the Gette had taught them that Turenne's "handsome Englishman" was one of the greatest commanders of all time. After the elder Pitt had especially asked Frederick the Great for the services of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick to command the British and Hanoverian contingents in Hanover, he was quite content to leave matters in the hands of that very distinguished soldier, and our troops quickly came to recognize the rare qualities of the Prussian field-marshal who had been set over them. All went smoothly except during the short period when Sackville, a vain and cantankerous if capable man, who got on no better with Granby, his second in command, than he did

with Ferdinand, succeeded to the chieftainship of the British troops. After Sackville's dismissal in consequence of his insubordination at Minden, Granby, a hearty soul and born leader of men, at his best when fighting under the general control of a superior, always got on excellently with the Prince. Wellington and the Spaniards in the Peninsula is another example. Only after Salamanca and Burgos would the Cortes place their military forces under the victor of Vimeiro, of Busaco, of Talavera, and of Badajoz, by which time his reputation was absolutely beyond the possibility of cavil. The succeeding campaign of Vittoria could not have been so triumphant as it was but for the loyal co-operation of the Spanish troops, although the Duke had good grounds for complaint at the attitude of the Cadiz executive in respect to many matters connected with army organization.

The objections to the appointment of a commander-in-chief to assume control over the armies of several States that are acting in concert are after all fairly obvious. Especially is this the case when the armies in question happen to be more or less of analogous standing in the military and political world. The drawbacks to the arrangement are indeed so grave in many, if not in most, cases as to entirely outweigh such advantages as can be claimed for the device. That this is so accounts for the absence of a supreme military head to the allies' forces in Belgium in 1815, in the Crimea, and on the Western Front during the present war. The large number of different forces in the field, the diversity in their respective potentialities, the intricate political problems embraced in any operations contemplated in that particular theatre of conflict-all these factors to a more or less degree account for the existence of a military overlord at Salonika; but that particular case is hardly likely to be quoted in the future as an instance of the generalissimo system proving an unqualified success.

What, then, are the objections to the plan? In the first place, neither the generals nor yet the troops of one country will suffer the domination of a commander belonging to another nationality gladly. It may be very foolish of them-but there it is. They may be prepared to fall in with the arrangement in the case of a Turenne or of a Eugene or of a Napoleon as master, but they are exacting in this matter, and rather hard to please. Forces furnished by quite minor States that happen to be working in co-operation with more imposing armaments may not feel slighted when placed under charge of a generalissimo drawn from the soldiers of a Great Power. Contingents which in respect to fighting strength fall very far short of the might of other armies with which they are associated in the field, may recognize readily enough some propriety of their being subordinated to the commander of the superior host. But under other circumstances than those

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named the very suggestion of a generalissimo is calculated to arouse a storm of disapprobation.

Lord Stair, an experienced, dexterous commander, had been at the head of the British troops in the Low Countries in 1742, in 1743, and in 1744. Then in 1745 it was decided to have a commander-in-chief of the allies, and the Austrian marshal, Königseck, was singled out for the job. Stair refused to serve under the marshal hailing from the Danube, and the result was that by skilful diplomacy (skilful diplomacy in those days was often synonymous with chicanery), the British Government contrived to get Cumberland appointed generalissimo, although Cumberland was by no means the tried soldier that Stair was. The Austrian generals fought shy of serving under Suvaroff in Italy in 1799; but that illustrious leader managed gradually to overcome their prejudices in his rough and ready fashion, and in the brilliant campaign of the Trebbia he succeeded in using the forces of the recalcitrant generals (which were decidedly superior in numbers to the Russians) to remarkable advantage. In that same year a joint British and Russian expedition was dispatched to the Helder, and the question of a British commander-in-chief arose, seeing that our forces were considerably the stronger numerically. The Duke of York, whose record had not been a brilliant one in 1793 and 1794, was chosen simply because, owing to his rank, there was no likelihood of General Hermann, the Tsar's commander, questioning his decisions. The campaign was by no means a success. When Wellington first assumed command in chief of the Iberian armies in 1812, the Spanish general, Ballasteros, an active, energetic leader who had caused Soult considerable anxiety in the south, refused to serve under the British generalissimo, published a most insubordinate proclamation, and--what was worse-helped by his defection to open a way for Soult to reach Madrid. So strongly did the Russians object to being placed under Prince Schwarzenberg in 1813 that the military head of the great European coalition had perforce to transmit his behests to the Tsar's principal commander, Barclay de Tolly, privately, whereupon that general issued the orders as coming from himself. Bernadotte's almost unconquerable inertia at the time when it was imperative that he should hasten to join in the massing of the allies' legions before Leipzig was undoubtedly to some extent attributable to his prejudice against serving under an Austrian commander-in-chief; although professional jealousy perhaps actuated him to some extent, although he probably had no great confidence in Schwarzenberg's tactical ability, and although he may well have felt qualms at the prospect of meeting his old master Napoleon in battle.

But the dissatisfaction which soldiers of high and low degree

are wont to manifest when placed under the orders of a foreign commander-in-chief is not the most serious objection to the generalissimo system. What above all things is to be feared is that, in the event of failure, there will be recriminations in high places in the field, and that this will lead to that very disunion which the arrangement is supposed to prevent. History provides almost numberless instances of quarrels arising between allied commanders and between allied armies after the fortune of war has declared against them, and the existence of a single authority belonging to one of the armies, invested with authority over them all, tends to focus the indignation of the other contingents upon that which has provided the peccant generalissimo. After Steinkerk, where William III had under his orders Austrian, Dutch, and Spanish troops as well as the British, Macaulay tells us that "in the camp of the allies all was disunion and discontent. National animosities raged without restraint or disguise." It was the same with Cumberland's forces after Fontenoy. The defeat at Fleurus in 1794 practically put an end to the efforts of the European coalition to overcome the French Revolutionary army in the Low Countries--not so much because of the severity of the reverse as because the feuds and schisms which arose out of it broke up the military partnership. Nor is it merely a question of discord between rival generals and disappointed troops.

The disruption may affect the political relations between the States that have been acting in military concert. The Emperor Paul retired from the contest against Napoleon in 1800 after the Helder failure, because he was dissatisfied with the way his troops had been handled during that ill-conducted enterprise by the British commander-in-chief. "Such were the dissensions which at this period prevailed at headquarters," writes Alison of the days following the defeat of the coalition host at Dresden in 1813, "that nothing but the most exalted spirit of the Sovereigns who ruled its destinies, and the most indefatigable efforts on the part of the able diplomats who were entrusted with its counsels, prevented the alliance from being broken up within a few days after it began its great contest for the deliverance of Europe. Schwarzenberg threw the blame for his discomfiture upon subordinates for not carrying out his plans as intended. The generals commanding the different armies insisted that the design was faulty, although it was not in fact unsound in itself. The danger of political disagreement may, in a case like this, be even greater than the danger of subsequent misunderstandings between the military chiefs.

Supposing that Sir D. Haig had been generalissimo on the Western Front last March and April, and that events had fallen out exactly as they actually did, the dissatisfaction in the French

Legislature and amongst the French people at the limited successes achieved by General Nivelle might have caused a great deal of unpleasantness between the two countries. Had General Pétain been supreme over the Franco-British armies three months ago he would have been held responsible by some ill-informed but noisy people on this side of the Channel for the set-back which somewhat discounted the value of General Byng's fine victory at Cambrai. The great merit of an Allied Council like that set up at Versailles, as compared to the acceptance of a supreme military chief, is that, in case the plan of campaign decided upon by that body "gangs agley," the confederated Powers cannot shuffle off responsibility for the contretemps upon each other. They are all in the same boat. There has been co-ordination and the result has been catastrophe. Their military plenipotentiaries, or their Prime Ministers, or whoever the people happen to be who hit upon the plan, are all equally in fault. Indeed, the nations themselves are responsible, seeing that they have been tolerating the Prime Ministers who made improper plans or who selected the military plenipotentiaries guilty of such ineptitude. The virtues of the Versailles Council, when it comes to dealing with operations of war, are, so to speak, defensive rather than offensive.

If a generalissimo be an unfailing remedy for all distempers when a coalition is in action-as some seem to think-then the "issimo" principle should surely be carried somewhat further. Why not a Premier-issimo"? Supposing that such an international novelty were to be introduced, might not our Mr. Lloyd George win the suffrages of Allied nations? He has been applauded by

the multitude in the Rue de Rivoli and under the shadow of St. Peter's; for the umpire who always gives his own side out does achieve a fleeting popularity with the other. He would cut a fine figure in the Hall of the Marshals. We in the United Kingdom would comfort ourselves with the reflection that the versatile statesman, charged with wider duties and burdened with more multifarious responsibilities, might perhaps enjoy less leisure than he does at present for devising operations of war, a subject concerning which he notoriously suffers from a defective judgment and a contumaciously unconquerable ignorance. It is an alluring thought.

For there is plenty of work for the Versailles Council to do. Co-ordination as between the Allies in respect to the actual conduct of campaigns has no doubt at times been imperfect. But political co-ordination and co-ordination in respect to resources has been still more in default. That is where the Trianon seems to come in. The generals can be trusted to work in concert if they are left alone to ponder in company over the problems that their armies have to solve. But questions of war aims, questions of relations with