and have probably been the medium of conveying the very large sums of money which at one time passed from Berlin to the Bolsheviks. The present situation in Germany is necessarily not without its anxieties and difficulties for the Government, and the perpetual whine in the speeches of Wilhelm II makes very pleasant reading. An immense number of Germans realize that war is not "the picnic" they fondly imagined when they set out to overrun the world in 1914 and realize Deutschland über alles. There is considerable suffering, chiefly in the towns, and much hunger, but mainly among the people who don't count. There have been strikes, as to the origin and size of which there is some obscurity, but in any case they are deliberately advertised abroad in the hopes of promoting "sympathetic strikes" under the auspices of our Independent Labour Party, which has played the game of the Hohenzollerns all through the war, and will continue to do so until the end of the chapter. There is no reliable evidence of any political movement in the Fatherland causing anxiety to the Emperor and his advisers, and to speak of the Hohenzollern dynasty as" in peril " is ridiculous. The events of the past winter leave the Pan-Germans and Annexationists stronger and more unchallenged than ever. Von Kühlmann was not even allowed to keep up his spurious "moderation " moderation" at Brest-Litovsk, where the negotiations were dominated by the General Staff, whose mouthpiece, General von Hoffmann, restored realities by his brutal declarations, incidentally rendering service to Europe by destroying illusions as to German policy and intentions. Bolsheviks are incapable of learning anything, but other Russians now know and Europe appreciates the true meaning of the catchword "No annexations and no indemnities," which was invented in Germany largely for the purpose of securing the return of the German colonies without the disagreeable necessity of annihilating the Grand Fleet.

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THE Allies are to commit themselves in advance for all time to the doctrine that under no circumstances shall the German "Annexations Empire be deprived of an inch of territory or pay a single mark. As the Allies are civilized Powers who repudiate Realpolitik, their word is as good as their bond, and, consequently, any declarations on their part

and Indemnities"

against "annexations and indemnities" would at the ultimate settlement prove of the utmost value to Germany in the day of her defeat, and be used against them with deadly effect. They would constrain the return of all the colonies conquered in Africa and elsewhere, and would prevent any Allies from making Germany pay anything towards the ruinous costs to which they have been put by her wanton aggression and savage anarchy. This fatal attitude would disable France from retrieving Alsace-Lorraine, which is the condition of her future security, and Italy from becoming master in her own house by obtaining Italia Irredenta. Although President Wilson is understood to have committed the United States to "No annexations and no indemnities " (at which Berlin is hugely delighted)-though in fairness to the President we should always remember that any policy to which he may incline rests upon the bedrock of Victory-no European statesman so far as we know has yet compromised his country by swallowing this formula. M. Clemenceau is the very last man who would dream of any such folly, which would be equally odious to Signor Sonnino and other far-sighted men in Rome. It may be true that here and there some thoughtless English spokesman may have used phrases susceptible of misunderstanding, but no man either in the Ministry or outside holds any mandate from the country to walk into this palpable German trap. There is less temptation than ever even for the "Defeatists" who occasionally assemble at Lansdowne House to do so, because the German authors of this claptrap shamelessly repudiate their own doctrine whenever they are in a position to dictate terms to Russia or to any other Power who may chance to lie at their mercy. The "negotiations" at Brest-Litovsk included substantial though disguised" indemnities from Russia to Germany, while in the interval the enemy has made it still plainer that she means to seize any territory she covets, beginning with the Baltic provinces and going on to the Black Sea.

In all long wars there is necessarily ebb and flow. Nor can we be surprised that the Fatherland, however short of food, however miserable may be the mass of its impotent people, should regard the immediate, if not the ultimate, future with comparative equanimity and even hopefulness. The

Ebb and Flow

moral of the only part of Germany that counts stands higher to-day than it did this time last year, for the simple reason that in the interval the parts have been to some extent reversed. Just as the Allies then anticipated a favourable decision in the approaching campaign, with the aid of Russia, to-day Germany, having eliminated Russia, contemplates what we contemplated at the beginning of 1917-i.e. overcoming her enemies. We do not believe she will succeed, but we understand her attitude, nor can we afford to minimize the fact that she is relatively stronger in a military sense than she was believed to be at any moment since the Marne, when she appeared to be carrying all before her. Were the German Higher Command equal to the organization and patriotism of the German people, and the discipline, equipment, and tactical ability of the German army, the position would be still more serious. We cannot but derive encouragement from the consistent failure of the overboomed Hindenburgs, Ludendorffs, Mackensens, and Falkenhayns to attain any of their primary objectives. After all, the Great German General Staff enjoyed the inestimable advantage of declaring war at their selected moment when the challenger was ready to the last gaiter-button, while of the challenged Powers Russia was practically unarmed, the French Army lacked boots, to say nothing of munitions, while the British Army had hardly begun to exist. In four years " Invincible" Prussia has only succeeded in bringing down secondary enemies, or enemies who disarmed themselves. We cannot resist the conclusion that had soldiers of the calibre of Sir William Robertson, Sir Douglas Haig, Marshal Joffre, General Foch, or General Pétain been at the disposal of Wilhelm II, enjoying Hindenburg's control over the massed resources of a hundred million people, and commanding an army that owns a nation," they would by now have achieved something beyond strafing Belgium, annihilating Serbia and Montenegro, encircling Rumania, and plundering Russia. They would at least have taken Paris, Calais, and Rome, and have had a serious shot at London.

THERE surely must be something radically wrong with German military leading as with our political leadership. Possibly the Kaiser has spoilt all his generals' plans, or it may be that

after all character counts, that wanton cruelty does not pay, that excessive energy has been expended in waging "Tails Up" war upon women and children. We shall know one day. Meanwhile we are concerned with the fact that the enemy's "tail" is temporarily very much "up," though none of us are downhearted save when we survey Downing Street. We are clearly in for a grim ordeal, during which we must set our teeth. It is now officially conceded that there has been a heavy transfer of German divisions from East to West, and the correspondents are all agog as to the big offensive, the date and whereabouts of which appear to be known to every journalistic expert," who is intimately acquainted with Ludendorff's projects. We know nothing of these mysteries, nor have we any desire to probe them. We have not the faintest idea as to where or when, if at all, the enemy will move. We only know that several thousand guns, which this time last year were firing from Allied positions upon the enemy, are now in the latter's hands, and might fire upon the Allies, though whether there are the necessary munitions for this vast accretion we do not know. Not only were there immense captures from the Italian army, including over two thousand guns, but an unspecified number were surrendered without fighting by the Russians, who have since added insult to injury by repudiating the debt incurred for weapons which at great sacrifice the Allies supplied them on the urgent appeal of the Petrograd Government. We are officially warned to prepare for superior enemy numbers and gun-power in the West. There may be sudden attacks on an unprecedented scale, considerable reverses and substantial losses in prisoners, through the overrunning of our divisions as the Germans were overwhelmed at Arras, at Messines, at Ypres, and during the opening stages of Cambrai last year. It were wiser to be ready for regrettable incidents without anticipating disaster or decision. Though heavily handicapped in some respects through no fault of its own, the British Army under Sir Douglas Haig is a splendid fighting machine, and we learnt on the Somme and the Ancre in 1916, as on the Hindenburg Line in 1917, that "a bulge" is not necessarily "a break through." There may be bulges, but there should be no break through on any part of the Western Front. We only hope that the Government will show more trust in the people, of whom it

demands unlimited trust, than hitherto, and will allow us to know the truth, however disagreeable, when it is known to the enemy. The British do best when treated seriously.

The French
Advantage

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THE French Army is at the top of its form and to-day fights with one immense advantage. Officers and men, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, believe in M. Clemenceau, whose very nickname--derisive in peace, tremendous in war-" the Tiger," is a recognized national asset. Men fight better under tigers than under monkeys and jackals or charlatans. The French Prime Minister knows and understands and admires the French Army, which reciprocates his sentiments. He is entirely free from that paltry jealousy which has occasionally poisoned the relations between ambitious politicians and soldiers, being inspired by the former's jealousy of the latter's distinction and prestige. The Tiger" has the heart of a lion. With all his seventy-six years, men of action leave his presence as they left the presence of Pitt, who was half his age, feeling braver than when they came. It would be impossible to overrate the value of such a personality at such a crisis, not only to the Republic, but to the entire Entente. Some of our Pacifists who pride themselves on their cosmopolitanism, though they are insular in their ignorance of every foreign country and of every foreign statesman, complain because M. Clemenceau has no time or inclination while the Mailed Fist is on his country's throat to sentimentalize about War Aims," as more distant Democrats can afford to do. He has told us that his policy can be expressed in one word, "Victory." With that in hand the Allies might realize all their ideals and aspirations so far as these are attainable in a world which will fall short of the millennium, even after the Boche is put on his back. But without M. Clemenceau's "Victory," pace Mr. Arnold Bennett, the Allies can do nothing except devote themselves to preparation for future wars and rumours of wars.

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WE may put the point thus: civilization could endure, or at any rate exist, without some of Mr. Arnold Bennett's War Aimsas to which we confess to being hazy-but it would vanish unless M. Clemenceau gets his Victory. If genuine Pacifists