to certain objects, or on certain subjects only, and perfectly sane with respect to other objects and on other subjects. In such a case he labors under partial insanity, or insane dǝlusions. Because of disease of the mind he sees objects in a false light, or believes in the existence of facts which do not exist. This phase of insanity was also covered by the answer of the judges in the McNaghten Case, referred to in the preceding section. They said: In case "he labors under a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in selfdefense, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment." 272

272 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car, & K. 130, Beale's Cas. 231.

(b) Connection between the Delusion and the Act. In all cases of delusion, the delusion must be connected with the act in the relation of cause and effect. A man is not exempt from responsibility merely because he is partially insane. If he does an act, the nature of which he understands, and which he knows to be wrong, he is none the less responsible because he is insane on other subjects."

278

Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224; People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333.

277 Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588.

This rule was also applied by the New York court of appeals in the late case of People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, where a convict had killed a fellow convict under an alleged insane delusion that the deceased was spying upon him, and had divulged a plan to escape.

And in People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, it was applied where a husband killed his wife under an alleged insane delusion, for several months, that she was putting poison in his food.

278 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, Beale's Cas. 231; Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106; Bovard v. State, 30 Miss. 600; Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230; State v. Geddis, 42 Iowa, 264; State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 446; State v. Danby, 1 Houst. C. C. (Del.) 166; Dejarnette v. Com., 75 Va. 867, 877; State v.

(c) Erroneous Belief Based upon Reasoning and Reflection.-A delusion, to be an insane delusion, so as to exempt a man from responsibility, must be the result of disease of the mind rendering him incapable of reason with respect to the object of the delusion. It must be an unreasoning belief in the exist ence of facts, and not merely an erroneous belief based upon reasoning and reflection. This distinction was brought out with admirable clearness by Judge Cox in his charge to the jury in the Guiteau Case. An opinion, he said, however erroneous or absurd, formed upon reasoning and reflection, or examination of evidence, is not an insane delusion, and never exempts a man from responsibility for his acts. If a man, from mental disease, should believe that God had appeared to him, and commanded him to kill his child as a sacrifice, this would be an insane delusion, and, if he should sacrifice his child in obedience to the supposed command of the Almighty, he would not be responsible for the homicide; but if a man, by reading newspapers and by reasoning, however absurdly, should come to

Maier, 36 W. Va. 757; State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; U. S. v. Ridgeway, 31 Fed. 144.

the conclusion that the good of the country required the removal of the president, and should assassinate him, he would be guilty of murder.279

279 It was further said by Judge Cox in the Guiteau case: "The important thing is that an insane delusion is never the result of reasoning and reflection. It is not generated by them, and it cannot be dispelled by them. A man may reason himself, and be reasoned by others, into absurd opinions, and may be persuaded into impracticable schemes and vicious resolutions, but he cannot be reasoned or persuaded into insanity or insane delusions. Whenever convictions are founded on evidence, or comparison of facts and opinions and arguments, they are not insane delusions. The insane delusion does not relate to mere sentiments or theories on abstract questions in law, politics, or religion. All these are subjects of opinions, which are beliefs founded on reasoning and reflection. * When men reason, the law requires them to reason correctly, as far as their practical duties are concerned. When they have the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, they are bound to do it. Opinions, properly so called, i. e., beliefs resulting from reasoning, reflection, or examination of evidence, afford no protection against the penal consequences of crime. * A man may reason himself into a conviction of the expediency and patriotic character of political assassination, but to allow him to find shelter behind that belief, as an insane delusion, would be monstrous." Guiteau's

97. Insane Irresistible Impulse.

(a) View That It is no Defense.—Whether or not an insane irresistible impulse to do an act exempts one from responsibility, when he has the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, and does know, when he does the act, that it is wrong, is a question upon which the courts do not agree. The English courts, since the MeNaughten Case, and many of the courts in this country, refuse to recognize this condition of the mind as a ground of exemption, but limit the test to the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act. Some of them, even in the face of medical testimony to the contrary, refuse to recognize the existence of such a mental condition as an insane irresistible impulse to do an act known to be wrong, but regard it as mere moral perversion. These courts hold that the only test of responsibility is the capacity to know that the act is wrong, and that a man who has such capacity is fully responsible, no matter what impulse may have driven him to do the act.280

Case, 10 Fed. 161. And see State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333.

280 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car.