mind; 252 and it must be irresistible, or, in other words, the disease must exist "to such

referred to in a preceding section. In Reg. v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525, he said, referring to the accused: "If some controlling disease was in truth the acting power within him, which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible."

It has been objected that it is difficult to apply this rule; but, as was said by Judge Sommerville in Parsons v. State, supra, the difficulty does not lie in the rule, but is inherent in the subject of insanity itself; and the same objection applies to the "right and wrong test," and will apply to any other test.

In Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385, 83 Am. Dec. 231, the supreme court of Illinois, after expressing doubt as to what the rule or tests should be in cases of alleged insanity, laid down this rule: "Whenever it should appear from the evidence that, at the time of doing the act charged, the prisoner was not of sound mind, but affected with insanity, and such affection was the efficient cause of the act, and that he would not have done the act but for that affection, he ought to be acquitted. But this unsoundness of mind, or affection of insanity, must be of such a degree as to create an uncontrollable impulse to do the act charged, by overriding the reason and judgment, and obliterating the sense of right and wrong as to the particular act done, and depriving the accused of the power of choosing between them." And see Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555.

282 Bolling v. State, 54 Ark, 588; Parsons v.

an extent as to subjugate the intellect, and render it impossible for the person to do otherwise than yield thereto." 283 The act must have been the product of the disease solely.281 98. Moral and Emotional Insanity, So Called.

Whenever irresistible impulse is relied upon as a defense, care must be taken to distinguish between insane irresistible impulse —that is, irresistible impulse resulting from disease of the mind-and mere moral perversion and passion. The expression "moral insanity" is often used, but, strictly speaking, it is not insanity at all. It is merely a perverted or abnormal condition of the moral system, where the mind is sound. It is well settle.1 that there is no exemption from responsibility merely because of moral insanity, or because of ungovernable passion, sometimes called "emotional insanity." 285

State, 81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193, Beale's Cas. 242, and other cases cited in the note preceding; and post, § 98.

283 Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262. And see Scott v. Com. 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138.

284 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193, Beale's Cas. 242; Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523. 285 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193, Beale's Cas. 242; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala.

99. Periodical Insanity.

A man may be periodically insane,-that is, insane at times only, with lucid intervals. When such a man is charged with a crime, the question is, what was his mental condition at the very time the act was committed? His condition then, and not before or afterwards,

307, 35 Am. Rep. 20; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588; Williams v. State, 50 Ark. 511; People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 473, Beale's Cas. 269; Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433, 16 Am. St. Rep. 408; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550; Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94, 32 Am. Rep. 99; State v. Mewherter, 46 Iowa, 88; State v. Felter, 25 Iowa, 67; Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 37; People' v. Mortimer, 48 Mich. 37; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482; People v. Foy, 138 N. Y. 664; State v. Murray, 11 Or. 413, 6 Cr. Law Mag. 255; Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 262; Lynch v. Com., 77 Pa. St. 205, 213; State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 131; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 58 Am. Rep. 638.

Construing the language of the court literally, moral insanity seems to have been regarded as a defense in Scott v. Com., 4 Metc. (Ky.) 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461, but there can be little doubt that the court meant insane irresistible impulse.

In a Connecticut case it was said that moral insanity may reduce a homicide from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree. Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 Am. Rep. 669. But see U. S. v. Lee, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 489, 54 Am. Rep. 293,

determines his responsibility,286 though, of course, his condition before and afterwards may be considered in determining his condition at the time, and may give rise to presumptions.

VIII. RESPONSIBILITY

100. In

OF DRUNKEN PER

SONS.

General.-Drunkenness furnishes no

ground of exemption from responsibility for crime except in the following cases:

1. Where it was involuntary, and so excessive as to temporarily deprive the accused of his reason.

2. Where the act was done while suffering from settled insanity or delirium tre

mens.

3. Where it negatives the commission of the act by the accused.

4. Where it negatives the existence of a specific intent, or of a knowledge of facts, which is an essential element of the crime charged.

5. In prosecutions for murder, evidence that the accused was drunk is immaterial, except for the following purposes:

(a) By the weight of authority, it may be

286 U. S. v. Sickles, 2 Hayw. & H. 319, Fed. Cas. No. 16287a; Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. Law, 196; Com. v. Winnemore, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 356,

considered in determining whether he acted under provocation and not from malice, if there was provocation, but not otherwise.

(b) And by the weight of authority, it may be considered for the purpose of determining whether he was capable of the premeditation and deliberation, or the specific intent to kill, necessary to constitute murder in the first degree.

101. Voluntary Drunkenness.

(a) In General.-No rule of law is more firmly established, and few have been more frequently applied, than the rule that voluntary drunkenness does not exempt a man from criminal responsibility for his acts. A drunken man is as fully responsible for his acts as a sober man, though he may have been so drunk as to be temporarily deprived of his reason and rendered incapable of knowing what he was doing, unless the fact of drunkenness negatives the existence of a specific intent or knowledge, which is an essential ingredient of the particular offense charged, or unless the accused was suffering from delirium tremens, or settled insanity resulting from previous habits of intemperance. "This vice," said Sir Matthew Hale, "doth