deprive a man of his reason, and puts many men into a perfect, but temporary, frenzy; but by the laws of England such a person shall have no privileges by his voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judg ment as if he were in his right senses.

91287

287 1 Hale, P. C. 32. And see 1 Inst. 247; 3 Inst. 46; 4 Bl. Comm. 25, 26; Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 125a; Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 144, Beale's Cas. 261; Burrow's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 75; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 472, Beale's Cas. 269; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484, Beale's Cas. 264.

The doctrine is applied in the following cases: U. S. v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1; Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28, Fed. Cas. No. 14,993; Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149, 20 Am. Rep. 292; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44; People v. Ferris, 55 Cal. 588; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232; Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452, 470; Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118; Upstone v. People, 109 Ill. 169; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550; Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush. (Ky.) 463, 8 Am. Rep. 465; State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.) 463; Com. v. Malone, 114 Mass. 295; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich, 9, 97 Am. Dec. 162; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22; Warner v. State, 56 N. J. Law, 686, 44 Am. St. Rep. 415; Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 Am. Rep. 556; State v. John, 8 Ired. (N. C.) 330, 49 Am. Dec. 396; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 58 Am. Rep. 263; Evers v.

(b) Does not Aggravate Offense.-Lord Coke said that drunkenness, instead of ex

State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 318, 37 Am. St. R. 811; Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. Dec. 539; State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483; Boswell v. Com. Grat. (Va.) 860; Willis v. Com. 32 Grat. (Va.) 929; State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799; State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491, 13 Am. St. Rep. 875.

"If a man chooses to get drunk," said Baron Alderson, "it is his own voluntary act. It is very different from madness, which is not caused by any act of the person. That voluntary species of madness which it is in a party's power to abstain from, he must answer for." Rex v. Meakin, 7 Car. & P. 297.

"Such a principle is absolutely essential to the protection of life and property. In the forum of conscience, there is no doubt considerable difference between a murder deliberately planned and executed by a person of unclouded intellect, and the reckless taking of life by one infuriated by intoxication; but human laws are based upon considerations of policy, and look ratner to the maintenance of personal security and social order than to an accurate discrimination as to the moral qualities of individual conduct. But there is, in truth, no injustice in holding a person responsible for his acts committed in a state of voluntary intoxication. It is a duty which every one owes to his fellow men and to society, to say nothing of more solemn obligations, to preserve, so far as it lies in his own power, the inestimable gift of reason. If it is perverted or destroyed by fixed dis

empting a man from criminal responsibility, aggravates the offense,288 but this is not the law,289

102. Use of Morphine and Cocaine.

It would seem clear that if a person voluntarily uses morphine and cocaine, not as medicine, but for the same reason for which one uses intoxicating liquors to excess, and thereby puts himself in such a condition as to be unable to reason or to distinguish between right and wrong, he should occupy precisely the same position as one who voluntarily becomes drunk by the use of intoxicating liquors. There seems to be no good reason for making any distinction. It has been held, however, in a late Texas case, that the rule is not the same, and that a person who is in such a condition by reason of the recent and voluntary use of morphine and cocaine, even in

ease, though brought on by his own vices, the law holds him not accountable. But if, by a voluntary act, he temporarily casts off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done him if he is considered answerable for any injury which, in that state, he may do to others or to society." Per Denio, J., in People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484, Beale's Cas. 264.

288 3 Inst. 46; Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 125 a. 289 McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514.

conjunction with the use of intoxicating liquors, is not responsible."

290

103. Drunkenness of Insane Person.

If a person is insane to such an extent as to be irresponsible, under the rules governing the criminal responsibility of insane persons, 291 the fact that he is also voluntarily drunk at the time he commits an act does not render him responsible. "It is as possible for an insane man to get drunk as a sane one. The addition of drunkenness to insanity does does not withdraw from such person the protection due to insanity, but, where a person commits homicide during drunkenness, reliance must be placed upon the original in

290 Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 386. In this case, the charge was assault with intent to murder, and the decision may be sustained because of the rule that voluntary drunkenness, even from intoxicating liquors, may be shown to negative the existence of a necessary specific intent. § 107. The court, however, clearly held, contrary to reason, it seems, that temporary insanity from the voluntary use of cocaine and morphine is not subject to the same rules as temporary insanity from the voluntary use of intoxicating liquors.

291 Ante, § 93 et seq.

sanity itself, and not upon the subsequent drunkenness."292

104. Involuntary Drunkenness.

The rule that drunkenness is no defense does not apply in the case of involuntary drunkenness, as where a man is intoxicated

292 State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 774; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 472, Beale's Cas. 269; Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278; People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334. And see Edwards v. State, 38 Tex.

Cr. R. 386.

In a late Louisiana case it was held that, when a charge of murder is defended on the ground that the accused was laboring under delirium tremens at the time of the commitment of the act, and that he was therefore unable to know, realize, or appreciate what he was doing, the delirium tremens must be shown to have antedated the fit of drunkenness during which the act was committed. The court said: "In other words, if a person, being in possession of his mental faculties, voluntarily gets into a fit of drunkenness, and during such drunkenness commits a homicide under a diseased mental condition, occasioned by the same, he cannot set up such diseased mental condition as an excuse for his act; that, in order that a man should stand excused for a homicide committed during drunkenness, and while in a diseased mental condition, the diseased mental condition which excuses the homicide should be able to be successfully urged as an excuse for the act of getting drunk." State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766.