Board of sury. instructions from the former, which would be inconsistent with the performance of their duty to Parliament.1 But notwithstanding its parliamentary origin and pecupendent on liar responsibilities, the Board of Audit has been hitherto the Trea- regarded as a department of the executive government, dependent upon the Treasury exclusively for the regulation of its strength, resources, and organisation; and as regards the examination of accounts under the administrative audit, it is strictly dependent upon the Treasury. The gradual extension of the principle of the appropriation audit, however, has been the means of elevating the Board of Audit into a more independent position. As soon as the main functions of the auditors shall be, not to act on behalf of the Treasury as a check upon the transactions of Treasury accountants, but on behalf of the House of Commons as a check upon the pecuniary transactions of the Treasury itself, of the other great departments of state, and of the executive government generally, the auditors will probably become, in fact as well as in theory, the servants of the House of Commons, and dependent upon the House, not only for guidance as to what duties they should perform but for the means of performing those duties efficiently.m Is in fact a mere Board of Verification. Still, it is important to remember that the Board of Audit was never designed to exercise any direct control over the public expenditure. In the words of Mr. Gladstone, it is a board to ensure truth and accuracy in the accounts of the public expenditure, and might properly be termed a board of verification.' To attempt to confer upon it coercive and controlling powers would be to transfer to it what strictly belongs to the House of Commons." It is as an auxiliary to the labours of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts that the investi 1 Rep. Com. Pub. Accts. 1865, caulay, Secretary Bd. of Audit, p. Evid. 1191-1200. 148. " Hans. Deb. vol. clxv. p. 1350. gations of the Board of Audit are mainly important, and are capable of being made increasingly valuable.° functions Board. By the Act of 1866, for consolidating the duties of the Enlarged Exchequer and Audit departments, the duties and respon- of the sibilities of the commissioners of audit are considerably Audit increased. They will now be required to examine the accounts connected with the permanent charges on the Consolidated Fund, the accounts relating to the receipts of money payable into the Exchequer, and the whole of the accounts relating to the voted services. In addition to this, it is provided by section 33 of the said Act, that the Treasury shall have the power, in case of any other accounts coming before them which, on public grounds, they might consider it desirable to subject to revision, to refer the same to the commissioners of audit for examination, even though they did not relate to the receipt and expenditure of public imperial funds. It has been suggested, however, by officers of the board and others, that this power. should only be exercised in rare and peculiar cases, and that as a rule the labours of the commissioners should be as much as possible confined to the business of examining accounts relating to the receipt, issue, and expenditure, of imperial funds." It is furthermore provided by section 34 of this Act, Audit of that all public officers who are in the receipt of fees shall fees. account for the same to the audit office. But this security is confessedly inadequate as a means of ascertaining whether all the fees received in any public department are brought to credit. All it can accomplish is to provide that all the fees brought to credit are duly accounted for. The check upon receipts must necessarily be conducted by some efficient system of check and countercheck in the department itself. dent posi Audit Board under the new Act. Indepen- into the system of auditing the public accounts. Indetion of the pendently of the advantages to be anticipated from the general application of the appropriation audit to every branch of the public expenditure, a point to be hereafter specially noticed, much benefit will result from the greater degree of independence assigned to the audit officers over that which they previously enjoyed. It is true that the Treasury is still empowered to appoint, from time to time, such officers as may be required for conducting the business of the department, and to regulate their number and salaries. But this power is conferred upon the Treasury expressly in order that there may be some member of the government, having a seat in the House of Commons, responsible for such appointments. And, on the Departmental Audit. other hand, the Comptroller and Auditor General is authorised to promote, suspend, or remove, any of the employés in his department; to make rules for the conduct of business therein; and (subject to the approval of the Treasury) to establish regulations for the guidance of all public accountants." In proceeding to define, more particularly, the functions which appertain to the Board of Audit, as a department for examining and verifying the public accounts, it should be premised that, irrespective of the operations of this board, every department in the state is bound to apply to their expenditure some sort of check or departmental audit, whether their accounts are examined by independent auditors or not.t And in addition to the check to which public accounts Hans. Deb. vol. clxxxii. p. 1864. Rep. Com. Pub. Accts. (Excheq. and Audit Bill), 1866, Evid. 291303. Ibid. 1865, Evid. 289. Thus the accounts of the Foreign Office have not hitherto been audited by the Audit Board, but by the permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Hans. Deb. vol. clxxix. p. 1100. But under the pro visions of the Public Moneys and Accounts Act of 1866, it is provided that, from April 1, 1867, these accounts shall be subjected to the Appropriation Audit, and to the revi sion of the Comptroller and Auditor General. See Special Report from Com. on Pub. Accts. 1866, on the Exchequer and Audit Departments Bill, Evid. 314-383. may be subjected in the department to which they relate, all accounts of public expenditure are liable to two kinds of audit-1. The administrative audit; 2. The appropriation audit. trative The administrative audit, as its name imports, is con- Adminisducted on behalf of the Treasury, with a view to purposes audit. which are purely administrative. Until recently, this was the only kind of audit applied to the public accounts; and it is still (1866) the only check which is applied to the miscellaneous civil service accounts, with certain exceptions to be hereafter noticed. This audit may be conducted by any persons whom the Treasury shall appoint; in fact, it is sometimes conducted by the Paymaster in Scotland, by the Paymaster-General, by the Board of Trade, and even by the Treasury itself. But, in general, it is conducted by the Board of Audit, acting exclusively on behalf of the Treasury, and with a view to enable the Treasury to maintain their legitimate authority and control over the various departments of expenditure." The board has no authority to apply this audit to the public expenditure generally, but only to such accounts as they may be directed by the Treasury to examine. Apart from the mere business of checking the accounts, it is the main duty of the board, in conducting this audit, to determine whether the departmental expenditure has been in accordance with Treasury instructions, whether special or general. After receiving the auditor's report, it becomes the duty of the Treasury to decide what should be done in respect to any irregularity, or departure from the directions of the Treasury, that may be pointed out therein." It is not a little curious, that amongst the numerous statutory provisions relating to the administrative audit, none can be found which imposes on the auditors the duty tion of the trative audit. Imperfee of questioning, or even of noticing, any expenditure that adminis- may have been incurred in excess of a parliamentary vote, or in respect of a service for which no appropriation whatever had been made." This left the door open for much abuse, and enabled the Treasury to expend money which had been granted for one service for entirely different purposes, without fear of detection or censure by Parliament. Sometimes it happened, however, that such reckless and extravagant expenditure was incurred, more particularly on behalf of the army or navy, as to call for the special interposition of Parliament.* For example, Origin of the appro the Admiralty account, for a series of years prior to 1831, was systematically misappropriated.' It was not until the year 1832 that a partial remedy was found for this evil, by the introduction of a new description of audit, which will now engage our attention. b. THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF THE APPROPRIATION AUDIT. It reflects the highest credit upon the government, that we are indebted, for this important administrative reform, audit. to one who held at the time a prominent office in the priation state. In the year 1832, Sir James Graham, who was at that time First Lord of the Admiralty, introduced into the House of Commons a Bill for the better regulation of the naval accounts, the most prominent feature of which was a provision empowering the commissioners of audit to examine the accounts and vouchers of naval expenditure, side by side with the votes and estimates for the naval service; and to report the result of the comparison annually to the House of Commons. This Bill became law; and, pursuant to its requirements, the votes for naval services were, for the first time, arranged under distinct heads, or branches of expenditure, in the annual Appropriation W Rep. Com. Pub. Accounts, 1865, Rep. Com. Pub. Accounts, 1865, App. p. 119. p. 119. 3 Hatsell, pp. 209–211. |