and that his great fecret was nothing else but Con

tent.

This virtue does indeed produce, in fome meafure, all thofe effects which the alchymift ufually afcribes to what he calls the philofopher's ftone; and if it does not bring riches, it does the fame thing, by banishing the defire of them. If it cannot remove the disquietudes arifing out of a man's mind, body, or fortune, it makes him eafy under them. It has indeed a kindly influence on the foul of man, in refpect of every being to whom he ftands related. It extinguishes all murmur, repining, and ingratitude towards that Being who has allotted him his part to act in this world. It deftroys all inordinate ambition, and every tendency to corruption, with regard to the community wherein he is placed. It gives fweetnefs to his converfation, and a perpetual ferenity to all his thoughts.

Among the many methods which might be made ufe of for the acquiring of this virtue, I shall only mention the two following. First of all, a man fhould always confider how much he has more than he wants; and fecondly, How much more unhappy he might be than he really is.

First of all, a man should always confider how much more he has than he wants. I am wonderfully pleafed with the reply which Ariftippus made to one who condoled him upon the lofs of a farm: Why, faid he, I have three farms ftill, and you have but one; fo that I ought rather to be afflicted for you than you for me. On the contrary, foolish men are more apt to confider what they have loft than what they poffefs; and to fix their eyes upon those who are richer than themselves, rather than on those who are under greater difficulties. All the real pleasures and conveniencies of life, lie in a narrow compafs; but it is the humour of mankind to be always looking forward, and ftraining after one who has got the start of them in wealth and ho

nour.

nour. For this reafon, as there are none can be properly called rich, who have not more than they want: There are few rich men in any of the politer nations but among the middle fort of people, who keep their wishes within their fortunes, and have more wealth than they know how to enjoy. Perfons of a higher rank live in a kind of splendid poverty, and are perpetually wanting, because inftead of acquiefcing in the folid pleasures of life, they endeavour to outvy one another in fhadows and appearances. Men of fenfe have at all times beheld with a great deal of mirth this filly game that is playing over their heads, and by contracting their defires enjoy all that fecret fatisfaction which others are always in queft of. The truth is, this ridiculous chace after imaginary pleafures cannot be fufficiently expofed, as it is the great fource of thofe evils which generally undo a nation. Let a man's eftate be what it will, he is a poor man if he does not live within it, and naturally fets himself to fale to any one that can give him his price. When Pittacus, after the death of his brother, who had left him a good eftate, was offered a great fum of money by the King of Lydia, he thanked him for his kindness, but told him he had already more by half than he knew what to do with. In fhort, content is equivalent to wealth, and luxury to poverty; or, to give the thought a more agreeable turn, Content is natural wealth, fays Socrates; to which I fhall add, Luxury is artificial poverty. I fhall therefore recommend to the confideration of those who are always aiming after fuperfluous and imaginary enjoyments, and will not be at the trouble of contracting their defires, an excellent faying of Bion the philofopher; namely, That no man has fo much care, as he who endeavours after the most happiness.

In the fecond place, every one ought to reflect how much more unhappy he might be than he VOL. VIII

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really

really is. The former confideration took in all thofe who are fufficiently provided with the means to make themselves eafy; this regards fuch as actually lie under fome preffure or misfortune. These may receive great alleviation from fuch a comparifon as the unhappy perfon may make between himfelf and others, or between the misfortune, which he fuffers, and greater misfortunes which might have befallen him.

I like the ftory of the honeft Dutchman, who, upon breaking his Leg by a fall from the mainmast, told the ftanders-by, it was a great mercy that it was not his Neck. To which, fince I am got into quotations, give me leave to add the faying of an old philofopher, who, after having invited fome of his friends to dine with him, was ruffled by his wife that came into the room in a paffion, and threw down the table that ftood before them: Every one, fays he, has his calamity, and he is an happy man that has no greater than this. We find an inftance to the fame purpose in the life of Doctor Hammond, written by Bishop Fell. As this good man was troubled with a complication of diftempers, when he had the gout upon him, he used to thank God that it was not the ftone; and when he had the ftone, that he had not both thefe diftempers on him at the fame time.

I cannot conclude this effay without obferving, that there was never any fyftem befides that of Christianity, which could effectually produce in the mind of man the virtue I have been hitherto speaking of. In order to make us content with our prefent condition, many of the prefent philofophers tell us, that our difcontent only hurts ourselves, without being able to make any alteration in our circumftances; others, that whatever evil befals us, is derived to us by a fatal neceffity, to which the gods themselves are fubject; while others very gravely tell the man who is miferable, that it is neceffary

ceffary he should be fo to keep up the harmony of the univerfe, and that the Scheme of Providence would be troubled and perverted were he otherwife. Thefe, and the like confiderations, rather filence than fatisfy a man. They may fhew him, that his difcontent is unreafonable, but are by no means fufficient to relieve it. They rather give difpair than confolation. In a word; a man might reply to one of thefe comforters, as Auguftus did to his friend, who advifed hinr not to grieve for the death of a perfon whom he loved, because his grief could not fetch him again: It is for that very reason, faid the Emperor; that I grieve.

On the contrary, Religion bears a more tender regard to human nature. It prefcribes to a very miferable man the means of bettering his condition; nay, it fhews him that the bearing of his afflictions as he ought to do will naturally end in the removal of them: It makes him eafy here, because it can make him happy hereafter.

Upon the whole, a contented mind is the greateft bleffing a man can enjoy in this world; and if in the prefent life his happiness arifes from the fubduing of his defires, it will arife in the next from the gratification of them.

A LEWD young fellow feeing an aged Hermit go by him barefoot, Father, fays he, you are in a very miferable condition if there is not another world. True fon, faid the Hermit, but what is thy condition if there is ? Man is a creature defigned for H 2

two

two different states of being, or rather for two different lives. His firft life is fhort and tranfient; his fecond permanent and lafting. The question we are all concerned in, is this, In which of those two lives is our chief interest to make ourselves happy? Or, in other words, Whether we fhould endeavour to fecure to ourselves the pleasures and gratifications of a life which is uncertain and precarious, and at its utmost length of a very inconfiderable duration; or to fecure to ourselves the pleafures of a life which is fixed and fettled, and will never end? Every man, upon the first hearing of this question, knows very well which fide of it he ought to close with. But however right we are in theory, it is plain that in practice we adhere to the wrong fide of the question. We make provifions for this life as though it were never to have an end, and for the other life as though it were never to have a beginning.

Should a fpirit of fuperior rank, who is a stranger to human nature, accidentally alight upon the earth, and take a furvey of its inhabitants; what would his notions of us be? Would not he think that we are a fpecies of beings made for quite different ends and purposes than what we really are? Muft not he imagine that we were placed in this world to get riches and honours? Would not he think that it was our duty to toil after wealth, and station, and title? Nay, would not he believe we were forbidden poverty by threats of eternal punishment, and enjoined to purfue our pleafures under pain of damnation? He would certainly imagine that we were influenced by a fcheme of duties quite oppofite to thofe which are indeed prefcribed to us. And truly, according to fuch an imagination, he must conclude that we are a fpecies of the most obedient creatures in the univerfe; that we are conftant to our duty; and that we keep a steddy eye on the end for which we were fent hither.

But