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Toward a New Institutional Economics
The Organizational Failures Framework
Peer Groups and Simple Hierarchies
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adaptive advantages agreement antitrust argument assessment assets assumes attributable auditing bargaining behavior bounded rationality capital market ceteris paribus Chapter circumstances collusion competition complex condition conglomerate contingent claims contracts decision decision-making default failure discussion distortions divisionalized divisions dominant firm economic effects efficiency employment relation enforcement enterprise entrants entry exchange experience-rating factors favor first-mover advantages idiosyncratic incentive individual industry information impactedness inside contracting interfirm internal labor markets internal organization involved issues large firms learning-by-doing limited M-form market failure market structure markets and hierarchies ment modes monopolistic monopoly moral hazard nontrivial oligopolistic oligopoly operating opportunism opportunistic organization form organizational failures framework organizational innovations outcomes parties peer group performance posed potential price discrimination problems profit profit maximization realized reasons regarded requires respect result risk Section sequential simple hierarchy small-numbers stage Stigler strategic supplier supply technological tion transaction costs types uncertainty vertical integration workers