Report to Congress Kosovo Operation Allied Force after-action reportDIANE Publishing |
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addition agreement air defense system Air Force aircraft aircrews airlift Albania alliance assessment assets attack Augmentation Belgrade campaign CAOC challenges CINCs coalition collateral damage command-and-control communications conduct conflict continue coordination crisis cruise missiles Deep Operations Defense Capabilities Initiative deployed deployment data develop effective employed engineering enhance ensure Europe execution Federal Republic future ground forces improve in-transit visibility infrastructure intelligence interoperability JDAM Joint Force joint operational architecture Joint Staff Joint Task Force lessons learned logistics major theater wars military forces military operations Milosevic missions nations NATO NATO’s North Atlantic Council Operation Allied Force operational plans options personnel precision preferred munitions procedures reconnaissance refugees Republic of Macedonia Republic of Yugoslavia requirements Serb Serbian Services sorties Standoff strategic strike success surface-to-air missiles surveillance tactics Task Force Hawk U.S. forces UAVs UNCLASSIFIED Figure United unmanned aerial vehicles weapons Yugoslav Yugoslavia
Popular passages
Page 9 - Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police, and paramilitary forces; • Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; • Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian air organizations; and • Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.
Page 7 - NATO's operational plan, the development of which began in the summer of 1998. Phase 0 was the deployment of air assets into the European theater. Phase 1 would establish air superiority over Kosovo and degrade command and control over the whole of the FRY. Phase 2 would attack military targets in Kosovo and those FRY forces south of 44 degrees north latitude, which were providing reinforcement to Serbian forces into Kosovo. This was to allow targeting of forces not only in Kosovo, but also in...
Page 12 - States would have to prosecute two major theater wars nearly simultaneously would be extraordinarily demanding—well beyond that required for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991. It would involve our complete commitment as a nation and would entail all elements of our total force . ... Consistent with our defense strategy, US forces could not...
Page 9 - Testimony will be presented this morning by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and later by other officials directly concerned with each part of the program.
Page 12 - ... equipped to fight. Commenting on this particular issue after the Kosovo War, the US OAF After-Action Report to the Congress explicitly considered OAF's impact on US strategy: "In considering the implications of OAF for US defense strategy, two important questions arise: what would be the impact of OAF on our ability to execute a single major theater war (MTW), and did the participation of US forces jeopardize our ability to execute the most demanding requirement of the defense strategy, namely...
Page 25 - Force would not have been possible to conduct without the use of our allies' military infrastructure, including military bases, airfields, and airspace. Notwithstanding these contributions, the operation highlighted a number of disparities between US capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities. The gaps...
Page 8 - Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and para-military forces; Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence...
Page 120 - US forces to mount two major wars in defense of our vital interests elsewhere, we are confident that we would have been able to do so, albeit at higher levels of risk. We were cognizant of these risks at the time and made various adjustments in our posture and plans to address them.
Page 108 - Losses due to accidents were few; indeed, they were even below levels typically anticipated in peacetime operations. The capability of US forces to achieve this degree of success is reassuring, but must be tempered by an understanding of the indirect costs in terms of reduced readiness in US -based forces and the post-conflict "reconstitution" expenses necessary to restore the deployed forces to a satisfactory steady-state operational tempo. Further, as discussed elsewhere, certain key force elements...
Page 25 - US administration asserted that " -the operation highlighted a number of disparities between US . capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities. The gaps in capability that we confronted were real, and they had the effect of impeding our ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with our NATO allies. For example, because few NATO allies could employ precision munitions in sufficient numbers (or at all), the United...