Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and PhilosophyAnthropic Bias explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes: the Doomsday Argument; Sleeping Beauty; the Presumptuous Philosopher; Adam & Eve; the Absent-Minded Driver; the Shooting Room. And there are the applications in contemporary science: cosmology ("How many universes are there?", "Why does the universe appear fine-tuned for life?"); evolutionary theory ("How improbable was the evolution of intelligent life on our planet?"); the problem of time's arrow ("Can it be given a thermodynamic explanation?"); quantum physics ("How can the many-worlds theory be tested?"); game-theory problems with imperfect recall ("How to model them?"); even traffic analysis ("Why is the 'next lane' faster?"). Anthropic Bias argues that the same principles are at work across all these domains. And it offers a synthesis: a mathematically explicit theory of observation selection effects that attempts to meet scientific needs while steering clear of philosophical paradox. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTHROPIC REASONING | 5 |
SYNOPSIS OF THIS BOOK | 7 |
FineTuning in Cosmology | 11 |
DOES FINETUNING NEED EXPLAINING? | 13 |
No INVERSE GAMBLERS FALLACY | 16 |
ROGER WHITE AND PHIL DOWES ANALYSIS | 18 |
SURPRISING vs UNSURPRISING IMPROBABLE EVENTS | 23 |
SLIDING REFERENCE OF SOON AND LATE? | 119 |
DOESNT YOUR THEORY PRESUPPOSE THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN CAUSALLY DISCONNECTED REGIONS AFFECTS WHAT HAPPENS HE... | 120 |
THE SELFINDICATION ASSUMPTIONIs THERE SAFETY IN NUMBERS? | 122 |
ObserverRelative Chances in Anthropic Reasoning? | 127 |
ANOTHER GO | 130 |
INDEXICAL FACTSNO CONFLICT WITH PHYSICALISM | 132 |
IN CONCLUSION | 136 |
THE NOBETTING RESULTS | 137 |
THE ANGEL PARABLE | 32 |
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS | 39 |
Anthropic Principles The Motley Family | 43 |
ANTHROPIC HODGEPODGE | 46 |
FREAK OBSERVERS AND WHY EARLTER FORMULATIONS ARE INADEQUATE | 51 |
THE SELFSAMPLING ASSUMPTION | 57 |
Thought Experiments Supporting the SelfSampling Assumption | 59 |
TWO THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS BY JOHN LESLIE | 62 |
THE INCUBATOR GEDANKEN | 64 |
THE REFERENCE CLASS PROBLEM | 69 |
The SelfSampling Assumption in Science | 73 |
SSA IN THERMODYNAMICS | 76 |
SSA IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY | 78 |
SSA IN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS | 82 |
SSA IN QUANTUM PHYSICS | 84 |
SUMMARY OF THE CASE FOR SSA | 86 |
The Doomsday Argument | 89 |
DOOMSAYER GOTT | 90 |
THE INCORRECTNESS OF GOTTS ARGUMENT | 92 |
DOOMSAYER LESLIE | 94 |
THE PREMISSES OF DA AND THE OLD EVIDENCE PROBLEM | 96 |
LESLIES VIEWS ON THE REFERENCE CLASS PROBLEM | 104 |
ALTERNATIVE CONCLUSIONS OF DA | 107 |
Invalid Objections Against the Doomsday Argument | 109 |
THE BABYPARADOX | 111 |
ISNT A SAMPLE SIZE OF ONE TOO SMALL? | 115 |
COULDNT A CROMAGNON MAN HAVE USED THE DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT? | 116 |
ARENT WE NECESSARILY ALIVE NOW? | 118 |
Paradoxes of the SelfSampling Assumption | 141 |
THE ADAM EVE EXPERIMENTS | 142 |
PREDICTIONS AND COUNTERFACTUALS | 144 |
REASONS AND ABILITIES | 150 |
SSA AND THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE | 154 |
UPSHOT | 156 |
THE METANEWCOMB PROBLEM | 157 |
Observation Selection Theory A Methodology for Anthropic Reasoning | 159 |
THE OUTLINE OF A SOLUTION | 161 |
TAKING ACCOUNT OF INDEXICAL INFORMATION OF OBSERVERMOMENTS | 162 |
REASSESSING INCUBATOR | 165 |
HOW THE REFERENCE CLASS MAY BE OBSERVERMOMENT RELATIVE | 168 |
THE OBSERVATION EQUATION | 172 |
A QUANTUM GENERALIZATION OF OE | 174 |
WHY R MUST BE REJECTED | 175 |
A SUBJECTIVE FACTOR IN THE CHOICE OF REFERENCE CLASS? | 181 |
Observation Selection Theory Applied | 185 |
THE FREAKOBSERVER PROBLEM PLACES ONLY LAX DEMANDS ON THE REFERENCE CLASS | 193 |
MODELING IMPERFECT RECALL | 194 |
THE CASE OF NO OUTSIDERS | 195 |
THE CASE WITH OUTSIDERS | 196 |
SYNTHESIS OF THE 12 AND THE 12 VIEWS | 198 |
ROBUSTNESS OF REFERENCE CLASS AND SCIENTIFIC SOLIDITY | 202 |
WRAPUP | 204 |
Bibliography | 207 |
219 | |
Other editions - View all
Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy Nick Bostrom Limited preview - 2013 |
Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy Nick Bostrom Limited preview - 2002 |
Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy Nick Bostrom No preview available - 2010 |