great King; neither fhalt thou fwear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black but let you communication be yea yea, nay nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."

To reconcile with this paffage of fcripture the practice of fwearing, or of taking oaths, when required by law, the following obfervations muft be attended to.

1. It does not appear, that fwearing "by heaven," "by the earth," "by Jerufalem," or "by their own head," was a form of fwearing ever made use of amongst the Jews in judicial oaths: and confequently, it is not probable that they were judicial oaths, which Chrift had in his mind when he mentioned those inftances.

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2. As to the feeming univerfality of the prohibition, "fwear not at all," the emphatic claufe "not at all," is to be read in connexion with what follows; "not at all," i. e. neither "by the heaven," nor "by the earth," nor "by Jerufalem," nor "by thy head;""not at all," does not mean upon no occafion, but by none of these forms. Our Saviour's argument feems to suppose, that the people to whom he fpake, made a diftinction between fwearing directly by "the name of God," and fwearing by those inferior objects of veneration, "the heavens," "the earth, Jerufalem," or "their own head." In oppofition to which diftinction he tells them, that, on account of the relation which these things bore to the Supreme Being, to fwear by any of them, was in effect and fubftance to fwear by him; "by heaven, for it is his throne; by the earth, for it is his footftool; by Jerufalem, for it is the city of the great King; by thy head, for it is his workmanship, not thine, thou canst not make one hair white or black:" for which reafon he fays, "fwear not at all," that is, neither directly by God, nor indirectly by any thing related to him. This interpretation is greatly con-> *

firmed, by a paffage in the twenty-third chapter of the fame Gofpel, where a fimilar diftinction, made by the Scribes and Pharifees, is replied to in the fame manner.

3. Our Saviour himfelf being "adjured by the living God," to declare whether he was the Chrift, the Son of God, or not, condefcended to answer the high priest, without making any objection to the oath (for fuch it was) upon which he examined him. "God is my witnefs," fays St. Paul to the Romans, "that without ceafing I make mention of you in my prayers:" and to the Corinthians ftill more ftrongly, "I call God for a record upon my foul, that to fpare you, I came not as yet to Corinth." Both these expreffions contain the nature of oaths. The epiftle to the Hebrews fpeaks of the cuftom of fwearing judicially, without any mark of cenfure or difapprobation: "Men verily fwear by the greater, and an oath, for confirmation, is to them an end of all ftrife."

Upon the ftrength of these reasons, we explain our Saviour's words to relate, not to judicial oaths, but to the practice of vain, wanton, and unauthorized fwearing, in common difcourfe. St. James' words, chap. v. 12. are not fo ftrong as our Saviour's, and therefore admit the fame explanation with more eafe.

IV. Oaths are nugatory, that is, carry with them no proper force or obligation, unless we believe, that God will punish falfe fwearing with more severity than a fimple lie, or breach of promife; for which belief there are the following reafons:

1. Perjury is a fin of greater deliberation. The juror has the thought of God and of religion upon his mind at the time; at leaft, there are very few who can shake them off entirely. He offends, therefore, if he do offend, with a high hand, in the face, that is, in defiance of the fanctions of religion. His offence implies a difbelief or contempt of God's

knowledge, power, and juftice, which cannot be faid of a lie, where there is nothing to carry the mind to any reflection upon the Deity, or the divine attri

butes at all.

2. Perjury violates a fuperior confidence. Mankind must trust to one another; and they have nothing better to truft to than one another's oath. Hence legal adjudications, which govern and affect every right and intereft on this fide the grave, of neceflity proceed and depend upon oaths. Perjury, therefore, in its general confequence, ftrikes at the fecurity of reputation, property, and even of life itself. A lie cannot do the fame mifchief, because the fame credit is not given to it.*

3. God directed the Ifraelites to fwear by his name; and was pleafed," in order to fhow the immutability of his own counfel," to confirm his covenant with that people by an oath neither of which it is probable he would have done, had he not intended to reprefent oaths, as having fome meaning. and effect, beyond the obligation of a bare promife; which effect must be owing to the feverer punishment with which he will vindicate the authority of oaths.

V. Promiffory oaths are not binding, where the promise itself would not be fo: for the feveral cafes of which, see the Chapter of Promifes.

VI. As oaths are defigned for the fecurity of the impofer, it is manifeft they must be interpreted, and performed in the fenfe in which the impofer intends them; otherwife, they afford no fecurity to him. And this is the meaning and reafon of the rule, "jurare in animum imponentis;" which rule the reader is defired to carry along with him, whilft we proceed to confider certain particular oaths, which are either of greater importance, or more likely to fall in our way than others.

Except, indeed, where a Quaker's or Moravian's affirmation is accepted in the place of an oath; in which cafe, a lie partakes, fo far as this reafon extends, of the nature and guilt of perjury.

† Deut. vi. 13. x. 29.

Heb. vi. 17.

Chapter XVII.

OATH IN EVIDENCE.

THE witnefs fwears, " to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, touching the matter in question."

Upon which it may be obferved, that the defigned concealment of any truth, which relates to the matter in agitation, is as much a violation of the oath, as to teftify a pofitive falfehood; and this whether the witnefs be interrogated to that particular point or not. For, when the perfon to be examined is fworn upon a voir dire, that is, in order to inquire, whether he ought to be admitted to give evidence in the caufe at all, the form runs thus: "You fhall true anfwer make to all fuch queftions as fhall be asked you;" but when he comes to be fworn in chief, he fwears " to speak the whole truth," without restraining it, as before, to the queftions that shall be asked: which difference fhews, that the law intends, in this latter cafe, to require of the witnefs, that he give a complete and unreferved account of what he knows of the subject of the trial, whether the questions propofed to him reach the extent of his knowledge or not. So that if it be inquired of the witness afterwards, why he did not inform the court fo and fo, it is not a fufficient, though a very common anfwer, to fay, "because it was never asked me.”

I know but one exception to this rule; which is, when a full discovery of the truth tends to accuse the witness himself of fome legal crime. The law of England conftrains no man to become his own accufer; confequently, impofes the oath of teftimony with this tacit refervation. But the exception must be confined to legal crimes. A point of honour, of delicacy, or of reputation, may make a witness backward to difclose fome circumstance with which he is

acquainted; but will in no wife juftify his concealment of the truth, unless it could be fhewn, that the law which imposes the oath, intended to allow this indulgence to fuch motives. The exception of which we are speaking is also withdrawn by a compact between the magiftrate and the witness, when an accomplice is admitted to give evidence against the partners of his crime.

Tenderness to the prifoner, although a fpecious apology for concealment, is no juft excufe; for, if this plea be thought fufficient, it takes the adminif tration of penal juftice out of the hands of judges and juries, and makes it depend upon the temper of profecutors and witnesses.

Questions may be asked which are irrelative to the caufe, which affect the witness himself, or fome third perfon; in which, and in all cafes, where the witness doubts of the pertinency and propriety of the qucftion, he ought to refer his doubts to the court. The anfwer of the court, in relaxation of the oath, is authority enough to the witnefs: for the law which impofes the oath may remit what it will of the obligation; and it belongs to the court to declare what the mind of the law is. Neverthelefs, it cannot be faid univerfally, that the anfwer of the court is conclufive upon the confcience of the witnefs; for his obligation depends upon what he apprehended, at the time of taking the oath, to be the defign of the law in impofing it and no after requifition or explanation by the court can carry the obligation beyond that.

Chapter XVIII.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE.

"I DO fincerely promife, and fwear, that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majefty King GEORGE." Formerly the oath of allegiance ran

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