make refpects the cultivation of the lands which are to holden.

There exift in this country conditions of tenure which condemn the land itself to perpetual fterility. Of this kind is the right of common, which precludes each proprietor from the improvement, or even the convenient occupation, of his eftate, without (what feldom can be obtained) the confent of many others. This tenure is alfo ufually embarraffed by the interference of manerial claims, under which it often happens that the furface belongs to one owner, and the Toil to another; fo that neither owner can ftir a clod without the concurrence of his partner in the property. In many manors, the tenant is restrained from granting leafes beyond a fhort term of years; which renders every plan of folid improvement impracticable. In thefe cafes the owner wants, what the firft rule of rational policy requires, "fufficient power over the foil for its perfect cultivation." This pow er ought to be extended to him by fome easy and general law of enfranchisement, partition, and inclofure; which, though compulsory upon the lord, or the rest of the tenants, whilft it has in view the me. lioration of the foil, and tenders an equitable compenfation for every right that it takes away, is neither more arbitrary, nor more dangerous to the ftabil ity of property, than that which is done in the conftruction of roads, bridges, embankments, navigable canals, and indeed in almost every public work, in which private owners of land are obliged to accept that price for their property which an indifferent jury may award. It may here however be proper to obferve, that although the inclosure of waftes and paftures be generally beneficial to population, yet the inclosure of lands in tillage, in order to convert them into pastures, is as generally hurtful.

But fecondly, agriculture is difcouraged by every conftitution of landed property which lets in those, who have no concern in the improvement, to a participation of the profit. This objection is applicable to all fuch customs of manors as fubject the proprie

tor, upon the death of the lord or tenant, or the alienation of the eftate, to a fine apportioned to the improved value of the land. But of all inftitutions which are in this way adverse to cultivation and improvement, none is fo noxious as that of tithes. A

claimant here enters into the produce, who contributed no affiftance whatever to the production. When years, perhaps, of care and toil have matured an improvement; when the husbandman fees new crops ripening to his fkill and induftry; the moment he is ready to put his fickle to the grain, he finds himfelf compelled to divide his harveft with a stranger. Tithes are a tax not only upon industry, but upon that industry, which feeds mankind; upon that fpecies of exertion which it is the aim of all wife laws to cherish and promote; and to uphold and excite which, compofes, as we have feen, the main benefit that the community receives from the whole fyftem of trade, and the fuccefs of commerce. And, together with the more general inconveniency that attends the exaction of tithes, there is this additional evil, in the mode at least according to which they are collected at prefent, that they operate as a bounty upon pafturage. The burthen of the tax falls with its chief, if not with its whole weight, upon tillage; that is to fay, upon that precife mode of cultivation which, as hath been fhewn above, it is the business of the ftate to relieve and remunerate, in preference to every other. No measure of fuch extensive concern appears to me fo practicable, nor any fingle alteration fo beneficial, as the converfion of tithes into corn This commutation, I am convinced, might be fo adjusted, as to fecure to the tithe-holder a complete and perpetual equivalent for his intereft, and to leave to industry its full operation and entire reward.

rents.

Chapter XII.

OF WAR, AND OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.

BECAUSE the Chriftian Scriptures defcribe wars, as what they are, as crimes or judgments, fome have been led to believe that it is unlawful for a Chriftian to bear arms. But it fhould be remembered, that it may be neceffary for individuals. to unite their force, and for this end to refign themfelves to the direction of a common will; and yet it may be true that that will is often actuated by criminal motives, and often determined to deftructive purposes. Hence, although the origin of wars be afcribed in Scripture to the operation of lawless and malignant paffions* ; and though war itself be enumerated among the foreft calamities with which a land can be vifited, the profeffion of a foldier is nowhere forbidden or condemned. When the foldiers demanded of John the Baptift what they fhould do, he faid unto them, "Do violence to no man, neither accufe any falfely, and be content with your wages."† In which answer we do not find that, in order to prepare themselves for the reception of the kingdom of God, it was required of foldiers to relinquish their profeffion, but only that they fhould beware of the vices of which that profeffion was accufed. The precept which follows," Be content with your wages," supposed them to continue in their fituation. It was of a Roman centurion that Chrift pronounced that memorable culogy, "I have not found fo great faith, no not in Ifrael." The firft Gentile converts who was received into the Christian church, and to whom the gospel was imparted by the immediate and efpe

James, iv. 1. + Luke, iii. 14. + Luke, vii. 9. § Acts, x. 1.

cial direction of Heaven, held the fame ftation and in the hiftory of this tranfaction we discover not the fmalleft intimation, that Cornclius, upon becoming a Chriftian, quitted the fervice of the Roman legion that his profeffion was objected to, or his continuance in it confidered as in any wife inconfiftent with his new character.

In applying the principles of morality to the affairs of nations, the difficulty which meets us arifes from hence, "that the particular confequence fometimes appears to exceed the value of the general rule." In this circumftance is founded the only diftinction that exists between the cafe of independent ftates, and of independent individuals. In the tranfactions of private perfons, no advantage that refults from the breach of a general law of juftice, can compenfate to the public for the violation of the law in the concerns of empire, this may fometimes be doubted. Thus, that the faith of promises ought to be maintained, as far as is lawful, and as far as was intended by the parties, whatever inconveniency either of them may fuffer by his fidelity, in the intercourse of private life, is feldom difputed; because it is evident to almost every man who reflects upon the fubject, that the common happiness gains more by the pref ervation of the rule, than it could do by the removal of the inconveniency. But when the adherence to a public treaty would enflave a whole people, would block up feas, rivers, or harbours, depopulate cities, condemn fertile regions to eternal defolation, cut off a country from its fources of provifion, or deprive it of thofe commercial advantages to which its climate, produce, or fituation naturally entitle it; the magnitude of the particular evil induces us to call in queftion the obligation of the general rule. Moral philofophy furnifhes no precife folution to thefe doubts. She cannot pronounce that any rule of morality is fo rigid as to bend to no exceptions; nor, on the other hand, can fhe comprise these exceptions within any previous defcription. She confefles that the obliga tion of every law depends upon its ultimate utility;

that this utility having a finite and determinate value, fituations may be feigned, and confequently may poffibly arise, in which the general tendency is outweighed by the enormity of the particular mischief: but the recals, at the fame time, to the confideration of the inquirer, the almoft ineftimable importance, as of other general rules of relative juftice, fo efpecially of national and perfonal fidelity; the unfeen, if not unbounded, extent of the mischief which must follow from the want of it; the danger of leaving it to the fufferer to decide upon the comparison of particular and general confequences; and the ftill greater danger of fuch decifions being drawn into future precedents. If treaties, for inftance, be no longer binding than whilft they are convenient, or until the inconveniency afcend to a certain point, which point must be fixed by the judgment, or rather by the feelings, of the complaining party; or if fuch an opinion, after being authorized by a few examples, come at length to prevail; one and almoft the only method of averting or clofing the calamities of war, of either preventing or putting a ftop to the deftruction of mankind, is loft to the world for ever. We do not fay that no evil can exceed this, nor any poffible advantage compenfate it; but we fay that a lofs, which affects all, will fcarcely be made up to the common stock of human happiness by any benefit that can be procured to a fingle nation, which, however refpectable when compared with any other fingle nation, bears an inconfiderable proportion to the whole. Thefe, however, are the principles upon which the calculation is to be formed. It is enough, in this place, to remark the cause which produces the hesitation that we fometimes feel, in applying rules of perfonal probity to the conduct of nations.

As between individuals it is found impoffible to afcertain every duty by an immediate reference to public utility, not only becaufe fuch reference is oftentimes too remote for the direction of private confciences, but because a multitude of cafes arife in which it is indifferent to the general intereft by what Nnn