Democracy and Redistribution
Employing analytical tools borrowed from game theory, Carles Boix offers a complete theory of political transitions, in which political regimes ultimately hinge on the nature of economic assets, their distribution among individuals, and the balance of power among different social groups. Backed up by detailed historical work and extensive statistical analysis that goes back to the mid-nineteenth century, this book explains, among many other things, why democracy emerged in classical Athens. It also discusses the early triumph of democracy in both nineteenth-century agrarian Norway, Switzerland and northeastern America and the failure in countries with a powerful landowning class.
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A THEORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
PROVING THE RESULTS OF THE INITIAL GAME
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENTDEMOCRACY CORRELATION
LIST OF POLITICAL REGIMES
THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS GROWTH TRADE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
THE STATE THE THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT
actors agricultural asset specificity Authoritarian Democratic Authoritarian authoritarian regime average becomes capita income capital central century Chapter choice civil constitutional contrast costs countries decline democracy Democratic Authoritarian Democratic democratic breakdown democratic regime dictatorships discussion distribution economic effect electoral elites empirical equal Estimation exports extent farms federal Figure Finally Gini index given growth hand higher impact income inequality increase independent individuals industrial institutions interaction investment lead lower measures median voter middle class mobility nature observations outcome parties percent percentage period political regime poor population possible Predicted preferences presidential presidential systems probability proportion public sector redistributive relatively remain repression result rich risk shows social societies strategy structure Table theoretical theory trade transfers transition turn turnout United universal urban variables wealthy World