to rely upon an accurate eye and a quick pencil for the above sketch, which may be, however, taken as a fair representation of the proportions of these singular pieces of sea ordnance.

We were informed, by the officer who showed us over the ship, that no fears were entertained of their perfect safety under the most severe fire, and that they had been subjected to the most rigorous tests before they were adopted by the government of the United States. But we remember how severely the guns which (in the hurry and confusion of the late Russian war) were rebored and adapted to receive Lancaster shell were said to have been tested previous to their being forwarded to Sebastopol. In the severer test of actual war, they failed; and we saw a few specimens of the results of weakening the chase of guns of large calibre lying upon the gun-wharf at Portsmouth, which, we presume, were brought home as a warning for the future. Annexed is an outline-sketch of one of these disabled monsters, after it had blown its nose off in the trenches before Sebastopol.

We are induced to believe that some such result as the above had entered into the calculation of the projector of Dahlgren's gun, for we found that they are intended for hollow projectiles. The Merrimac has every sort of hollow projectile on board. We were informed that it is now a practice in the American navy to carry a quantity of empty hollow shot, which may be plugged up and used in that state, or be charged and fitted with fuses and used as shells. Judging from the construction of the Merrimac's guns, we should be inclined to think that they would not be strong enough to fire solid shot, and we are strengthened in that opinion from the fact that she had no solid shot on board.

However, should the principle of Commander Dahlgren's gun be correct, it possesses certain advantages which will render these guns very useful as naval ordnance, particularly in giving greater stability to vessels of war, in consequence of the centre of gravity of each gun being brought more amidships. These guns are all furnished with elevating-screws, an arrangement that certainly facilitates the "sighting," if the strength of the gun is not injured thereby. The rammers and sponges are novelties in their way; but whether the substitution of bristles for sheepskin is an advantage or not we cannot say.

The next important feature in the armament of this frigate that attracted our attention, was her gun-carriages. They have only two wheels, which are placed on the fore-axle of the carriage; but, to expedite the running out of the gun, the rear of the carriage is fitted with a lever with a roller, on which the carriage is borne. This is in some respects a French invention, and, for rapidity of firing, is unequalled. We did not notice that there existed any other difference in the management of the gun that materially deviated from our own service.

All the fighting-gear of the Merrimac was in excellent condition, and she bears testimony that the government of the United States are open to any suggestion or improvement of a promising character in their ships-of-war. Thus care has been taken that, when this vessel is at her load-line, that the height of her gun-deck ports shall be well out of the water, even in the strongest winds. Her height 'tween decks is ample, and her bulwarks are so lofty that, with the hammocks stowed, they are eight feet and a half above the height of the deck.

The greatest defect we saw was her propelling arrangements, and we heard that she never exceeds seven knots under the most favourable circumstances. We must, however, acknowledge that we had no opportunity of judging, as we never saw her under steam.

We observed that the operation of fishing the anchor can be performed by the engine, if necessary, by a very simple contrivance. The fish-davit is centred on a hoop on the foremast, and may be swung like a crane over either anchor, for the purpose of fishing it. It can also be used for removing the heavy framework of the pivot-gun when it is used. The Merrimac, though fitted with Griffith's screw-propeller, is nevertheless a perfect sailing ship. Her rig is in all respects similar to the largest American sailing frigates. From her immense size, her sails, when all set, cover upwards of 56,000 square feet, and large as this spread of canvas may appear, yet she seems under-masted in consequence of her extraordinary length.

In all screw ships the shaft of the propeller interferes with the stepping of the mainmast, and several modes are adopted to overcome the difficulty. The manner in which it is obviated in the Merrimac is as follows:-A step is formed of a beam of oak placed athwart ships, which is supported by solid iron uprights, and these uprights rest upon kelsons, the shaft working between. The arrangement in our navy is to have forked iron steps in the form of an arch, beneath which the shaft revolves. In some of our largest ships the heel of the mast is perforated, and the shaft is passed through the aperture. Of course all these methods of stepping the mainmast are less strong than that where the mast is immediately supported by the kelson; but this last method is impossible in screw ships, as the shaft interferes.

The general appearance of the Merrimac, externally and internally, is excellent. Her fighting quarters are roomy; indeed, the appearance of her main-deck is most imposing, and, if we except the somewhat clumsy look of the huge wooden knees which the Americans prefer to the more compact ones made of iron, we never saw such a splendid deck before; and if to the above description we add that she is built of live oak, and is a strong and light ship, and that her displacement is calculated to be 4000 tons, we have given a fair description of this specimen of American naval architecture, and are in a position to compare her with our own first-class frigates and line-of-battle ships, to which her bulk and weight of metal assimilates.

We will conclude our remarks, then, upon the frigates of the United States as compared with our own, by recapitulating the broadside force of the Chesapeake and Shannon of 1815, and contrasting them with the Merrimac and Shannon of 1856, by which process we shall see at a glance the vast increase in destructive power of our naval ordnance in

the last forty years-a destructive power, be it remembered, which, vast as it is, is yet wonderfully increased in efficiency by the element of steam, which has been imported into both navies since the last war. The subjoined statement will briefly tell its own tale :—

Shannon, 1815 Broadside force, 538 lbs. Tonnage, 1066

Chesapeake, do.

Shannon, 1856

Merrimac, do.

Wellington, do.

Thus it will be seen that the Merrimac, when armed with her full complement of sixty guns, will throw 570 lbs. more shot at each broadside than our heaviest frigate, while she is 1600 tons larger. She is nearly four times as large as the Shannon of 1815, and has three times more broadside force; and, moreover, that she equals in tonnage our heaviest line-of-battle ship, the Duke of Wellington of 131 guns.

Let us also compare this frigate with any of our ordinary line-ofbattle ships, one of our eighties, for instance. Take the Majestic as a sample of the rest. This ship has eighty guns disposed as follows:Lower-deck, ten 8-inch guns of 65 cwt., eighteen 32-pounders of 58 cwt.; main-deck, four 8-inch of 65 cwt., and twenty-four 32-pounders of 50 cwt.; upper-deck, twenty-four 32-pounders of 42 cwt.-broadside force, 1532 lbs. The total weight of her fighting-guns is 4,162 cwt., carried in a hull of 2,589 tons Admiralty measurement. Now the Merrimac's tonnage is said to be by her own officers 4000, and her broadside force, when fully armed, is 1764 lbs., or 214 lbs. more than one of our eighty-gun ships. We have no means of ascertaining the weight of her guns, as no information was afforded on that subject; but, of course, they cannot materially differ from those of the Majestic, and they are buoyantly carried in a hull of 4000 tons burden. We do not take upon ourselves the task of judging which is the most efficient ship, although it is quite evident which is the largest. We, however, recognise, in the naming the Merrimac a frigate, something of that smart prac tice which characterized our American "brethren" in the last war. However, if by "frigate" is meant a ship with a single battery-deck from stem to stern, then the Merrimac, notwithstanding her vast size, is a frigate, but equal to a line-of-battle ship in everything but name.

We trust, however, that the lesson taught us by the Americans in the frigate actions between the Constitution and Guerrier, the Macedonian and the United States, will not be thrown away, and that a few companion ships to the Merrimac and the Niagara will be laid down in our own yards, so as to put us on level terms with them. We say this, knowing the trouble and expense we have experienced in passing through the transition state from canvas to steam, and of adapting engines of great weight and power to the hulls of our men-of-war, the whole, or nearly the whole, of which has been avoided by our transatlantic brethren. They are happily so situated as not to be compelled to maintain huge armaments for the protection of their country. With us it is a necessity. We must not only be armed at all points, but we must take the lead. America can wait the result of our experiments, and then take advantage of our experience. She has not passed

through an intermediate state of bungling trials in building her steam ships-of-war. No costly apprenticeship has damped her ardour or drained her exchequer; but we have been obliged to feel our way through a host of difficulties, from paddle to screw. Most of this she has been spared: she leaps at once to conclusions-builds a fine frigate (we beg her pardon-a line-of-battle ship in disguise), sends her over to England, and we admire her, as we are bound to do; at the same time we cannot help thinking that our American friends are very fortunate in having a warning beacon like England to point out the road to success, without running any risk or expense themselves.

REMARKS ON THE ORGANIZATION AND OTHER MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE ROYAL ARTILLERY. [SECOND ARTICLE.]

THE system of uniting the two duties of the gunner and the driver in the Royal Artillery, and recognizing as a general principle, free from any but very rare individual exceptions, that the same man can be taught to drive a pair of horses after the manner of a postilion, at no very rapid rate, and to perform the very simple and easily acquired duty of sponging and serving a gun, is at the present moment, after existing for a considerable number of years, and having its advantages fully tested and demonstrated during the late war, seriously threatened in its continuance. On what grounds this is being done, or by what reasons the authorities are influenced, it is difficult to understand. The new system to be substituted for the old one would appear to be that a company of artillery, on taking over a field battery, is to have a number of men of short stature attached to it for the purpose of acting as drivers. On the completion of the course of field instruction, these short men are to be turned over to the relieving company, and commence again under a new set of officers; so that, in fact, our field artillery will be made up of two sets of men, the one permanently attached to horses, in whom the officers have only a temporary interest, and the other of gunners, whose duties will be considerably cramped, and their usefulness diminished by the new arrangement. The company of artillery will be no longer complete in itself and equal, wherever it may be quartered, to meet, as it used to do, any exigency which the nature of our colonial empire might require from it. The new system will be one of continual making and breaking up-of making a company perfect in its field duties, and, as soon as it is so, taking the essential drivers away from it and pulling it to pieces again. The regiment will consist of two parts, neither of which can act alone, and both of which may not be together when the case requires it. There will, moreover, when they are together, be a divided interest from beginning to end. There can be no feeling of comradeship between men whose duties are made to appear decidedly different, and who know they are only associated to

gether for a limited period; the gunners will feel no interest in horses which are to be exclusively ridden or driven by a different class of men; the drivers will think, and most likely very properly think, that the horses and harness are as much as they need trouble themselves about, and that they have no concern in the guns or in the preservation of the stores of the battery generally; the officers and non-commissioned officers will certainly not be inclined to favour the unhappy driver, who is only temporarily attached to them, and whose services in action will always bear the character of being of secondary consideration.

It may possibly be intended, by retaining the designation of gunner and driver in common to all artillerymen, that all are to be, as at present, instructed in driving; but it is evident that if men exclusively instructed as drivers are attached to batteries, none others but these, unless in very exceptional cases, will be much practised in that part of au artilleryman's duty. It cannot be otherwise on the face of it, for few of these short men are physically equal to the service of a 9-pounder gun; they compel the necessity, therefore, of keeping the gunners for their own work only.

The old plan was by far the best in every respect. By it the men of a company, on taking over a field battery, were divided into three classes of drivers according to their capabilities, as to appearance or in other respects, for that duty. They were all equally instructed as gunners. The men of the first class of drivers were considered as those more or less permanently attached to horses as long as the company remained in battery; the second and third class men were what is technically called "off men." By having these as far as possible always mounted at watering order, and by giving them instruction in riding drill, they soon obtained fair seats and entire confidence on horseback. Whenever the first-class driver was sick, or on furlough, or "in trouble," his off man took his place. In the course of time, where time was allowed, every man in the battery became more or less a driver, and it was constantly falling to him to discharge that duty. He was equally as good a gunner, and the company of artillery was thus complete within itself, and if quartered at the Cape or elsewhere, on being required for field duties, could take over a battery without waiting for any aid as to drivers from home. Having completed the course of field instruction, it went back to its dismounted duties, carrying with it all the advantages of that instruction, and it gave way to others, who in turn progressed in the same way. A knowledge of field duties-in the care of horses and in riding and driving, as well as in serving field gunsbecame disseminated throughout the corps, and a power was obtained of turning the whole of it into field artillery, if such was required. This was the theory of the old system, and it required nothing but a very moderate establishment of batteries to carry it out. This establishment, before the war, was always denied, or, in the more showy exhibitions of the horse brigade, it was neglected. The consequence was that, when the war broke out, nothing in the shape of a field artillery existed at all. The apathy and indifference of the artillery authorities on this subject has never met with its deserts, and now, when a liberal establishment of field batteries has been granted, the same parties are giving

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