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sioners of the United States, and of the state of Pennsylvania. This committee of conference was not empowered to conclude on any thing. They could only receive and report the propositions which might be

made to them.

rected to rendezvous at Bedford; and those of Maryland and Virginia, at Cumberland, on the Potomac. The command of the expedition had been conferred on Governor Lee of Virginia; and the Governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania commanded the militia of their respective states, under him.

The president, in person visited, each division of the army; but, being confident that the force employed must look down all resistance, he left the secretary of the treasury to accompany it, and returned himself to Philadelphia, where the approaching session of Congress required his presence.

Men of property and intelligence, who had contributed to kindle the flame under the common error of being able to regulate its heat, now trembled at the extent of the conflagration. It had passed the limits they assigned to it, and was no longer subject to their control. The committee of conference expressed themselves unanimously in favor of accepting the terms offered by From Cumberland and Bedford, the army marched the government, and exerted themselves in the committee of safety to obtain a decision to the same effect. In in two divisions into the country of the insurgents. The that committee, the question whether they would sub-greatness of the force prevented the effusion of blood. mit peaceably to the execution of the law, retaining ex- The disaffected did not venture to assemble in arms. pressly the privilege of using all constitutional means to Several of the leaders who had refused to give assuraneffect its repeal was debated with great zeal. The less vi- ces of future submission to the laws, were seized, and lent party carried it by a small majority: but, not thinking some of them detained for legal prosecution. themselves authorised to decide for their constituents on so momentous a question, they afterwards resolved that it should be referred to the public.

This reference resulted in demonstrating that though many were disposed to demean themselves peaceably, yet a vast mass of opposition remained determined to obstruct the re-establishment of civil authority.

From some causes among which was disaffection to the particular service, the prospect of bringing the quota of troops required from Pennsylvania into the field, was at first unpromising. But the assembly which had been summoned by the Governor to meet on the first of September, expressed in strong terms, its abhorrence of this daring attempt to resist the laws, and to subvert the government of the country; and a degree of ardour and unanimity was displayed by the people of other states, which exceeded the hopes of the most sanguine Some feeble attempts friends of the administration. were indeed made to produce a disobedience to the requisition of the President, by declaring that the people would never be made the instruments of the secretary of the treasury, to shed the blood of their fellow citizens; that the representatives of the people ought to be assembled before a civil war was commenced; and by avowing the extravagant opinion that the President could not lawfully call forth the militia of any other state, until actual experiment had ascertained the insufficiency of that of Pennsylvania. But these insidious suggestions were silenced by the general sense of the nation, which loudly and strongly proclaimed that the government and laws must be supported. The officers displayed an unexampled activity; and intelligence from every quarter, gave full assurance that with respect to both numbers and time, the requisitions of the President would be punctually observed.

The governor of Pennsylvania compensated for the defects in the militia law of that state, by his personal exertions. From some inadvertence, as was said, on the part of the brigade inspectors, the militia could not be drafted, and consequently the quota of Pennsylvania could be completed only by volunteers. The governor, who was endowed with a high degree of popular elocution, made a circuit through the lower counties of the state, and publicly addressed the militia, at different places where he had caused them to assemble, on the crisis in the affairs of their country. So successful were these animating exhortations, that Pennsylvania was not behind her sister states in furnishing the quota required from her.

On the 25th of September, the President issued a second proclamation, describing in terms of great energy, the obstinate and perverse spirit with which the lenient propositions of the government had been received; and declaring his fixed determination, in obedience to the high and irresistible duty consigned to him by the constitution "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," to reduce the refractory to obedience.

But although no direct and open opposition was made, the spirit of the insurrection was not subdued. A sour and malignant temper displayed itself, which indicated but too plainly, that the disposition to resist had only sunk under the pressure of the great military force brought into the country, but would rise again should that force be withdrawn. It was, therefore, thought advisable to station for the winter, a detachment to be commanded by Major General Morgan, in the centre of the disaffected country.

Thus without shedding a drop of blood did the prudence and vigour of the executive terminate an insurrection, which, at one time, threatened to shake the government of the United States to its foundation. That so perverse a spirit should have been excited in the bosom of prosperity, without the pressure of a single grievance, is among those political phenomena which occur not unfrequently in the course of human affairs, and which the statesman can never safely disregard. When real il's are felt there is something posilive and perceptible to which the judgment may be directed, the actual extent of which may be ascertained and the cause of which may be discerned. But when the mind, inflamed by supposititious dangers, gives a full loose to the imagination, and fastens upon some object with which to disturb itself, the belief that the danger exists seems to become a matter of faith, with which reason combats in vain.

Under a government emanating entirely from the people, and with an administration whose sole object was their happiness, the public mind was violently agitated with apprehensions of a powerful and secret combination against liberty which was to discover itself by the total overthrow of the republican system. That those who were charged with these designs, were so destitute of the means as well as of the will to effect them, did not shake the firm belief of their existence. Disregarding the apparent partiality of the administration for France, so far as that partiality was compatible with an honest neutrality, the zealots of the day ascribed its incessant labours for the preservation of peace, to a temper hostile to the French republic; and while themselves loudly imprecating the vengeance of heaven and earth on one of the belligerents, and openly rejoicing in the victories of the other; while impetuously rushing into a war with Britain, and pressing measures which would render accommodation impracticable,they attributed a system calculated to check them in this furious career, not to that genuine American spir t which produced it, but to an influence which, as far ais opinions are to depend on facts, has at no time insinuated itself into the councils of the United States.

In popular governments, the resentments, the suspicions, and the disgusts, produced in the legislature by warm debates, and the chagrin of defeat; by the desire of gaining, or the fear of losing power; and which are created by personal views among the leaders of parties, The troops of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were di- I will infallibly extend to the body of the nation. Not

sion, have disseminated, from an ignorance or perversion of facts, suspicions, jealousies, aud accusations of the whole government.'

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only will those causes of dissatisfaction be urged which really operate on the minds of intelligent men, but every instrument will be seized which can effect the purpose, and the passions will be inflamed by whatever may serve Notwithstanding the disagreement between the exeto irritate them. Among the multiplied evils generated cutive and one branch of the legislature concerning by faction, it is perhaps not the least that it has a ten- self-created societies, and the policy observed towards dency to abolish all distinction between virtue and foreign nations, the speech of the President was treated vice; and to prostrate those barriers which the good and with marked respect; and the several subjects which it wise have erected for the protection of morals, and recommended engaged the immediate attention of Conwhich are defended solely by opinion. The victory of gress. A bill was passed authorizing the President to the party becomes the great object; and, too often, all station a detachment of militia in the four western measures are deemed right or wrong as they tend to counties of Pennsylvania; provision was made to compromote or impede it. The attainment of the end is pensate those whose property had been destroyed by considered as the supreme good, and the detestable doc- the insurgents, should those who had committed the intrine is adopted that the end will justify the means. jury be unable to repair it: and an appropriation exceedThe mind habituated to the extenuation of acts of moral ing one million one hundred thousand dollars was made turpitude, becomes gradually contaminated, and loses to defray the expenses occasioned by the insurrection. that delicate sensibility which instinctively inspires hor- Many of the difficulties which had occurred in drawror for vice and respect for virtue. In the intemper- ing out the militia were removed, and a bill was introate abuse which was cast on the principal measures of duced to give greater energy to the militia system genethe government, and on those who supported them, in rally; but this subject possessed so many intrinsic diffithe violence with which the discontents of the oppo-culties, that the session passed away without effecting nents to those measures were expressed, and especially any thing respecting it. in the denunciations which were uttered against them by the democratic societies, the friends of the administration searched for the causes of that criminal attempt which had been made in the western parts of Pennsyl vania to oppose the will of the nation by force of arms. Had those misguided men believed that this opposition was to be confined within their own limits, they could not have been so mad, or so weak, as to have engaged in it. The ideas of the President on this subject were freely given to some of his confidential friends. "The real people," he said, "occasionally assembled to express their sentiments on political subjects, ought never to be confounded with permanent self-appointed societies, usurping the right to control the constituted authories, and to dictate to public opinion. While the former was entitled to respect, the latter was incompatible with all government, and must either sink into general disesteem, or finally overturn the established order of things."

In his speech at the opening of Congress, the President detailed at considerable length the progress of opposition to the laws, the means employed both by the legislature and executive to appease the discontents which had been fomented, and the measures he had finally taken to reduce the refractory to submission.

As commander in chief of the militia, when called into actual service, he had, he said, visited the places of general rendezvous, to obtain more correct information, and to direct a plan for ulterior movements. Had there been room for a persuasion that the laws were secure from obstruction, "he should have caught with avidity the opportunity of restoring the militia to their families and homes. But succeeding intelligence had tended to manifest the necessity of what had been done; it being now confessed by those who were not inclined to exaggerate the ill conduct of the insurgents, that their malevolence was not pointed merely to a particular law; but that a spirit inimical to all order had actuated many of the offenders.

After bestowing a high encomium on the alacrity and promptitude with which persons in every station had come forward to assert the dignity of the laws, thereby furnishing an additional proof that they understood the true principles of government and liberty, and felt their inseparable union; he added-"To every description of citizens let praise be given. But let them persevere in their affectionate vigilance over that precious depository of American happiness,-the constitution of the United States. And when in the calm moments of reflection, they shall have retraced the origin and progress of the insurrection, let them determine whether it has not been fomented by combinations of men who, careless of consequences, and disregarding the unerring truth that those who rouse cannot always appease a civil convul.

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From the Philadelphia Gazette.

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES.-June, 1832.

The United States,

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Fourteen packages
of goods. Kir-
by, Beard and
Kirby, claimants.

On motion for a new trial.

OPINION OF JUDGE HOPKINSON, Numerous reasons have been filed in this case against the verdict; and to support the motion on the part of the claimants for a new trial. Some of them have not been touched or insisted upon in the argument on the motion, and therefore will not require particular attention from the Court. Such as have been maintained in the argument, will be considered and disposed of. The rea

sons are,

1 and 2. "Because the Jury were sworn to try the issue between the United States and Kirby, Beard and Kirby, whereas no such issue exists upon the record. Because the Jury were incorrectly qualified."

I have no doubt that the Jury were properly sworn both as regards the real parties in interest, and as they of this exception on another ground. appear upon the record; but I shall put the dismission

It is now

The first four Jurors called to the book, were sworn to try the issue between the United States and fourteen packages of goods, whereof Cardwell, Potter and Co., were the claimants. The counsel for the claimants immediately interrupted the clerk, and observed to him that Cardwell, Potter and Co., were not the claimants, but the agents of the claimants, who were Kirby, Beard and Kirby, and that the Jury should be so sworn. Under this direction, to which the District Attorney agreed, the four Jurors were re-sworn according to it, and all the other Jurors were also so sworn. objected to the verdict, that the Jury should not have been so sworn or qualified; that Kirby, Beard and Kirby are not the claimants on the record, but the issue was between the United States and Cardwell, Potter and Co, claimants. Can it be imagined that a court holding the power to set aside a verdict, and grant a new trial, for the purposes of justice, would exercise that power under such circumstances, when the error, if any, was the error of the party who would now take advantage of it; and which is confessedly a mere matter of form, and pure technicality, having no influence or bearing on the merits of the case' It is impossible. This is the first class or head of reasons; the next relates to alleged errors of the court.

1 and 2. "In admitting the three appraisements to be received in evidence."

This exception was passed over on the argument. Indeed I know not what could have been said for it, as the appraisements in question were not only a part of the proceedings directed in such cases by the act of Congress, but were read to the Jury on the express call of the counsel of the claimants.

3d. "In admitting in evidence the invoices of John Siter, William Chaloner, Joseph Brown and John Bury." As to the invoices of Siter, Chaloner and Brown, they were neither offered nor given in evidence. Those gentlemen had severally made importations of articles similar to those in question, and they were examined as to the prices they had paid for them. They did refer, without objection, to their invoices to assist their memories in ascertaining the prices; but the invoices were not read to the Jury, or, in any other manner, made a part of the evidence of the cause. No exception was taken or noted by the claimants to the decision of the court on the admissibility of the question "what were the prices paid by the witnesses for these articles?" although the question was objected to; and as to the invoices, they were used in no other way than that mentioned.

The invoice of John Bury was offered and read in evidence and also the letter which accompanied itbecause both the invoice and the letter came from the claimants, and were clearly evidence against them. If this were not so, their admission can afford no ground of exception to the verdict, as they were given to the Jury without objection.

These are all the reasons founded on supposed errors of the court in the course of the trial; another class lates to alleged errors in the charge to the Jury.

The 2d error under this fourth head relates to the appraisements and was not noticed in the argument. The 3d error of this head, which relates to "the small invoice" was also passed by in the argument. As to that paper I told the Jury, that there was a mystery about it which had not been explained; not merely because it gave a different valuation to the goods, from that in the regular invoice by which the goods were offered for entry-but that it purported to be a bill of sale from Kirby, Beard and Kirby, to Potter, Cardwell and Co., when in truth no such was made; but the goods were sent to this country for and on account of Kirby, Beard and Kirby, and Potter, Cardwell and Co., were but the consignees, having no ownership in them, nor interest but as consignees. I stated other circumstances which threw a cloud of suspicion over this part of the case, together with the explanations that were offered on the part of the claimants; and left the whole to the Jury for their consideration, with this observation "The Jury must say what this paper means, and whether it gives rise to any suspicion of an unfair intention,"

4th error-"In instructing the Jury that the appraisements were made with great care and were therefore entitled to great weight in the consideration of the

case."

As these appraisements were received in evidence, I cannot perceive in what was the error or the mischief to say that they had been made with great care. The appraisers appeared before the Jury and made the same appraisements under their oaths taken here, as they had

under their official oaths taken at the Custom House.

They explained particularly the time, which was severe-ral days, occupied in the business, and the means they took to obtain information, to assist them in ascertaining the true value of the articles at the time and place required by the law. Was there any error in telling the Jury that appraisements thus made, for whatever purpose they were given in evidence, were entitled to their respect in proportion to the care with which they had The 5th error under this head, has not been insisted

1st. "In instructing the Jury, that there was nothing in the objection that the act of 28th May, 1830, was unknown to the house of Kirby, Beard and Kirby before they shipped the goods in question."

The of

were told to consider John Bury's testimony, of special importance, because it came from the claimants themselves; but this was not said as to Mr. Siter's evidence.

We come now to the 5th general class.."Because the court did not instruct the Jury upon the rule of law, pressed in argument by the counsel of the claimants, in reference to the testimony of Donald Mcllvain, viz:-That he was entitled to belief unless impeached, and that no such attempt having been made, he stood before the Jury entirely worthy of credit; but on the contrary remarked that it was strange he did not purchase at the prices named."

I cannot withhold the expression of my surprise that this reason should be seriously urged to the court, how-been made? I think not. ever expedient it might have been to address it to a Jury, to enlist their feelings for the claimants on a sup-upon; indeed it is a mistake in point of fact. The Jury posed ignorance of the law they were offending. What is the purport and effect of the law of 28th May, 1830 Is it to create a new offence to make that unlawful which was before lawful? Certainly not so. fence they have committed was always a violation of the laws of the United States, visited by certain and severe penalties. But these penalties were found not to be adequate to prevent the offence. The temptations to cupidity were too strong to be restrained by an increase of duties on the goods which were falsely invoiced. The penalty was therefore enlarged to an entire and absolute forfeiture of the goods. The plea of the claimants is "we knew that by making up this false invoice, with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States, we were violating one of their laws but we supposed that in case of a detection we should suffer only by an increased charge upon our goods and not by their forfeiture, and therefore we are innocent; therefore we should be acquitted of all penalty and the Jury should have so rendered their verdict." This is a most extra. ordinary course of reasoning in law or morals. Besides, did Messrs. Kirby, Beard and Kirby, require to have a knowledge of the enactments of the act of 28th May, 1830, to teach them that fraud and perjury are crimes every where, under all circumstances and upon all subjects? And it was only by and through fraud and perjury that the offence charged and proved upon them by the verdict of a most respectable and intelligent Jury, could have been perpetrated. But, in their code of morals, fraud and perjury are nothing unless they are to be followed by a forfeiture of goods. These remarks are reluctantly made; but they are rendered necessary by the perseverance and zeal with which the reason has been pressed first upon the jury and now again upon

the court.

If the Judge had instructed upon the point as the exception requires him to do, he might indeed have been charged with invading the rights of the Jury. If there be any thing which peculiarly belongs to them in the trial of a cause, it is to judge of the credibility of witnesses, and it is.not for the court to "direct or instruct" them who is "entitled to belief" or who stands before them "entirely worthy of credit." As to the evidence of Donald McIlvain, if I had told the Jury my opinion of it, it would have been that it was impeached by all the evidence of the cause, and by circumstances testified by himself. I repeat now, what I said to the Jury, it is difficult to reconcile the evidence of Donald McIlvain with his conduct; it is difficult to discover why, if he were desirous of purchasing goods for himself, and had orders to do so from others, he did not take them at the prices he says they were offered to him for, as these prices were certainly lower than any other sales or offers we had any account of, and much lower than the actual sales made about the same time.

It is difficult also to reconcile his testimony with the letter and invoice received by John Bury, from Kirby, Beard and Kirby, in which the pins are charged at a

much higher price than Donald McIlvain says the same house offered them to him for, at or near the same time, and which prices Kirby, Beard and Kirby assured Mr. Bury were their lowest. After these remarks I told the Jury that nevertheless, Mr. Mcllvain had sworn positively to the fact, and they would give the weight they thought proper to his evidence, under all the evidence and circumstances of the case.

There is another answer to this exception to the charge of the court which I mention not because it is necessary in the case, but on account of its general importance.

If the counsel in a cause desire to have the opinion of the court given to the Jury upon any point or matter of law, it is their duty to state it explicitly, and to ask the opinion of the court, or they cannot make the silence of the court, or an omission to instruct the Jury on that point, a ground for a new trial. Misdirection is always a good ground, but not an omission to direct, where no direction is required. It is not enough to say, that the counsel "pressed a point in his argument;" he must do more-no court is bound to give specific answers to, or notices of, all the matters the counsel may think it expedient to press upon them in the argument. When a charge or opinion of the court is wanted on a particular point, it must be particularly stated and asked for; such is the practice, and such it ought to be; or verdicts would be perpetually in danger from concealed objections.

The 6th error, "Because the court told the Jury that the claimants had known the testimony of the United States for eighteen months-and yet produced none to contradict it; there being no proof of that knowledge made at the trial, and the court being entirely mistaken as to the fact."

ing between contradictory testimony which is best entitled to belief; with such comments as will clearly explain to them the view taken by the court of the case. All that is necessary is, that the Jury should distinctly and explicitly understand that such observations are to be received by them merely for the purpose of assisting them in their deliberations, of recalling their recollection to the facts testified, and turning their attention to the true points of inquiry; but that the decision to be made upon the evidence belongs altogether to them, and that no direction or authoritative instruction is to be given concerning them. These doctrines are fully recognized and strongly enforced by Starkie, (1 Evid. 440. 1.) This respectable author says:-"The prac tice of advising the Jury, as to the nature, bearing, tendency and weight of evidence, although it be a duty which, from its very nature, must be, in a great measure discretionary on the part of the Judge, is one, which does not yield in importance to the more definite and ordinary one of directing them in matters of law. The trial by Jury is a system admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, but, in order to obtain the full benefit to be derived from the united discernment of a Jury, it must be admitted to be essential, that their attention should be skilfully directed to the points material for their consideration." After some further remarks, this author adds that-"Jurors unaccustomed, as they usually are, to judicial investigations, require in complicated cases, all the aid which can be derived from the experience and penetration of the Judges, to direct their attention to the essential points, and enable them to arrive at a just conclusion." Again, after saying that the Jury should have "excluded from their consideration all such evidence as is likely to embarrass, mislead or prejudice them in the course of the inquiry," he proceeds "much yet remains to be done of a nature which cannot

ces; to resolve a complicated mass of evidence into its most simple elements; to exhibit clearly the connexion, bearing, and importance of its distinct and separated parts, and their combined tendency and effects, stripped of every intrinsic and superfluous consideration, which might otherwise embarrass and mislead a Jury; and to do this in a manner suited to the comprehension and understanding of an ordinary Jury, some of the most arduous as well as the most important duties incident to the judicial office." In this powerful delinea. tion of what a charge to a Jury ought to be, who is not reminded of the clear and luminous order; of the strong and satisfactory discriminations; and the admirable combination of facts and circumstances, with which Judge Washington discharged this most arduous as well as most important duty of the judicial office?

The entire mistake as to the fact is found in the exception and not in the court. I speak not of my per-be defined; to divest a case of all its legal incumbransonal knowledge that this case was formerly heard before me and proceeded on to the close of the testimony on the part of the United States, when it was dismissed on discovering that it was a case for a Jury and not for the Judge alone. But on this trial of the cause, the former hearing was repeatedly referred to by the counsel on both sides Indeed in the cross-examination of some of the witnesses of the United States, they were questioned by the claimants' counsel as to what they had said-as to the evidence they had given on the former hearing. I reminded the Jury of this fact, that there had been a former hearing at which these witnesses had been fully examined in the presence of the claimants' counsel and cross-examined by him; and remarked to them that by this means the claimants had been made acquainted with the evidence by which they were assailed, and had had full time to repel it; but that they had not produced a single importer of pins in the United States, to prove that he had purchased pins at the prices of their invoices, nor any manufacturer in England, to say that he had sold them at such prices. I see no error or extensión of the court over the Jury in these observations; or departure from the evidence in this

case.

The 7th error-"That the general tenor of the charge was such as to take away the question of fact from the Jury."

The generality of this exception admits only of a general answer and it might be dismissed for the reason that it specifies nothing; but I will take the occasion to state what I believe to be the right, and duty of a court in charging a Jury, beyond which not a step was taken in this case. That the question of fact should not be taken from the Jury by the court is too clear to be the subject of discussion; but I hold it to be equally certain, that it is the right and duty of the court to give its aid to the Jury in explaining the evidence; in collating its various parts; in drawing their attention to the most material facts in proof and their application to, and bearing upon the important points of the case; in ascertain

I have quoted the opinions of this author which he sustains by authority, thus at large, because I think them replete with good sense and practical ability; and that it is only by following them that the trial by Jury will be attended by invaluable advantages which belong to it. It is a solecism to say that a court may set aside the verdict of a Jury, if, in the opinion of the court, it be contrary to evidence; and yet that is an invasion of the right of the Jury over the facts, if the court should present to them their views of the evidence to prevent the error instead of correcting it. In the case in question no instance has been pointed out in which the court exceeded or even filled the space allowed. The evidence given on the trial was arranged in the order of the points to be considered and decided, but its effect was left fully and without prejudice to the Jury. The witnesses were named, and the circumstances alluded to which might detract from or give weight to their testimony, but their credibility, positive and comparative, was distinctly submitted to the judgment of the Jury. Finally, the allegation of the exception, that the "charge of the court was such as to take away the question of fact from the Jury" has not been supported by any reference to the charge, or any part of it, found

in the notes of the Judge, or in those of any of the counsel, nor by the recollection of either of any fact so taken from the Jury.

The 8th error. "Because the court remarked that it was extraordinary, that Kirby, Beard & Kirby, should have examined Boughton, a man in their own employ." If any such remark had been made by the court, it would be an extraordinary reason for setting aside a verdict. But no such remark was made. It was said that it was extraordinary they had not examined some other witnesses on the question of market value, but had relied upon him, especially as he knew nothing of the market price and value of the article, but was a workman or manufacturer, and neither a buy-true verdict to give according to the evidence—and it er nor seller of the article.

The 9th error. "Because the court erred in saying, that the various expressions in the acts of Congress upon the subject of value, and the computation of advalorem duties, were unimportant in the case; also in saying that to prove the value in London, value at Manchester, Liverpool and Warrington could be a guide."

We find in this exception, the same error which attends so many of those we have to consider in this case; that is, an entire mistake of what was said by the court. I will transcribe from my notes, what I did say to the Jury on this subject, "All the evidence which has been given of prices, of market value, or fair market value, or current value, or actual value, is to bring you to the same conclusion, to a satisfactory answer to the question you are trying: Is the valuation of these goods in this invoice a false valuation as charged in the information, which is the offence described in the act of Congress of 1830, on which this information is founded? Were these goods really worth more in the London market? Were the buying and selling prices higher in that market, than those charged in this invoice at the time when 'this invoice was made up? However the phrases may vary in the different acts of Congress-current value-actual value-or market value, the inquiry with you always is-does the invoice contain a true valuation of these pins, or a false one? and the phraseology of the law is important on this issue, only as it may assist you in answering and deciding this question. Were these pins, or similar pins, bought and sold in the London market, in June, 1830, at these prices? Are the valuations of this invoice true or false?" I see no error in any part of these remarks. As to the other branch of this exception, that the court erred in saying "that to prove value at London, value at Manchester, Liverpool and Warrington, could be a guide,”—the Jury were constantly kept in mind that they were to inquire into and decide upon the value at London, and that the prices and value at the other places mentioned, of which evidence was given on both sides, were to be considered by them only as auxiliary to that purpose, and they might make it so, as the witness had stated what was the ordinary difference of prices in these markets, when any existed.

Some illustrations were given to show that the evidence was not to be confined literally to the time and place of exportation, or it would tie us down to the hour and to the exact spot where the manufactory or warehouse stands.

The 10th error. "Because when the Jury came in, and one of them asked, whether in making up his opinion, he was at liberty to avail himself of his own previous knowledge, the court replied-"your oath is to decide according to the evidence; that is the only proper guide to your decision."

The language used by the court to the Jury was not precisely that stated in the exception; although the difference may not be important. I am willing to give my answer its full and fair meaning, such as was probably understood by him. It certainly was not, nor was it intended to be, a prohibition to the Juror, to avail himself of his knowledge of the subject; to his giving his verdict on any ground, or for any reason he might think

proper, on his own responsibility. But is was a strong
intimation by the court, that it was his duty to render
his verdict on, and according to the evidence given in
court under oath, in the presence of the court, the parties
and the public; and not to disregard such evidence in
favor of his private knowledge or opinions, derived from
more uncertain and unsafe sources. It would have been
idle in the court to attempt to prohibit what it could
not prevent; for a Juror may give his verdict as he wills
to do, and no body has a right to question him for his
reasons. All the court can do, is to inform him of what
the law expects and his duty requires of him; that is,
well and truly to try the issue submitted to him, and a
cannot be doubted that the evidence intended by the
law and the Juror's oath, is the evidence openly given
on the trial before the court; certainly this is the
true theory of the open, public, trial by Jury, by wit
nesses, by evidence, in presence of the court, of the
parties, of the public, with the benefit of cross examina-
tion; and the usefulness and safety of this admirable
mode of trial will be greatly imparied if Jurors are to
understand that it is no usurpation of power, no viola.
tion of their duty, when they get secretly together in
their private room, to put aside all the evidence of the
cause and bring together as the foundation of their ver
dict, all the opinions, prejudices, rumors and hearsays,
which they may call their previous and personal know-
ledge of the subject. The same rule must be applied
to criminal as to civil cases, and the accused can never
be assured of safety, although the whole evidence given
in his presence may testify his innocence, if he is to be
tried secretly, by other evidence in the Jury room.
These principles find ample support, and no contradic-
tion, from every authority in relation to them. In Tidd's
Prac. 327-speaking of the insufficiency of the writ of
attaint as a remedy for a false verdict, it is said "there
are numberless cases of false verdicts without any cor-
ruption or bad intention of the Jurymen. They may
have heard too much of the matter before the trial, and
imbibed prejudices without knowing it." This hear-
say, and these prejudices, are precisely what a Juror
might call and conceive to be a previous knowledge of
the subject; and this error can be guarded against only
by excluding them as far as practicable, altogether
from the mind of the Juror, and referring him for
his verdict, to the proper and legal evidence of the
case. We find, every where, the principle sustained,
that every thing which is to influence the verdict of a Jury
should be openly determined in the presence of the court.
Thus in Hale 306-"If a Juryman have a piece of evi-
dence in his pocket, and after the Jury are sworn and
gone out together, he showeth it to them, that is a mis-
demeanor in the Jury." So again-"If the Jury send
for a witness to repeat his evidence that he has given
openly in the court, it will avoid a verdict." The same
law is stated in Metcalf v. Dean. Cro. Eliz. 189. Again—
"If the Jury after their departure from the bar, desire
to hear the testimony of a witness again, they may be
sent for into court, and the witness may be heard again
openly, when the court or parties may ask what ques
tions they think fit." Salk. 405-"If a Jury give a ver-
dict on their own knowledge, they ought to tell the
court so, that they may be sworn as witnesses; and the
fair way is to tell the court before they are sworn, that
they have evidence to give."

In the case before as, the question asked by the Juror, and the answer given by the court, are thus stated on my notes. They were read at the time to the Juror in the presence of the counsel, and agreed to be correct. One of the Jurors asks-"Whether he may avail him self of any previous knowledge he has of the subject, in giving his verdict, the court replied that the ques tion is answered by the oath of the Juror to try the cause, and a true verdict give, according to the evidence."

I think, indeed, (although it is not on my notes,) that

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