Woman Sempronia; and fo have as clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believ'd that Sempronia dug Titus out of the Parfly-Bed (as they use to tell Children) and thereby became his Mother; and that afterwards, in the fame manner, the dug Caius out of the Parfly-Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife: the Notion that the fame Woman contributed, as Mother, equally to their Births (tho' I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it) being that on which I grounded the Řelation, and that they agreed in that Circumftance of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their Descent from the fame Perfon, without knowing the particular Circumftances of that Defcent, is enough to found my Notion of their having or not having the Relation of Brothers. But tho' the Ideas of particular Relations are capable of being as clear and diftin&t in the Minds of those who will duly confider them, as thofe of mix'd Modes, and more determinate than those of Substances; yet the Names belonging to Relation, are often of as doubtful and incertain Signification, as thofe of Subftances or mix'd Modes, and much more than thofe of fimple Ideas; because relative Words being the Marks of this Comparison which is made only by Mens Thoughts, and is an Idea only in Mens Minds, Men frequently apply them to different Comparisons of Things, according to their own Imaginations, which do not always correfpond with thofe of others ufing the fame Names.

The Notion of §. 20. Thirdly, That in thefe I call Moral Relations, I have a true Notion of the Relation is Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule, whether the Rule be true or the fame, whe- falfe. For if I meafure any thing by a Yard, I know whether the thing I meather the Rule fure be longer or fhorter than that fuppos'd Yard, tho' perhaps the Yard I meacompar'd to, be fure by be not exactly the Standard; which indeed is another Inquiry. For tho' true or falfe. the Rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the Agreement or Difagree

any Action is

ment obfervable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the Relation. Tho' measuring by a wrong Rule, I fhall thereby be brought to judge amifs of its moral Rectitude, because I have try'd it by that which is not the true Rule; but I am not mistaken in the Relation which that A&tion bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is Agreement or Difagreement.

Ideas for

fome clear and dif tina, others obfcure and confus'd.

Of Clear and Obfcure, Diftinct and Confus'd Ideas,

S. 1.HAVING fhewn the Original of our Ideas, and taken a View of their feveral forts; confider'd the Difference between the fimple and the complex, and obferv'd how the complex ones are divided into thofe of Modes, Subftances and Relations; all which, I think, is neceffary to be done by any. one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the Progrefs of the Mind in its Apprehenfion and Knowledge of Things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the Examination of Ideas. I muft, nevertheless, crave Leave to offer fome few other Confiderations concerning them. The firft is, That fome are clear, aad others obfcure; fome diftinct, and others confus'd. Clear and ob§. 2. The Perception of the Mind being most aptly explain'd by Words relafcure, explain'd ting to the Sight, we shall beft understand what is meant by clear and obfcure in by Sight. our Ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obfcure in the Objects of Sight. Light being that which difcovers to us vifible Objects, we give the Name of obfcure to that which is not plac'd in a Light fufficient to difcover minutely to us the Figure and Colours which are obfervable in it, and which, in a better Light, would be difcernible. In like manner our fimple Ideas are clear, when they are fuch as the Objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-order'd Senfation or Perception, prefent them. Whilft the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the Mind, whenever it has occafion to confider them, they are clear Ideas. So far as they either want any thing of that original Exactnefs, or have loft any of their first Freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnish'd by time, fo far are they obfcure. Complex

Ideas,

Ideas, as they are made up of fimple ones, fo they are clear, when the Ideas that go to their Compofition are clear; and the Number and Order of thofe fimple Ideas, that are the Ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§. 3. The Caufe of Obfcurity in fimple Ideas, feems to be either dull Organs, or Causes of Obvery flight and tranfient Impreffions made by the Objects, or elfe a Weaknefs infcurity. the Memory not able to retain them as receiv'd. For to return again to visible Objects, to help us to apprehend this Matter: If the Organs or Faculties of Perception, like Wax over-harden'd with Cold, will not receive the Impreffion of the Seal, from the ufual Impulse wont to imprint it; or, like Wax of a Temper too foft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or else suppofing the Wax of a Temper fit, but the Seal not apply'd with a fufficient Force to make a clear Impreffion: in any of thefe Cafes, the Print left by the Seal will be obfcure. This, I fuppofe, needs no Application to make it plainer.

§. 4. As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has such a full and evident Per- Distinct and ception, as it does receive from an outward Object operating duly on a well-confused, what. difpos'd Organ, fo a diftinet Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confufed Idea is fuch an one, as is not fufficiently diftinguifhible from another, from which it ought to be different.

6.5. If no Idea be confus'd, but fuch as is not fufficiently distinguishible objection: from another, from which it fhould be different; it will be hard, may any one fay, to find any where a confufed Idea. For let any Idea be as it will, it can be no other but fuch as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very Perception fufficiently diftinguishes it from all other Ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceiv'd to be fo. No Idea therefore can be undistinguifhible from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from it felf: for from all other it is evidently different.

§. 6. To remove this Difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the Confufion Ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must confider, that things rank'd under diftinct Names, are fuppos'd different enough to be diftinguifh'd, that fo each fort by its peculiar name may be mark'd, and difcours'd of a-part upon any occafion: And there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are fuppos'd to ftand for different things. Now, every Idea a Man has, being visibly what it is, and diftinct from all other Ideas but it felf; that which makes it confus'd, is, when it is fuch, that it may as well be call'd by another name, as that which it is exprefs'd by: the Difference which keeps the things (to be rank'd under thefe two different names) diftinct, and makes fome of them belong rather to the one, and fome of them to the other of thofe names, being left out; and fo the Diftinction, which was intended to be kept up by those different Names, is quite loft.

Confufion of

Ideas, is in their Names: reference to

§. 7. The Defaults which ufually occafion this Confufion, I think, are chiefly these Defaults which following: makeConfufion

First, When any complex Idea (for 'tis complex Ideas that are most liable to First, complex Confufion) is made up of too fmall a Number of fimple Ideas, and fuch only as are Ideas made up common to other things, whereby the Differences that make it deferve a diffe-of too few rent name, are left out. Thus he that has an Idea made up of barely the fimSimple ones. ple ones of a Beaft with Spots, has but a confus'd Idea of a Leopard; it not being thereby fufficiently diftinguish'd from a Lynx, and feveral other forts of Beafts that are spotted. So that fuch an Idea, tho' it hath the peculiar name Leopard, is not diftinguifhible from thofe defign'd by the names Lynx or Panther, and may as well come under the name Lynx as Leopard. How much the Custom of defining of Words by general Terms, contributes to make the Ideas we would exprefs by them confus'd and undetermin'd, I leave others to confider. This is evident, that confus'd Ideas are fuch as render the Ufe of Words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct Names. When the Ideas, for which we use different Terms, have not a Difference anfwerable to their diftinct Names, and fo cannot be diftinguish'd by them, there it is that they are truly confus'd.

6.8. Secondly, Another Default which makes our Ideas confus'd, is, when tho' Secondly, Or the Particulars that make up any Idea are in number enough; yet they are fo its fimple ones jumbled together, that it is not eafily difcernible, whether it more belongs to the jumbled diforName that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make derly together.

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Y

us

Thirdly, Or are

us conceive this Confufion, than a fort of Pictures ufually fhewn as surprising Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on the Table it felf, mark out very odd and unusual Figures, and have no difcernible Order in their Pofition. This Draught, thus made up of Parts wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is in it felf no more a confus'd thing, than the Picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein tho' there be as little Order of Colours or Figures to be found, yet no body thinks it a confus'd Picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confus'd, fince the want of Symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not; for another Draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be call'd confus'd. I anfwer, That which makes it be thought confus'd, is, the applying it to fome Name, to which it does no more difcernibly belong, than to fome other: v. g. When it is faid to be the Picture of a Man, or Cafar, then any one with reafon counts it confus'd: because it is not discernible, in that State, to belong more to the name Man, or Cafar, than to the name Baboon, or Pompey; which are fuppos'd to ftand for different Ideas from thofe fignify'd by Man, or Cafar. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, plac'd right, hath produc'd thofe irregular Lines on the Table into their due Order and Proportion, then the Confufion ceafes, and the Eye presently fees that it is a Man, or Cafar, i. e. that it belongs to thofe Names; and that it is fufficiently diftinguifhible from a Baboon, or Pompey, i. e. from the Ideas fignify'd by thofe Names. Juft thus it is with our Ideas, which are as it were the Pictures of things. No one of these mental Draughts, however the Parts are put together, can be call'd confus'd (for they are plainly difcernible as they are) till it be rank'd under fome ordinary Name, to which it cannot be difcern'd to belong, any more than it does to fome other Name of an allow'd different Signification.

§. 9. Thirdly, A third Defect that frequently gives the name of confus'd to mutable and our Ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermin'd. Thus we may undetermin'd. obferve Men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary Words of their Language,

till they have learn'd their precife Signification, change the Idea they make this or that Term ftand for, almost as often as they ufe it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his Idea of Church or Idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not fteddy to any one precife Combination of Ideas that makes it up, is faid to have a confus'd Idea of Idolatry or the Church: tho' this be ftill for the fame reason that the former, viz. because a mutable Idea (if we will allow it to be one Idea) cannot belong to one Name rather than another; and fo lofes the Distinction that distinct Names are defign'd for.

Confufion with S. 10. By what has been faid, we may obferve how much Names, as fuppos'd out reference to Reddy Signs of things, and by their difference to ftand for and keep things difNames, hardly tinct that in themselves are different, are the Occafion of denominating Ideas diftinct

conceiveable.

Confufion con cerns always

two Ideas.

or confus'd, by a fecret and unobferv'd Reference the Mind makes of its Ideas to fuch Names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I fay of Words, in the third Book, has been read and confider'd. But without taking notice of fuch a Reference of Ideas, to diftinct Names, as the Signs of diftinct things, it will be hard to fay what a confus'd Idea is. And therefore when a Man designs, by any Name, a fort of things, or any one particular thing, diftinct from all others; the complex Idea he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more particular the Ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the Number and Order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it ftill of the perceivable Differences, whereby it is kept feparate and distinct from all Ideas belonging to their Names, even thofe that approach nearest to it, and thereby all Confufion with them is avoided.

§. 11. Confufion, making it a difficulty to feparate two things that fhould be feparated, concerns always two Ideas; and thofe moft, which moft approach one another. Whenever therefore we fufpect any Idea to be confus'd, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be feparated from: and that will always be found an Idea belonging to another Name, and fo fhould be a different thing, from which yet it is not fufficiently diftinct, being either the fame with it, or making a Part of it, or at leaft as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is rank'd under; and fo

keeps

keeps not that Difference from that other Idea, which the different Names import.

. 12. This, I think, is the Confufion proper to Ideas, which ftill carries with Caules of Conit a fecret Reference to Names. At least, if there be any other Confufion offuîon. Ideas, this is that which most of all diforders Mens Thoughts and Difcourfes : Ideas, as rank'd under Names, being thofe that for the most part Men reason of within themselves, and always thofe which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are fuppos'd two different Ideas mark'd by two different Names, which are not as diftinguifhible as the Sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be Confufion: And where any Ideas are diftinct, as the Ideas of thofe two Sounds they are mark'd by, there can be between them no Confufion. The Way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex Idea, as precifely as is poffible, all thofe Ingredients whereby it is differenc'à from others; and to them fo united in a determinate Number and Order, apply steddily the fame Name. But this neither accommodating Men's Eafe or Vanity, or ferving any Design but that of naked Truth, which is not always the thing aim'd at, fuch Exactnefs is rather to be wifh'd than hoped for. And fince the loofe Application of Names to undetermin'd, variable, and almost no Ideas, ferves both to cover our own Ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no wonder that moft Men should ufe it themselves, whilft they complain of it in others. Tho', I think, no small part of the Confufion to be found in the Notions of Men, might by Care and Ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some Ideas are fo complex, and made up of fo many Parts, that the Memory does not eafily retain the very fame precife Combination of fimple Ideas under one Name; much lefs are we able conftantly to divine for what precife complex Idea fuch a Name ftands in another Man's Ufe of it. From the firft of thefe, follows Confufion in a Man's own Reafonings and Opinions within himfelf; from the latter, frequent Confufion in difcourfing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of Words, their Defects and Abuses, in the following Book, I fhall here fay no more of it.

§. 13. Our complex Ideas being made up of Collections, and fo Variety of fim- Complex Ideas ple ones, may accordingly be very clear and diftinct in one part, and very obfcure and may be distinct confufed in another. In a Man who fpeaks of a Chiliaedron, or a Body of a thou-in one part, and confus'd fand Sides, the Idea of the Figure may be very confus'd, tho' that of the Number be very diftin&t; fo that he being able to difcourfe and demonftrate concerning that part of his complex Idea, which depends upon the Number of a Thoufand, he is apt to think he has a distinct Idea of a Chiliaedron; tho' it be plain, he has no precife Idea of its Figure, fo as to diftinguish it by that, from one that has but 999 Sides: the not obferving whereof, caufes no fmall Error in Mens Thoughts, and Confufion in their Difcourfes.

§. 14. He that thinks he has a diftinct Idea of the Figure of a Chiliaedron, let This, if not him for trial-fake take another parcel of the fame uniform Matter, viz. Gold, heeded. caufes or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a Figure of 999 Sides: He will, I Confufion in doubt not, be able to distinguish these two Ideas one from another, by the num-our Arguings. ber of Sides; and reafon and argue diftinctly about them, whilft he keeps his Thoughts and Reasoning to that part only of thefe Ideas, which is contain❜d in their Numbers; as that the Sides of the one could be divided into two equal Numbers, and of the other not, &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their Figure, he will there be presently at a lofs, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two Ideas, one of them diftinct from the other, by the bare Figure of thefe two Pieces of Gold; as he could, if the fame parcels of Gold were made one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five Sides. In which incompleat Ideas, we are very apt to impofe on our felves, and wrangle with others, efpecially where they have particular and familiar Names. For being fatisfy'd in that part of the Idea, which we have clear; and the Name which is familiar to us, being apply'd to the whole, containing that part alfo which is imperfect and obfcure; we are apt to ufe it for that confufed Part, and draw Deductions from it, in the obfcure part of its Signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

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§. 15.

Inftance in
Eternity.

Matter.

§. 15. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name Eternity, we are apt to think we have a pofitive comprehenfive Idea of it, which is as much as to fay, that there is no part of that Duration which is not clearly contain'd in our Idea. 'Tis true, that he that thinks fo may have a clear Idea of Duration; he may also have a very clear Idea of a very great Length of Duration; he may alfo have a clear Idea of the Comparifon of that great one with ftill a greater: But it not being poffible for him to include in his Idea of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration where he suppofes no End, that Part of his Idea, which is ftill beyond the Bounds of that large Duration, he reprefents to his own Thoughts, is very obfcure and undetermin'd. And hence it is, that in Difputes and Reafonings concerning Eternity, or any other Infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve our felves in manifeft Abfurdities.

Divifibility of §. 16. In Matter we have no clear Ideas of the Smallness of Parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our Senfes : and therefore when we talk of the Divifibility of Matter in infinitum, tho' we have clear Ideas of Division and Divifibility, and have alfo clear Ideas of Parts made out of a whole by Divifion; yet we have but very obfcure and confus'd Ideas of Corpufcles, or minute Bodies fo to be divided, when by former Divifions they are reduc'd to a Smallnefs much exceeding the Perception of any of our Senfes; and so all that we have clear and diftinct Ideas of, is of what Divifion in general or abstractly is, and the Relation of Totum and Pars: But of the Bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain Progreffions, I think, we have no clear nor diftinct Idea at all. For I ask any one, Whether taking the fmalleft Atom of Duft he ever faw, he has any diftin&t Idea (bating still the Number which concerns not Extenfion) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1000,000 Part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his Ideas to that degree, without lofing fight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of thofe Numbers. Such a degree of Smallness is not unreafonable to be fuppos'd, fince a Divifion carry'd on fo far, brings it no nearer the End of infinite Divifion, than the first Divifion into two Halfs does. I must confefs, for my part, I have no clear diftinct Ideas of the different Bulk or Extenfion of thofe Bodies, having but a very obfcure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Divifion of Bodies in infinitum, our Idea of their diftinct Bulks, which is the Subject and Foundation of Divifion, comes, after a little Progreffion, to be confounded, and almost loft in Obfcurity. For that Idea, which is to reprefent only Bignefs, must be very obfcure and confus'd, which we cannot diftinguifh from one ten times as big, but only by Number; fo that we have clear diftin&t Ideas, we may fay, of ten and one, but no diftin&t Ideas of two fuch Extensions. 'Tis plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite Divifibility of Body, or Extenfion, our diftinct and clear Ideas are only of Numbers; but the clear diftin&t Ideas of Extension, after fome Progrefs of Divifion, is quite loft and of fuch minute Parts we have no diftinct Ideas at all; but it returns, as all our Ideas of Infinite do, at laft to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any diftinct Idea of actual infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a clear Idea of Divifion, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear Idea of infinite Parts in Matter, than we have a clear Idea of an infinite Number, by being able ftill to add new Numbers to any affign'd Number we have: Endless Divifibility giving us no more a clear and distinct Idea of actually infinite Parts, than endlefs Addibility (if I may fo speak) gives us a clear and diftin&t Idea of an actually infinite Number; they both being only in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein confifts the Infinity) we have but an obfcure, imperfect, and confus'd Idea; from or about which we can argue or reafon with no Certainty or Clearnefs, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number of which we have no fuch diftinct Idea as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obfcure one, that compar'd to any other, it is ftill bigger: And we have no more a clear pofitive Idea of it when we fay or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we fhould fay it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a Proportion to the End of Addition, or Number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and fo proceeds, fhall as foon come to the End of

all