peace with France, if accomplished by the late negociations, would have been fatal to the security of the Country.'

The true objections to the measure then, as well as at the present more a ful crisis, apply to the unavoidable nature and effects of any treaty that could be proposed; not to its particular terms; yet we heard of "a good peace," and "an honourable peace," as proper to be treated for with France. For my part, if the possibility of a safe Peace can be shewn, I will heartily admit, be its articles what they may, that it is good for my country in these evil times; and not dishonourable to her, but glorious to those who may make it. But while no such peace is to be hoped for, I would not treat; because I would not lead the people of England into the dangerous error of supposing, that peace with France, in her present attitude, is compatible with their safety; nor would I lead the people of Europe, and America, to believe that England is of that opinion.'

The writer thinks that Bonaparte will again offer us the uti possidetis, but with this he is not contented; and nothing short of the status quo ante bellum for ourselves and our allies will satisfy him.

But this, (says he) it may be exclaimed, it would be preposterous to expect at present from France. I admit it; and therefore it would be preposterous to expect at present a peace safe for Great Britain. The impossibility consists in this, that France will not relinquish her new pos sessions on the continent; and that therefore Great Britain cannot safely relinquish her undivided possession of the sea. We cannot do so, not only because we should, by opening the sea to our enemy, enable him soon to become a formidable maritime power, but because his usurped Empire on shore would become far more terrible and irresistible than it is, were its commercial communications restored. We dare not give him back his navigation, and let him keep all his new territory too.

These principles, in any day but the present, would have needed no demonstration. If we can safely make peace with France in her present most alarming attitude, we have been fighting since 1792, and even in all our wars since the treaty of Ryswick, not only without necessity, but upon the most irrational and extravagant views that ever governed the policy of a nation.'

Granting the premises, this reasoning is forcible: but the ineligibility of a peace on any other terms than those of the status quo ante bellum must first be proved; and who can point out a period at which such extreme terms are likely to be obtained? The consequence, then, must be permanent war.

In the following passage, the author suggests an idea which, it is exceedingly to be regretted, was not sufficiently considered before it was too late :

There was a time perhaps, when it might have been more prudent to open the sea to France, leaving her in a state of great continental aggrandizement, than to risque her pushing her conquests

still further, if that could have been prevented by any pacific conventions that we had power to make, for ourselves and our allies; but if there was ever a proper season for such policy, it plainly exists no longer; and this, not only because our enemy has shewn that no confidence can be placed in any treaty which opposes his thirst of universal empire; but because it may now fairly be doubted, whether any further increase of his dominions would really add to his power.'

The writer next expresses a sentiment that has been before advanced, but on which we cannot too frequently reflect:

For my own part, however singular the opinion may seem, i should have less apprehension of danger from the arms of Napoleon, if the remaining territories of Prussia, and Austria, and even the immense domains of Russia, and Turkey, were added to his conquests, than I feel at the present moment. At sea, the acquisition of every bottom still friendly to this country, would not now enable him to cope with us; and on shore, he has power enough already for our destruction, when it can be brought into action against us. The momentum of the vast machine, on its present scale, is more than we can hope finally to resist but every enlargement of its dimensions, and multiplication of its intricate movements, increases its tendencies to interior derangement; and therefore, without adding to our im, mediate peril, improves our chance of escape. Buonaparte has hitherto been so astonishingly prudent, or fortunate, that we naturally begin to doubt whether there be any thing too difficult for him to ac complish; but his power is already composed of so many discordant elements, that their cohesion is truly wonderful: and as he proceeds, he is gaming at double or quits. Even the large armies, which he has to station in so many conquered countries will soon be very diffi. cult to govern they, or their generals, will probably recollect, that the Roman legions bestowed the purple, as well as kept the provinces in subjection; and revolutions in this extraordinary age move with a celerity of which history has no example.'

It is the opinion of this author that, if peace be made, hostility will still be continued by the enemy against our com

merce:

It is impossible, (he observes,) when we consider Napoleon's maxims of commercial policy, to doubt that he will avail himself, as soon as the sea is open, of all his enormous power and influence, to exclude us by means of treaties, and of municipal laws, not only from France, but from every other country in Europe, to the Government of which he can dictate. With a sincerity unusual to him, he has already pretty plainly intimated that such will be his pacific system, by protesting, in limine, when he began to negociate, against every stipulation in fa. vour of our commerce. He would have no commercial treaties with us whatever.

And here I must own myself quite at a loss to comprehend the views of those, who regard the interests of our commerce and manufactures, as considerations on the side of peace. That such is not the X

REV. MARCH, 1807.

opinion

opinion of our merchants in general, is well known; and yet they judge perhaps only from the necessary effects of a free peace com petition against them, under the present great disadvantages of the country without taking into the account the unfair preferences and exclusions, to be systematically opposed to them in foreign countries.

Who that attentively considers the spirit of Napoleon's late decree against our commerce, can be insensible to the danger of his acting on the same principle in time of peace? He might then perhaps find means to carry into effect, what he now impotently threatens. The necessities of his subjects, and of the subjects of his allies and dependents, will secure to us their custom during war, in spite of his prohibitions; for it cannot be supposed that our Government will omit to employ the obvious means of counteracting them. I hope rather that we shall embrace the fair opportuuity which it affords of asserting more firmly our maritime rights, and thereby giving new vigour to British commerce. But when we shall have no longer the power of opposing to regulations on shore, the pressure of our hos tilities by sea; when the ships of France, Spain, Holland, Genoa, and Venice, and all the other maritime Countries now hostile to us, shall be able to navigate without interruption, on every voyage, and with every species of merchandize; the same interdict on our trade, in the inoffensive form of municipal laws, may produce the desired effect, and gradually exclude us from almost all the ports of Europe.

Commerce, it is true, will force its way in spite of prohibitions, where the demand and the profits sufficiently excite the enterprise of the merchant; but it is difficult to believe that the manufactures and trade of this country, under the extreme pressure of our public burthens, will long retain inherent energy enough in the comparative cheapness and skill with which they are conducted, to supplant other maritime nations, in their own, or neighbouring markets; and if by a hostile system which we cannot retaliate, they shall be further encumbered with all the disadvantages and risques of a contraband carriage, while our rivals can trade safely, and with every encouragement that commercial laws can afford, I see not how we can hope long to maintain the unequal contest. In this view the comparison between peace and war is plain and simple. Napoleon is fully resolv ed to deprive us of the commerce of the continent; but in war he has the inclination without the power; in peace he will have both. He holds the continental gates of the market; but in war we command all the roads that lead to it, and can therefore starve him into the admission of our trade-in peace, the roads will be free to him, and he will still command the gates.'

、

We allow some force to an observation made by this author, which is founded on the ruling passion of Bonaparte; his personal feelings,' he states, still more than his interest or his policy render his adherence to a pacific system utterly hopeless. Neither the example of the administration which treated at Amiens, nor that of the present cabinet and Mr. Fox, would afford any sanction for a new experiment on the good faith and moderation of France, after the battle of Auerstadt

and the total ruin of Prussia.' He moreover regards it 'as very doubtful whether a steady prosecution of the war be not the most economical, as well as the safest course, we can at present pursue.' He admits, however, that permanent war is a dreadful idea; but let it be contrasted, as to meet fairly the present arguments for war it ought, with permanent servitude to France, and perhaps its horrors will vanish.'

This tract contains abundance of matter which claims the most serious attention:-but to the remainder of it we can make only a brief reference.-The writer considers our regular army as formed on much too small a scale; and he regards our volunteer force as requiring to be very differently modelled. We believe that similar sentiments are very prevalent; and we sincerely trust that the author may be successful in rousing public attention, and in directing it to these vital concerns.He displays in striking colours the vices which degrade the character of the French chief; and he strenuously combats his title to the epithet of great, which his enslaved subjects have conferred on him. Altogether, we consider this performance as not unworthy of its author, and as one for which every lover of his country will feel indebted to him.

Jo.

ART. XII. Orme's Graphic History of the Life, Exploits, and Death of Horatio Nelson, Viscount and Baron Nelson of the Nile, &c. &c. &c.; containing 15 Engravings; and intended as an Accompaniment to the three celebrated Whole-sheet Plates of his Lordship's splendid Victories, viz. the Battles of St. Vincent's, the Nile, and Trafalgar, which are explained by References and Keys. The Memoirs by Francis William Blagdon, Esq. Folio. 21. 28. Boards. Orme, Longman and Co. &c.

THE brilliancy of Lord Nelson's professional career, through

a series of unprecedented national services, and the splendour which illumined the close of a life so gloriously eventful, claim adequate commemoration from the poet, the historian, and the artist. Ordinary productions, however, are as inefficacious as they should be inadmissible: though the venerated name of Nelson may give temporary currency to every species of insufficient performance, whether of the pen, the lyre, or the pencil. On the importance of engraving, that most useful handmaid to the arts, it is needless for us to comment at large; and we shall merely observe that its relative utility to works of design is as that of the press to the efforts of the muse and the labours of science. This invaluable acquirement, we have reason to believe, was unknown in Greece and in Italy until the 15th century; otherwise, we should probably have been in possession

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possession of the historic compositions of Apelles, Zeuxis, Pharasius, and other painters of the interesting ages of antiquity; and in architecture we should have been presented with the drawings of Vitruvius, which would have satisfactorily elucidated many ambiguities that now cloud his valuable writings.The discovery of the graphic art seems, as was the case with that of printing, to have been accidental: the first plates usedwere wood and pewter, on which some German painters, with Albert Durer and others, engraved their own designs; and they were followed in example by many of the most celebrated of the Italian Schools.

To Mr. Orme's Graphic History of Lord Nelson, perhaps we cannot offer more than negative applause: but positive approbation must be bestowed on it in one respect, if we be truly informed that the proprietor has departed from a practice of late date, of striking from the plate numerous impressions under the delusive title of proof prints: a practice which involves a contradiction in terms, is contrary to every former proceeding, disgusting to our senses, and degrading to the dignity of an art emphatically termed liberal.

It is here stated that on the 4th of July 1806, a committee of nobility, surveyors, &c. viewed the cathedral of St. Paul, and determined that the most appropriate spot for the intended monument to Lord Nelson's memory was in the centre, beneath the dome, where it is to be erected without delay.' With all due respect to the enlightened part of the aristocracy, who have been poetically called the "Corinthian pillars of polished Society," we cannot help thinking that the circumstance of these nobles mingling with surveyors, on so important a consultation, bodes no good. Of what description of artists were the persons here called surveyors? To answer the question, we shall in vain consult the pages of Vitruvius, Vasari, &c. Yet, whoever they might be, we are bound to applaud their determination: for the propriety of which we have the authority of Sir Christopher Wren, whose comprehensive power of discernment cannot be doubted, grounded as he was known to be in every branch of science, and pre-eminently versed in the law of optics. He was well aware that such an object was materially necessary for the classic embellishment of his noble edifice, and could only be attained by the aid of a mass of happily chosen sculpture ;-and who could blame him for wishing that it might be made his own monument,-he who "bade temples rise, the beauteous works of peace?"

Since this publication was printed, however, we have heard, with no common degree of concern, that the resolution of the Committee has been rescinded; and we have also the mortification