ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. INTRODUCTION 1. An Inquiry 1. SINCE it is the understanding that sets man above the INTROD. rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them 3; it is certainly a subject, into the even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The Understanding understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and per- pleasant ceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires and useful. art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our 1 I follow Coste's French Version in separating the 'Introduction' from the First Book, an arrangement more expressive of its relation to the Essay than that adopted in the other editions. 2 'The understanding' with Locke is that in man which enables him to have ideas; and to form intuitive, demonstrable, and probable propositions about what exists. It represents man in his ultimate relations to truth and error. Cf. note on p. 7. ''Scientia et potentia humana in idem coincidunt'-as Bacon puts it, Nov. Org. i. aph. 3. 4 Locke assumes that 'human understanding' can be investigated as one among the other 'objects' which present themselves in the universe; but with this signal peculiarity, that it is itself the factor of knowledge; and also an object that is apprehended, not by any of the five senses, but introspectively, and therefore with difficulty, because all men are in early life accustomed to confine their atten. tion to external objects, so that in introspection or reflection they have to resist habit. INTROD. own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things1. Design. 3 2. This, therefore, being my purpose-to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge 2, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent2 ;— I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence 4 consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations which, however 1 All the sciences,' says Hume, 'have a relation to human nature, and are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they all lie under the cognizance ("understanding") of men, and are judged by their powers and faculties' (Treatise of Human Nature, Introduction). Human understanding, in short, is the common element in all the sciences. 2 In Locke's use of words, knowledge usually means what is absolutely certain; judgment, belief, opinion, and assent, on the contrary, refer to the sphere of probability, including all degrees from moral certainty down to the faintest likelihood. By the ambiguous term 'original' of knowledge he means the time and circumstances in which men begin to be percipient, and the sources from which a human understanding gradually derives its knowledge of facts. 'Physical consideration,' i. e. study of the understanding as expressed in terms of the physical organism, instead of by introspective consciousness of its actual operations. * Its 'essence,' i. e. whether the real essence of mind in man is material or spiritual-whether God has endowed the human organism with self-con sciousness, or has given to each man a spiritual substance. 5 Spirits'-the animal spirits which some ancient philosophers, and Des Cartes among the moderns, adduced in explanation of external perception, memory, and sensuous imagination. He connects 'sensations' with the organism, which must be observed by the senses; 'ideas' with the understanding, which must be studied through self-consciousness. Cf. Bk. II. ch. i. § 23, on sensation, and Introd. § 8, on idea. 7 He thus declines both, not only ontology, but also physiological psychology, of which Hobbes had given an example, and thus isolates the 'human understanding' from its organic relations, treating it as non-natural, at the point of view of physiological materialists. It were to be wished, Stewart remarks, that Locke had adhered more to this resolution. If he had done so, he would have been less disposed to seek the explanation of experience in organic functions, which themselves need to be explained, than in the ultimate constitution of reasonin the supernatural in man and in the universe. curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my INTROD way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with. And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method 2, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have3; and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge; or the grounds of those persuasions 5 which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it o. 3. It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds Method. between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasion 7. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method :— 1 Objects,' i. e. ideas, in Locke's lan guage. It is not a critical analysis of the ultimate constitution of knowledge -an abstract epistemology-that he has in view, any more than it is an interpretation of human understanding in terms of its organism. It begins with an inquiry into the ideas or phenomena which provide material for the human understanding. * This assumes that human understanding in its ultimate relations to its objects can be dealt with adequately when it is examined as an aggregate of phenomena, a succession of invisible events, to which the 'historical plain method' is applicable. 'Historical,' the method of observing what happens * See Bk. IV. ch. i-xiii. 6 Yet the motive spirit of the Essay 7 This is the special subject of the Fourth Book. INTROD. Useful to know the Extent of sion. First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them1. Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it 2. Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion: whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent3. 4. If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what our Com- things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they prehenfail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes 1 The subject of the Second Book, and negatively of the First. 2 The basis and boundary of human 'knowledge,' or absolute certainty, is examined in the first thirteen chapters of the Fourth Book. 3 'Assent,' in its degrees of probability, from moral certainty down to the faintest presumption, is considered in the fourteenth and following chapters of the Fourth Book. This Book is thus the culmination of the whole inquiry; yet it has been left in the background by most critics of the Essay, who, with Cousin, assume that for Locke the study of the 'understanding' is the study of man's 'ideas,' or Idealogy; instead of a study of man's 'intellectual perceptions' and probable 'presumptions,' concerning the relations of his ideas,-in which perceptions and presumptions alone, according to Locke, knowledge and probability consist. His design, thus announced, is so far analogous to Kant's, although it is a history of the presented data, not a critical analysis of the rational constitution, of human understanding. Whether the work designed and executed by Locke should be called 'Logic,' or 'Metaphysics,' is a question, touched by Locke himself, in his correspondence with Molyneux. That human knowledge is neither Omniscience nor Nescience, but must, in all instances of it, be somewhere intermediate between the two, is the central lesson of the Essay. about things to which our understandings are not suited; and INTROD. of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state. and Con 5. For though the comprehension of our understandings Our Capacity comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we suited to shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our State our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has cerns. bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion1. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) пávта пρòs (wǹv kaì evoéßetav, whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable. And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our 1 Locke always takes for granted that an understanding of what exists is in some degree possible for man, varying in each individual according to his intellectual development and oppor. tunities of experience; while in all it |