-- CHAP. XXVII. BOOK II. 10. But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, Con- always remained present in the mind, whereby the same sciousness thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, personal as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that Identity. which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this conscious makes ness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another1; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts2,-I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e. the same substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all. The question being what makes the same person; and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person, which, in this case, matters not at all different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life3. For, it being the the idea of equality; so likewise upon that Locke is concerned with, in this Book, which deals with ideas, not with knowledge. 1 Cf. ch. x. § 9 2 Cf. ch. i. §§ 10-17. 3 In thus pressing a distinction between identity of substance and identity of person, he seeks to show that the latter is independent of the former, and that the personality is continuous as far as memory (latent as well as patent?) can go, whatever changes of CHAP. XXVII. same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, BOOK II. personal identity depends on that only1, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances2. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come3; and would be by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two persons, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or a short sleep between the same consciousness uniting those distant 1 Here' depends on,' not 'is constituted by,' as in other passages. It is the terms which contribute to the relation of personal identity-i. e. self now, and self in the past-in which this relation 'terminates,' that Locke has in view. As to our conviction of the identity of those terms, Butler remarks, But though we are certain that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked whether we may not be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever; because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who 2 As in a change from the natural 3 Making itself the same by its memory of itself, and thus in memory creating, and not merely discovering, itself if the expressions in the text are strictly interpreted; the thinking substance 'contributing to the production' of the successive acts, which acts memory 'unites' in one person. (Cf. p. 415, note 2.) BOOK II. actions into the same person, whatever substances1 contributed to their production 2. CHAP. XXVII. stance. 11. That this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our Personal very bodies, all whose particles, whilst vitally united to this Identity in same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are Change of Sub- touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of ourselves; i. e. of our thinking conscious self. Thus, the limbs of his body are to every one a part of himself; he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off a hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus, we see the substance whereof personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off 3. Personality in Change of Substance. 12. But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons ? And to this I answer: First, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether 'change of substance,' e. g. by transmigration into another body'whatever substances'-whatever organised body, or other substance. 2 Can the same personality—accountability-be 'annexed' to two or more substances, which all contribute to the production of the memory by which the personality is constituted ? 36 'Je suis aussi de cette opinion, que la conscience, ou le sentiment du moi, prouve une identité morale ou personnelle. Je ne voudrais point dire que l'identité personnelle et même le soi ne demeurent point en nous, et que je ne suis point le moi qui ait été dans le berceau, sous prétexte que je ne me souviens plus de rien de tout ce que j'ai fait alors. Il suffit, pour trouver l'identité morale par soimême, qu'il y ait une moyenne liaison de consciosité d'un état voisin, ou même un peu éloigné à l'autre, quand quelque saut ou intervalle oublié y serait mêlé.' (Leibniz.) When Locke makes personal, i. e. moral identity depend on memory, this may include potential memory, in which our whole past conscious experience is possibly retained; and when he suggests the transmigration of one man's memory into the bodies of other men, or even of brutes, this may be taken as an emphatic illustration of the essential dependence of the idea of our personality upon selfconsciousness only, but not as affirming that this transmigration actually occurs under the present order of things. CHAP. XXVII. their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive BOOK II. personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance1. And therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies: unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too. in Change stances Person. 13. But next, as to the first part of the question, Whether, Whether if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial sub- of thinkstances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person? ing SubI answer, that cannot be resolved but by those who know there can what kind of substances they are that do think 2; and whether be one the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another 3. I grant were the same consciousness the same individual action it could not but it being a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another 1 The animal organism is continually changing its particles, and this, according to Locke, is change of the ' material substance.' Consciousness that he is the same person, cannot be consciousness that he is the same substance, to one who makes his body his substance. 2 He maintains (ch. xxiii. §§ 5, 15, &c.) that we have as clear (or as obscure) an idea of what spiritual substances are as of material substances. 3 How does Locke thus distinguish the spiritual substance from the self that is given in consciousness? Is not СНАР. XXVII. BOOK II. cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent-why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true-will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God; who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that, if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved 3. 1 In other words, we cannot be deceived in our presentative, but we may in our representative experience. 2 Under the natural order of things, which we are obliged to accept in faith, the identity apparent to the person who feels himself the same, with its implied moral responsibility, is intransferable in fact. 3 'According to Mr. Locke, we may always be sure that we are the same persons, that is, the same accountable agents or beings, now which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches : or as far as a perfectly just and good God will cause it to reach.' (Perronet's Vindication of Locke, p. 21.) The last clause suggests a conscious revival of the latent stores of memory, which may include all the past experi. ence of the person. |