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THE TURKISH REVOLUTION.

Three points are especially interesting in connection with the remarkable change which has taken place in the condition of the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, the unprecedented manner in which one of the most despotically governed countries in the world has acquired freedom; secondly, the prospects of a satisfactory working of the new order of things and its permanence-in other words, the prospects of real reformation which the transformation offers; thirdly, the feelings with which the modified situation in which Turkeq finds herself is viewed by her immediate neighbors and by the rest of the world.

I propose to deal with these three points as comprehensively as is possible within the compass of a Review article.

The re-establishment by Abd-ulHamid of the Constitution he had promulgated in 1876, and almost immediately afterwards suspended, came as a tremendous surprise to everybody, not excepting the chiefs of the Young Turkey party, who did not expect such a sudden fruition of their patriotic labors. Undoubtedly these labors have been very great during the last ten years or so, and marked by an ability and perseverance which reflect the greatest credit on the reorganizer of the party, Prince Sabah-ed-dine, own nephew of Abd-ul-Hamid, who, at the early age of thirty, has gained undying glory as the prime agent in the destruction of one of the most infamous and yet most deeply-rooted political systems in the world. But the obstacles to success opposed by the ill-inspired genius of Abd-ul-Hamid, and the extraordinary difficulty of weaning the Turkish peasant, who forms the backbone of the Turkish army, from his almost animal devotion to the Sul

tan-Caliph, were recognized to be of such magnitude by the party as to cause it to believe that at least two or three years more would be necessary to bring about that general revolt of the troops upon which it had rightly centred its efforts and which, by depriving the Hamidian régime of its principal support, would bring it to the ground. What hastened the event is that the indescribably wretched condition which has been the lot of the Turkish soldier under the autocracy of Yildiz, and which none but men of his admirably patient and disciplined race would have endured so long, became at last intolerable to him when he was brought into contact with his fellowsubjects, most of them his co-religionists, of the Macedonian Gendarmerie, whose treatment, under European supervision, formed such a contrast to his own. The army concentrated in Macedonia, which represented fourfifths of the military establishment of Turkey, having revolted, the movement spread with lightning rapidity to the neighboring troops in the Vilayet of Adrianople, and from them to those in the vicinity of Constantinople, because it arose from a reaction against unbearable sufferings common to all the soldiers of the Sultan, with the exception of those belonging to the panpered Guard, garrisoned around Yildiz itself, and also because, unlike former mutinies, the rebellion in Macedonia broke out in the midst of a whole Army Corps simultaneously, and thus gave encouragement to other units and divisions to follow suit.

The Young Turkey party had no anticipation of this happy precipitation of events, due to unforeseen causes; but no sooner had the tendency manifested itself among the rank and file to take into its own hands the matter

of the reformation of their lot-their object was purely selfish in the beginning, and confined to the desire of remedying military grievances only than the party intervened through the numerous officers affiliated to its cause, and, adjusting the movement to its general purposes, gave it the significance of a political rising, which led, in an extraordinarily short time, to the attainment of its fundamental programme. Herein lies the great merit of Prince Sabah-ed-dine and his coadjutors. They were prepared for emergencies because they had patiently established a wide-spread connection with the regimental officers of the Turkish Army, the great majority of whom had personal as well as patriotic motives for adhering to the Young Turkey creed, but who ran the greatest risks in joining the ranks of the party. In this way a military revolt was promptly transformed into a revolution: the first, be it noted, which has taken place in the history of Turkey. It is a fact that, so far, all dethronements and other forced political changes in the Ottoman Empire have been the result of conspiracies or revolts. It is a sign of the times that, whereas it has been impossible in the past to bring the Turkish masses into line against the throne, because to them it represented an intangible Idol, semi-religious, semi-political, they have been awakened by their sufferings into a notion of solidarity, the underlying element of which is a new-born spirit of criticism in regard to the SultanCaliph. The great difference between the Turkish upheaval of 1876 and the present one is that the former represented the ideas of a small group of enlightened patriots, whereas the latter is thoroughly national in character.

The role played by Abd-ul-Hamid in the drama which has just been enacted is intensely interesting to analyze. At first-that is, during two or

three days-the crowned Machiavelli of modern times could not bring himself to believe that the system he had devised for preventing his subjects. and especially his troops, from combining against him in any but a sporadic and timid manner-that system which we cannot help admiring as a marvel of ingenuity, knowledge of human nature, and singleness of purpose -had failed to act after serving him so well for thirty-one years. When, however, with the quick perception which is one of the attributes of his extraordinary intellect, he realized that this was the case, and that resistance to the wishes of the nation was out of the question, he promptly adapted himself to the new situation and, shedding the despot, entered into the skin of a constitutional sovereign with a facility and good grace which came as a revelation even to those most intimately acquainted with him. It was an axiom with all students of Abd-ulHamid's character that, rather than part with the omnipotence of despotism, which appeared to be as necessary an element of existence to him as. the breath of his nostrils, he would confront a hundred deaths or put an end to his days with his own hands. Is he not authentically known to have said that, so long as he could remain the absolute master of his subjects, the Empire might shrink to the size of a single province? And does not the whole history of his reign confirm this statement? Does it not teach that his. object has been to weaken the Empire systematically, methodically, unrelentingly, in order the better to dominateit, but nicely calculating withal his destructive action so as to prevent the fabric from collapsing entirely before his death, and thus have some territory, if only that single province of which we have just spoken, to dominate? Never in history has the motto of "Après moi le déluge" been more

thoroughly followed than by Abd-ulHamid as Sultan of Turkey. And yet that very man, when confronted by the inevitable in the shape of an unexpected revolution, bows to it, and says to his subjects: "I thoroughly identify myself with the change. My dearest wish is to preside over its successful development." And he means what he says. Not that he would not take advantage of the smallest chance of recovering his lost power; but, seeing none, and rightly so, for reasons which will presently appear, he has no alternative, since he has decided to remain on the throne, but to play the part of constitutional sovereign as thoroughly as he has typified that of despot. It is indeed a wonder that, instead of abdicating or committing suicide as one would have expected of a ruler who, having sacrificed everything to the possession of absolute power, and having enjoyed it in all its Oriental plenitude for thirty-one years, is suddenly deprived of it-he should bend himself to the tameness of limited monarchy. It is only another reason for admiring this prodigious man, in whom will-power is evidently the supreme quality among so many other remarkable attributes. But, it may be asked, what is it that has caused him to exercise his will-power in the direction he has adopted. No doubt the fact that, being no longer able to sacrifice the Empire to his misguided ambition, he has suddenly awakened to a sense of patriotism, and wishes to make amends to his country by serving it in the only capacity left to him, that of constitutional sovereign. Be that as it may, we need not hesitate to believe the genius of Abd-ul-Hamid will act now as an invaluable aid to Turkey, as invaluable in the present as its illdirected action in the past has been incalculably injurious to her. The writer is firmly convinced that, if only he live long enough, Abd-ul-Hamid is

destined to become the best sovereign Turkey has ever had, after having certainly been the worst. None better than he, possessed as he is of an incomparable experience, a unique coup d'ail, and a deftness of touch that makes a very magician of him, could pilot the ship of State through the stormy seas of reform; for stormy they will soon become, the present glad calm and sunshine being the result of temporary causes, as will be presently explained. Who knows but what Abdul-Hamid may yet wipe out the memory of the wrongs he has inflicted upon his country by services of equal magnitude?

Another very remarkable circumstance accompanying the Turkish Revolution, and which justifies the pretty name given to it by Hilmi Pasha, unc évolution sans tache, is that it has given rise to no excesses on the part of the soldiery or the civilian population. The movement has been, so far, kept well in hand by the Young Turkey leaders, who have used their newfound power with a tact and moderation equal to the consummate skill and dogged perseverance which has led to the triumph of their programme. Only two cases of violence against the representatives of the former régime, of which the horrors were sufficient to justify the most terrible reprisals on the part of the population, have been recorded up to date. Fehim Pasha, perhaps the greatest villain of the infamous gang which served as an instrument for the execution of the now defunct policy of Yildiz, was lynched at Broussa by the mob, and another myrmidon of the palace, a notorious spy, was badly beaten at Salonica. For the rest, arrest and imprisonment have been the only forms of punishment to which recourse has been had. As for pillaging or even mafficking, there has been no instance of them. This constitutes the highest testimonial

not only in favor of the leaders of the movement but of the Musulman population at large, and more especially the predominant Turkish element, which was credited in so many quarters with every instinct of brutality but has given the world, not excluding the West, which indulges in such complacent self-laudation, a lesson in selfrestraint and generosity which should receive ample recognition from the detractors of the race, its English detractors especially, who have been. loudest in their denunciations of the "unspeakable Turk." It is only fair to add that it is in England also that Turkey has found her staunchest friends, and that they have always formed the majority of the population.

While it developed without displaying excesses of any kind, the Turkish Revolution has been marked by the fraternization of Musulmans and Christians, and of Christians among themselves, and, still more astonishing phenomenon, by the surrendering to the Turkish authorities of the "Comitadji" bands of Macedonia. But this fraternization, so far as the majority of the Christians is concerned, is attributable to no permanent feeling. Overjoyed at the suppression of the tyrauny which weighed so heavily on them, the Christians, thinking for the moment of nothing else but of manifesting their wild delight, fell on the necks of their Musulman compatriots, who had already moved to meet them more than half way. The latter are certainly inspired by a sincere desire for permanent reconciliation. But it is just as certain that the former, or at least certain nationalities among them, will sooner or later, rather sooner than later, freeze into indifference and from indifference pass back to hostility. As for the "Comitadjis," the latest news to hand is to the effect that they are already reverting to their former occupation. This brings me to

the second point of my article, namely, the prospects of good working and durability of the new order of things in Turkey.

The Turks proper, the founders of the Ottoman Empire, of which they have always been and will continue to remain the axis, and which is composed of nearly as many nationalities as the mosaic of peoples governed by the Hapsburgs, are giving conclusive proofs of their sincere desire to weld the variegated and, so far, antagonistic populations of Turkey into one whole, inspired by a feeling of common citizenship. This is natural. Chastened by a bitter experience, the Turks have become fully aware that they can only keep together what remains of the inheritance of Osman, their inheritance, through the contentment of the races they have conquered. It is for this reason that the first care of the Young Turkey party in its hour of triumph has been to proclaim and emphasize what, du reste, constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the resuscitated Constitution of Midhat Pasha, namely, the equality before the law, under the common name of Ottomans, of all the elements of the heterogeneous multitude which inhabits the Empire. The Turkish population (I am still speaking of the Turks proper) has cordially adhered to this notion of its leaders. Few incidents in history are more touching than the visit paid by a large assemblage of Turks to the Armenian cemetery in Constantinople in order to deposit floral tributes on the graves of the victims of the massacre of 1894 and to have prayers recited, by a priest of their own persuasion, over the butchered dead. Truly, the Turks have shown to extraordinary advantage during the present crisis. Not only have they displayed marked steadiness of demeanor in a situation which would have produced disorderly intoxication in most nations, but they have

also acted like men of feeling and refinement, confirming the verdict of those who knew them best that they are "the gentlemen of the East." And they have been well served by their instincts. For, if anything was calculated to placate the Armenians and throw them into the arms of the race from whose midst sprang their arch tormentor and which, though it did not lend itself to the execution of the sanguinary anti-Armenian policy of the Yildiz-it is the Kurds who are guilty of this revolting complacency-yet has much with which to reproach itself in regard to them, it is this charmingly simple act of contrition and redemption.

The Turks have offered moral reparation, in this and other gracefully inspired forms, to the Armenians for past ill-treatment, and the latter having accepted it in the same spirit, while, on the other hand, the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1876 has been already accompanied by preliminary measures of reform and other circumstances which make it imperative on every fair-minded person to give the ruling element in Turkey credit for the earnest desire and the ability to introduce competent government into the Empire -a point to which I will revert with greater wealth of argument at the end of this article, asking my readers to take it provisionally for granted that the Turks deserve the full confidence of the world in the new rôle they have assumed-nothing stands in the way of a permanent political association of the two peoples.

There are Armenians but there is no Armenia. In none of the Turkish vilayets or Russian provinces included in the boundaries of the defunct Kingdom of Tigrane the Great do the Armenians form the majority. Even if they did and were well grouped geographically they could not dream of achieving absolute independence, counting, as they

do, less than 2,000,000, between two such powerful neighbors as Russia and Turkey. The Poles, who form a compact ethnic mass numbering 20,000,000, and who possess at least as much patriotism and vitality, not to speak of civilization, as the Armenians, have renounced the idea, not, indeed, of regaining the unity of which the partition of their country has deprived them-that will come-but of reconstituting an independent political entity. With the sense of realities they have developed in the school of adversity they have understood that, situated as they are numerically and geographically, the extreme form of self-government they can attain is that of autonomy as federal member of one of the two gigantic States between which and Austria their territory is divided, namely Russia, who offers them the advantage of reconciliation and union with a kindred race. Can the Armenians hope to do better than the Poles? As a matter of fact, only a small minority of the leaders of the race, which is sensible in the main, and has calmed down from the chimerical exaltation which posessed it at one time, as it possessed the Poles, have aspired for anything else but happy conditions of existence under Turkish rule. Excellent foundations for this exist in the very considerable autonomy which the Armenians as well as the other non-Musulman elements of the Empire already enjoy in a form which is remarkable in that it is racial, not territorial, and groups them into distinct units called Millel (nations) under their religious chiefs-Patriarchs, Exarchs, Rabbis, etc. If, to the full exercise of this legally recognized privilege, which, under the autocracy of Abdul-Hamid, received many checks, be added the benefits of a good imperial government, nothing will be wanting to make the lot of the Armenians, as a people, as satisfactory as it is

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