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III. ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS

I HAVE said enough, and more than enough, to account for the deep distrust throughout patriotic circles at any threat of Secret Diplomacy by political amateurs, which is all Great Britain is offered. Foreign policy is the most fascinating, but also the most difficult and bewildering, subject to which a lifetime of effort, work, and travel must be devoted, and even then men can hardly hope to do more than appreciate their own ignorance. It cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by overworked Parliamentarians who have been trained to regard it as a by-product of the main business of life, i.e. the Party struggle at Westminster. It has occasionally, but not often, been the main preoccupation of the head of a British Government under modern democratic conditions. We can look back with pardonable pride upon certain phases, e.g. Lord Rosebery's conspicuous service in starting continuity of policy when he interned himself at the Foreign Office in 1892, resolutely averting his gaze from all those domestic alarums and excursions in which Gladstonianism revelled. Likewise upon Lord Salisbury's skilful defensive diplomacy throughout the whole period of the South African War, when a hostile world was successfully dissuaded from deciding the moot point as to which Power should "bell the cat," i.e. beard the lion. Then we had Lord Lansdowne's constructive work, already referred to, between 1903 and 1905. Afterwards Sir Edward Grey saved a peculiarly difficult and delicate situation from the end of 1905 when the Radical "wild men " got control of the country to August 1911, when Haldaneism descended upon us like a blight and the Potsdam Party gave that turn to our policy which led directly to the ultimatum of August 1914.

What is felt by every one who takes any serious interest in international affairs, or who has any appreciation of Prussian policy or methods, is that neither Mr. Balfour nor Lord Robert Cecil, with all their great gifts, are properly equipped to cope with the crisis which confronts them.. Neither have ever taken foreign policy sufficiently seriously. With the one it was a Side Show which a Prime Minister could not entirely ignore, and though while in opposition (1906-1915) Mr. Balfour applied his fine intellect to many subjects and distinguished himself in the discussion of most, he never attempted to grapple with inter

national politics, and treated war with Germany as something altogether outside practical politics. But he can at any moment indite a masterly memorandum putting us in the right and our opponents in the wrong-on paper. Unfortunately, however, when in the right Mr. Balfour is liable to allow men of inferior calibre to embark on devious courses producing disquieting incidents which might easily lead to diplomatic disaster. He is the soul of loyalty to our Allies and would observe the Pact of London in the spirit as well as to the letter, but he is of the laissez-faire, laissez-aller type which is so charming in private life and relatively harmless in normal politics, but terrifying in war. As Matthew Arnold would have said, Mr. Balfour lacks ruthlessness, while his love of argument, in which he excels, is so highly developed that he might almost be tempted to embark on a discussion with a German for the pleasure of putting him in the wrong. Then, again, he is desperately unsuspicious, and you cannot be too suspicious in dealing with Germans who expend themselves in devising fresh tricks and fresh falsehoods. Such manoeuvres are so nauseating to a man of Mr. Balfour's temperament that he speedily wearies of believing in them, and is therefore susceptible of the advice of those who elect to believe that the Germans are much less black than they are painted by themselves.

Nor can Lord Robert Cecil, who though a first-class fighting man in the House of Commons and keen and determined on the things he cares about, adequately supplement his Chief. Prior to the war he never pretended to take the faintest interest in any of the subjects that are now seen to matter infinitely more than the relatively trivial topics upon which Parliamentarians concentrate and which they honestly believe to be the be-all and end-all of our national life. Foreign nations never meant anything to the Under-Secretary, nor can one recall any utterances of his on any aspect of national defence, while his views on Imperial questions might without unfairness be described as Early Victorian." On the other hand, Lord Robert is a very hard and conscientious worker, who must have learnt a good deal during the last two and a half years, all the more as he has always been liked and respected by those who have had anything to do with him. Everybody wishes him well, and that is a great asset in office, but to be frank one would be alarmed if his country had to depend largely upon him in a diplomatic struggle with the Wilhelmstrasse, partly because he has not begun to realize what he is up against, partly because he is liable to be tempted off the rails in pursuit of some will-o'-the-wisp. This hobby matters little in Party politics, but is paralysing in diplomacy. No one can hope to be infallible, every one is liable and, indeed, bound to blunder amid the pitfalls of foreign affairs, especially in war,

but when Lord Robert Cecil is wrong he is very wrong, and the more wrong he is the more obstinate and resourceful in wrongdoing. There can therefore be no profitable Secret Diplomacy by Great Britain under present conditions, because the only instruments that present themselves, however secret, are not diplomatists.

There has been much rumour throughout the month of October. Autumn is the season of rumour, and with von Kuhlmann at the Wilhelmstrasse there was bound to be a flood of falsehood, which is his chief asset. But there were also some delusions in London, though one may hope that so far no harm has been done, and that all irregular diplomacy has been nipped in the bud. Let us equally hope that any misguided persons have seen the error of their ways and realize that the back stairs is the very last spot in which to play about either with a Boche or with any agent, confederate, or friend of any Boche.

The more openly Secret Diplomacy is discussed in this country the better for everybody concerned-except the enemy. As the danger is momentarily overcome and no cloud at present disturbs our relations with any of our Allies, who fully appreciate the loyalty of the British War Cabinet and the British nation, there can be no harm in mentioning the fears which took possession of many minds during the circulation of all these conflicting canards. That Germany is desperately anxious to get into touch with any of the Allies goes without saying. Her semi-official Press, which is run on identically the same principles, but with signally less craft, than in the days of Bismarck and Busch, has ingenuously disclosed the reason-namely, that once she can entangle any of her enemies in pourparlers she will have achieved her object and virtually won the war. The reason for this is obvious. Pourparlers through neutrals, if successful, would lead to direct negotiations, and any serious negotiations contain the promise of an armistice. The German General Staff realizes that if once the Cease Fire sounded in so hideous a war there would be no further fighting. In other words, Germany would have achieved the first part of the Pan-German programme, holding as she does almost all Belgium, a very rich, if not the richest, part of France, Serbia, Rumania, and enormous stretches of Russia. Therefore her object is, by hook or by crook, regardless of what may be the military situation at any given moment in any particular theatre of war, to lure some Ally to talk, because either that Ally by talking on its own account would compromise itself in the eyes of the other Allies, and the seeds of disruption of the Entente would be sown, or he would drag his fellow-Allies after him into the pour parlers.

Von Kuhlmann was appointed Foreign Secretary by Hinden

burg, Ludendorff, and the Crown Prince, whom the Kaiser allows to govern the country-just as they chose Dr. Michaelis as Imperial Chancellor, because von Kuhlmann is regarded as the man most likely to engineer an armistice, which is a primary German objective. The Foreign Secretary has a boundless belief in his ability to fulfil his contract, his greatest asset in his own opinion and in that of the Kaiser and his entourage being his intimate knowledge of British politics and British politicians, which was the subject of his special study during many years in London. He has learnt to talk the language that impresses and imposes on our Right Honourables, and with them in his pocket, so to speak or of any one of them of sufficient importance-he thinks that the trick is done. Having "nobbled" Downing Street he would have no difficulty with the Quai d'Orsay or the Consulta. Let us hope that though his premises may not be entirely erroneous his conclusion is unsound. Von Kuhlmanns usually suffer through excessive savoir faire which causes them to overlook some vital factor. He has never understood the great part which public opinion plays in this country in saving our Government from itself and from such as he.

Just as some of our statesmen are too slack or too simple, von Kuhlmann is invariably too clever. Note what he did in the present instance. After pulling every wire to get a move onappealing piteously for the aid of every friend of the Central Empires, who in their turn rent the air with their clamours as to the distressful condition of the realms of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns and having apparently tempted one of his dupes to approach one of his traps-he proceeded to publish his triumph to the world. He was in the state of a hen which had laid an egg and could not conceal the fact. Bismarck must have turned in his grave-if Kuhlmann's newspapers reached him in the nether regions when he learnt at the end of September that the German Foreign Secretary was describing the precise whereabouts and exact nature of his booby trap. It was at the moment that the Papacy had fluttered the diplomatic dovecots by a Peace Note which was as much resented by the Allies as it was welcomed by the Centrals the former had made it so clear that they stood in no need of extraneous interference or advice, while the latter were actively advertising for third parties to play their game. Von Kuhlmann's journals were busily disseminating the idea that Great Britain's sole preoccupation was Belgium, and that if she could be satisfied upon that single point she would throw up the sponge and retire from the war: nothing else mattered to her, either Alsace-Lorraine, Trentino, Trieste, the German colonies, or the interests of any of her Allies. So ran the legend of the Wilhelmstrasse, which was duly taken up and exploited against

us in neutral and even in allied countries. The Catholic Press of Germany was permitted and encouraged to say that the German Government's answer to the Papal Note would meet England's wishes on the one thing she cared about-Germany being prepared to clear out of Belgium, and would inform the Vatican to that effect. Then came von Kuhlmann's gaffe. In his exaltation he instructed one of his henchmen to state in terms, not that he was running after England, which was undeniably true, but that England was running after him. It was the Weser Zeitung which rendered the conspicuous service to the Allies of disclosing von Kuhlmann's impression of what was taking place or of what he wished the world to believe to be the fact.* The Lokalanzeiger had got so far as to tell its readers :

So far as we are informed, an English feeler was very recently actually put forward in friendly States in relation to the Belgian question, and an answer was made in an equally non-committal form, dealing with the English suggestion of an exchange of a pledge in regard to Belgium in return for the German African colonies.

The Weser Zeitung went even further, its Berlin correspondent declaring:

People say that England caused inquiries to be made as to what attitude would be adopted towards Belgium. These inquiries were not, indeed, made officially, but still through intermediaries who are to be taken very seriously [my italics], to the Central Governments and in the first place to the German Government.

If we might believe this, the British Government had perpetrated a blunder which was worse than a crime, because, in the first place, they were prepared to recognize the Hohenzollerns who are our objective, and, secondly, to suggest that any arrangement that might be made concerning Belgium would be a substantial satisfaction of our war aims. Needless to say there was not the faintest shadow of a pretext for pretending that the British War Cabinet had perpetrated any such folly, though it subsequently transpired that some one without its knowledge had made some inquiry in some quarter, though one learns with satisfaction that there was no breach of the Pact of London, because incidents unknown to the War Cabinet were known to the Allied Governments in this world of Alice in Wonderland in which we move and live and have our being. From the moment of von Kuhlmann's "disclosure" there was a clearing of the air, British protests provoking a suggestive telegram from Reuter's correspondent in Rome, which somehow escaped the hospitality of the London Press, but found a lodgment in the capacious columns of the Manchester Guardian. Apparently there had been a denial from London"that Great Britain had asked for information from the Vatican with a view to replying to the Pope's Note of August 1," the Roman reply stating that, according to "some authorities, *See Amsterdam telegram to the Times, September 21.

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