tamia Commissions. They show clearly that our strategy was based upon no clearly thought-out policy, that one intriguing and ambitious Minister was able to rush his colleagues into the most disastrous enterprises; that Lord Kitchener, overwhelmed with work, having insufficient knowledge of the problems with which he had to deal, and unaccustomed to rely for advice and assistance on his subordinates, was eventually led to acquiesce, though with the gravest misgivings, in these undertakings. As for what remained of the General Staff, it found itself ignored, plunged into a course of action on which it had had no opportunity of expressing a considered opinion, in furtherance of a policy it had never approved. The plans which had been prepared in peacetime for the very contingencies which had now arisen were left in their pigeon-holes unconsulted, and the General Staff were robbed of all responsibility and relegated to the position of clerks.

The full consequences of this state of affairs are not even yet realized. The disasters of Gallipoli and Mesopotamia were of slight importance in themselves compared to the fact that we became in the first year of the war committed to a military policy which ignored every elementary principle of strategy. Now it is a truism that in war, whereas a mistake in tactics, even if it involves the loss of a battle, may be retrieved, a mistake in strategy is nearly always irreparable. A General who has once committed his forces in a wrong direction is seldom allowed the opportunity to alter his dispositions. It is just this which our amateur strategists like Mr. Churchill forget. They know that war is always a risky business, that in the past victory has only been won by taking chances, that extreme audacity has ever been the characteristic of great commanders, and so they indulge in what they are pleased to term "legitimate gambles"; but what they forget is that the element of gambling is justifiable, and is indeed necessary in the execution of a military operation, but is never by any chance justifiable in a plan of campaign. Napoleon, except in the last two years of his reign when his prospects were almost hopeless, never formed a plan in which the chances were not at least two to one in his favour, nor did he ever embark on a campaign without the most exhaustive previous study and preparation. And there is another point which Mr. Churchill, who is understood to be an admirer of Napoleon, would do well to bear in mind. His plans were bold only when he himself, a supreme military

genius, was charged with their execution; when, on the other hand, they were entrusted to others they were of a much more cautious description. The aim of our present strategy is the defeat of the German armies in France and Flanders. In the execution of that policy we have in the past, and shall in the future, require the utmost boldness from our Commander-in-Chief in France. It was a legitimate gamble on the part of Sir John French when he decided to hold Ypres in the autumn of 1914 and the spring of 1915; it was a legitimate gamble on the part of Sir Douglas Haig to persist in his offensive on the Somme after the partial failure of the first attack; it was a legitimate gamble when he decided on July 31 last to carry out his attack in spite of the risk involved by bad weather. There is plenty of room for audacity in the present war, and the nation is bound to support by every means in its power those Commanders in the field who bear the responsibility of taking these chances; but it is also bound to allow no gambling whatever on the part of its politicians. And the only way to prevent this is to ensure that the supreme direction of the war shall remain in the hands of the soldiers, and in theirs alone.

Matters were allowed to drift on in the chaotic state described above until the autumn of 1915, by which time we had drifted into another campaign in Macedonia. Military opinion does not seem to have been consulted before the expedition to Salonika was dispatched, nor indeed does there appear to have been any machinery for consulting it. By the end of September the situation had become serious. The attempt to force the Dardanelles had definitely failed-it was very doubtful if our army could remain on the peninsula during the winter, and equally doubtful whether its withdrawal would not entail disaster; while a small British and French force was left isolated at Salonika without a chance of co-operating with the Serbian army, whose annihilation by a combined attack from front and rear appeared imminent. The Government, thoroughly alarmed, at last realized the consequences of attempting to run a gigantic war without the support of any considered military opinion. They decided, therefore, that the General Staff should be reconstituted under Sir Archibald Murray, but, unfortunately, in taking this step they continued to adhere to the old futile course of looking out for a distinguished General and then pitchforking him into a post without even ensuring that he has a chance of fulfilling the duties assigned to him. The

result of this arrangement was that both Lord Kitchener and Sir A. Murray became jointly responsible for the supreme direction of the war, a system which was obviously foredoomed to failure. There is reason to believe that Sir A. Murray at least realized the functions of a General Staff. For the first time the General Staff had a head who formulated a policy, gave the most careful consideration to every question, foresaw clearly the result of the course on which the Government had embarked, and gave them excellent advice. But his position was impossible, he had no power to express his views or to carry out his policy, and we continued to drift through October and November, while the situation became steadily worse. By December it was critical. The Government had at last consented to the partial evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, but half the force remained clinging to Cape Helles in imminent danger of being driven into the sea. In Macedonia a weak Anglo-French force was in full retreat before superior numbers of Bulgarians, who threatened to overwhelm it and capture Salonika. The Serbian army had ceased to exist. In Egypt the most vital of Imperial communications, the Suez Canal, was in constant danger from Turkish raids, while the Senussi tribesmen had established themselves in the Western Desert within striking distance of the Nile Valley. In Mesopotamia the advance to Bagdad had ended in disaster, and General Townshend was invested in Kut. The way to Persia and Afghanistan was open to enemy agents. The situation in both these countries was threatening, and serious fears were entertained as to its effect in India. In East Africa we were unable to defend British territory, the Uganda railway was seriously endangered, and British prestige was at its lowest ebb. Such was the situation when Sir William Robertson was appointed to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. He owed his appointment not only to the fact that his past career had been an unbroken success and that he had risen from the ranks by merit alone, but that there was no man who possessed in a greater degree the absolute confidence of all ranks of the Army--a confidence based on a recognition of his profound knowledge of all branches of his profession, on his judgment, foresight, and breadth of mind. It is significant also that Lord Kitchener trusted him to such an extent that he voluntarily surrendered the entire direction of the war into his hands. What this step must have involved to

a man of Lord Kitchener's stamp may be imagined, but his essential greatness is shown by the fact that, having taken it, he continued up to the day of his death to give unfailing support to the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

A more difficult situation has seldom faced any man than that which confronted Sir W. Robertson on taking up his appointment. Disaster appeared imminent in three theatres of war, we were committed in all directions to ill-conceived enterprises, withdrawal from which was either impossible or could only be undertaken at the risk of disaster. It was an occasion which required boldness, decision, and determination. Strange to say, it was at this juncture that that eminent strategist, Mr. Churchill, disappeared from the scene. The withdrawal from Gallipoli was a real gamble which, one would have supposed, would have rejoiced his heart, an even more difficult and dangerous operation than the original landing. Moreover, a more sensitive character than his might have considered that he had a moral obligation to extricate the unfortunate men whom he had been so largely instrumental in sacrificing in a hopeless enterprise. But "gambles are only legitimate to the politician when he is likely to reap some personal glory from them, so he discreetly left it to the soldiers to extricate themselves from the mess in which he had involved them.

From the moment the new Chief of the General Staff arrived at the War Office a change came over the scene, a new spirit was infused into our policy. The drifting, the hesitation, and delay of the past were at an end. He at once decided to evacuate Cape Helles, an operation which was carried out with complete success. The situation in other theatres was tackled with the same firmness of purpose. Egypt, the base for all operations in the Mediterranean, was in a state of chaos. An enormous force had been collected in that country, composed of the wreckage of Gallipoli, partially trained troops in depots, and drafts for the Dardanelles and Salonika; for these forces a vast jumble of stores, material, transport, and equipment had been collected. This medley of troops was at once sorted out, organized and equipped, and dispatched to those theatres where their presence was required. A sufficient force was concentrated at Salonika adequately armed and equipped, in order to hold that place against any effort the enemy might make. In Egypt the vicious principle of a passive defence on the line of the Canal was abandoned, a railway was

pushed out into the Sinai Desert and the oasis of Katia, the natural outpost of Egypt or the East, was occupied. At the same time the oases of the Western Desert were cleared of the Senussi. In Mesopotamia it was too late to save Kut, but the construction of railways and the provision of river transport was immediately set on foot in order to enable General Maude to undertake an advance in the coming winter. In East Africa General Smuts had been placed in command of a strong South African force which, in the course of a few months, drove the Germans from the northern and western portions of the colony, and soon put an end to all serious resistance.

Last, but not least, our armies in France were placed in a position to undertake an offensive on a great scale in the summer of 1916. During the past year the material results of Sir W. Robertson's policy have been the defeat of the German army on the Somme, which enabled the French to relieve Verdun and inflicted so severe a blow on the enemy, both in respect of casualties incurred and in the loss of valuable tactical positions, that he was compelled to undertake a general retreat early in the present year on a front of about one hundred miles. During the present summer these successes have been followed up by three further offensives on an even greater scale, attended with more rapid and striking results, which will probably have a far-reaching effect on the course of the war, and have already shown that the Allies in the West are able to capture any position, however strong by nature or by art, even under the most disadvantageous climatic conditions. In Macedonia an unfortunate diversion, which might easily have been disastrous, has been attended with greater success than we had any right to expect, owing to the capture of Monastir, the deposition of King Constantine, and the intervention of Greece. In Egypt the Sinai railway enabled us, in the winter, to establish ourselves at El Arish, a position which is vital to the defence of Egypt as it ensures the control of the whole Sinai Peninsula and denies to the enemy the only waterbearing area for a base of operations against that country; we have since pushed on to the walls of Gaza and are now menacing the Turkish position in Palestine. In Mesopotamia General Maude captured Bagdad in March and has since secured the whole of the surrounding country and completed the rout of the 6th Turkish Army. These remarkable results have been gained

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