November 19; and the danger to Europe from the progrefs of the French arms. As to the firft, minifters did not, and could not state that the Dutch had called upon us to fulfil the terms of our alliance. The plain truth was, that to force the Dutch into a war at fo much peril to them, which they faw and dreaded, was not to fulfil but to abuse the treaty; and the conduct of ministers, as to this ground of complaint, was wholly difingenuous. Secondly, The decree of the 19th of November he regarded as an infult, and the explanation of the executive council as no adequate fatisfaction. But the explanation, imperfect as it was, fhewed that the French were not difpofed to infift upon that decree, and that they were inclined to peace. It was furely the extreme of arrogance to complain of infult without deigning to ftate the nature of the reparation required. When it was faid we must have fecurity, we ought at leaft to tell them what that word was meant to import. Thirdly, With refpect to the danger of Europe and the balance of power, we had feen the entire conqueft of Poland, and the invasion of France, with fuch marked indifference, that it would be difficult now to take it up with the grace of fincerity. For fatisfaction upon this point we had demanded no lefs than the immediate withdrawment of the French troops from the Auftrian Netherlands. Were we then come to this pitch of infolence as to fay to France- You have conquered a part of an enemy's territory who made war upon you. We would not interfere at your requeft to mediate a peace, but we now require you to abandon the advantages you have gained, while he is preparing to attack you anew'?-Was this the neutrality we meant to hold out to France If you are invaded and beaten we will be quiet fpectators, but if you defeat your enemy, if you enter his territory, we declare war against you'? That the invasion of the Netherlands ought to alarm us, if the refult of that invafion was to make the country an appendage to France, there could be no doubt. The French had promised to

evacuate

evacuate the country at the conclufion of the war: Was this naked promise fufficient? Certainly not. But it was for us to state candidly and explicitly the security which would be deemed fufficient. What fecurity would they be able to give us after a war which they could not give now? Was it clear that they would refuse that fecurity, if we would condefcend to propose it to them in intelligible terms?

But all these grounds of hoftility against France, Mr. Fox faid, differed totally from the avowed object of the combined armies, our eventual allies in this war; which was no less than the deftruction of the republican government of France recently established. To this, then, we came at laft-that we were ashamed to own engaging to aid the restoration of defpotifm, and collufively fought pretext in the Scheld and the Netherlands. In all decifions on peace or war, it was important to confider what we might lofe and what we could gain. Extenfion of territory was neither expected nor eligible. On the other hand, would any man say that the events of war might not, with too great probability, produce a change in the internal state of Holland, and the political fituation of the stadtholder, too afflicting to anticipate? Was the state of Ireland fuch as to make war defirable? This was faid to be a fubject too delicate to touch upon; but he approved not of that delicacy which taught men to fhut their eyes to danger. The state of Ireland was indeed alarming, the grofs mifconduct of administration having brought the government and legislature into contempt in the eyes of the people. He hoped the plan to be purfued would be conciliatory; that conceffion to the claims of the people would be deemed wifdom; and the time of danger, contrary to the maxims of policy hitherto adopted, the fit time for reform.-After a most able and eloquent, though unavailing, fpeech from this trulygreat and illustrious ftatefman, the question was put, and the addrefs carried without a divifion.

A very few days fubfequent to this debate the intelligence was received that France had declared war against Great Britain and Holland; and, on the 11th of February, 1793, a royal meffage was delivered to the two houses of parliament, announcing, "That the affembly now exercifing the powers of government in France have, without previous notice, directed acts of hostility to be committed against the perfons and property of his majefty's fubjects, in breach of the law of nations, and of the moft pofitive ftipulations of treaty; and have fince, on the most groundless pretences, actually declared war against his majesty and the United Provinces. Under the circumstances of this wanton and unprovoked aggreffion his majefty had taken the neceffary steps to maintain the honor of his crown, and to vindicate the rights of his people, And his majesty relies with confidence on the firm and effectual support of the house of commons, and on the zealous exertions of a brave and loyal people, in profecuting a just and necessary war; and in endeavouring, under the bleffing of Providence, to oppose an effectual barrier to the progrefs of a fyftem which ftrikes at the fecurity and peace of all independent nations, and is pursued in open defiance of every principle of moderation, good faith, humanity, and juftice. In a cause of such general concern his majesty has every reason to hope for the cordial co-operation of those powers who are united with his majesty by the ties of alliance, or who feel an interest in preventing the extension of anarchy and confufion, and in contributing to the Security and tranquillity of Europe."

Such is the famous meffage, upon the peculiar phrafes contained in which the changes have fo long been rung with so much noife and fo little meaning. Upon this occa fion Mr. Pitt contented himself with examining the feveral articles of the French declaration; and he concluded with afferting, that he found in it nothing but pretexts and alle-gations too weak to require refutation. "We had, he faid, in every instance, obferved the ftricteft neutrality with refpc&t

fpect to France. We have pufhed to its utmoft extent the fyftem of temperance and moderation. We have waited to the last moment for fatisfactory explanation." He then moved the address to the throne.

Mr. Fox expreffed his aftonishment that the minifter fhould pretend to have acted on a fyftem of temperance and moderation, when every conciliatory propofition on the part of the French had been disdainfully rejected. Every step on our part feemed to indicate a defire to break with France. To have continued earl Gower at Paris after the event of the 10th of Auguft would have implied no recognition of the validity of the government which fucceeded to the monarchy, or approbation of their proceedings; and it was certainly more eligible to treat with those who exercised the powers of government in a direct than an indirect mode. As the prohibition of exporting corn to France, when it was allowed to other countries, was a pofitive infraction of the fubfifting treaty; and the order received by M. Chauvelin to depart the kingdom was an act of open hoftility on our part; he could not allow the declaration of war to be an unprovoked aggreffion on that of France. He moved, therefore, a fuitable amendment to the proposed addrefs.

Mr. Burke pronounced a vehement Philippic, affording a melancholy contraft to the fpeeches of his better days. Among other extravagances, he took upon him to affirm that the members of oppofition had no right to demand from minifters the avowal of any specific object as neceffary to the juftification of the war. For his part, he had never heard or read of any fuch principle in theory, or of any fuch avowal in practice. The firft queftion he conceived to be, whether there was just cause or foundation for the war? The fecond, how it fhould be carried on to the greatest effect?-In no inftance whatever had any power, at the commencement of a war, declared what the object of it was. It was contrary to the policy of this and

every other country: it was never heard of.* No man, he declared, had a more lively sense of the evils of war than himself. A war with France, in prefent circumstances, must be terrible; but peace much more fo. A nation that had abandoned all its valuable diftinctions, arts, fciences, religion, law, order-every thing but the fword, was most dreadful to all countries composed of citizens who only used foldiers as a defence. He had no hesitation to pronounce, as in the Divine prefence, that minifters had not. precipitated the nation into a war, but were brought to it by an over-ruling neceffity. He had been grieved to the foul, for four years paft, that his utmost exertions were unable to produce, upon the government of the country, or in the public mind, a sense of the danger that approached thèm. At length the infatuation was removed,-ministers awoke to the peril that menaced; and he pledged himself, therefore, to give them his clear, steady, uniform, unequivocal fupport. If any charge was to be laid to the share of ministers, it was that of too long delay; but in his early oppofition

*The effrontery of this affertion, even in Mr. Burke, is amazing; for it is an incontrovertible historical fact that the present is the only war fince the Revolution which has been entered upon without an avowed and definite object. Nothing analogous to it has taken place in our annals fince the war against Holland in 1672, the object of which was never avowed, though well known to be the fubverfion of the exifting government, and the eventual partition, of the country. The object of the war immediately fucceeding the Revolution was, to compel France to a recognition of the new fettlement. Of the war of queen Anne, the reftitution of the Spanish monarchy to the House of Austria, Of the war of 1718, the evacuation of the island of Sicily by Spain on the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. Of the maritime war of 1740, the renunciation by Spain of the pretended right of fearch in the American feas. Of the continental war, the defence of the Pragmatic Sanction. Of the war of 1755, to repel the encroachments of France upon the territorial rights of our colonies in North America. Of the American war, the establishment of the supremacy of Great Britain, and the right of taxation over the fame colonies. Even the laft of our wars, that with the Dutch in 1780, had a fpecific object, infignificant and contemptible as it confeffedly was, viz. the exemplary punishment of the penfionary of Amfterdant, M. Van Berkel.