Opinion, per AVERY, J. 18, 1919, of the act of the general assembly entitled "An Act providing for the validation and ratification of certain contracts of the state entered into through the state highway department" (108 O. L., pt. 2, 1122), and that this court must give effect to this action of the legislature in the case at bar. Counsel for defendant in error, on the other hand, contend that said alleged curative act, which they charge was drawn to meet the very situation presented by this case, is unconstitutional by virtue of the provisions of Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, in that it purports to make legal and operative a void contract, and to do this of its own force and effect and without the intervention of any court; in other words, that it commands, and does not simply authorize, courts to carry into effect the contract upon such terms as shall be just and equitable. Upon this claim the case of Hout v. Hout et al., 20 Ohio St., 119, has some bearing. In that case this court held that the power which Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, confers upon the legislature, and the powers which the legislature is authorized to confer upon the courts, are permissive and not mandatory. Brinkerhoff, C. J., said at page 126 of the opinion: "Now, it is very clear, we think, that the power which this section of the constitution confers upon the legislative body, and the powers which the legislative body are authorized to confer upon the courts, are permissive and not mandatory powers, "The general assembly authorize courts,' etc., is the language. The general * * may * * * Opinion, per AVERY, J. assembly may put into exercise the powers granted in the section under consideration, or it may refrain from doing so without any disregard of a constitutional mandate; it may authorize courts to cure omissions, etc., but it cannot command them." It is, however, unnecessary for us to pass upon the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the act in question, for on other general and well-recognized principles of law we are of opinion that the act has and can have no application to the case at bar. We can not and will not apply it to set aside the judgment of the court of appeals in this case. It is well settled that the legislature has no right or power to invade the province of the judiciary, by annulling, setting aside, modifying, or impairing a final judgment previously rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. People, ex rel. Lafferty, v. Owen, 286 Ill., 638, 3 A. L. R., 447, and annotation. The judgment of the court of appeals in this case was final (Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution) unless under that section and Section 2 of the same article the case was one "of public or great general interest," in which event this court "may direct" the court of appeals to certify its record here and "may review and affirm, modify or reverse the judgment of the court of appeals." The practice established by this court requires a showing from the record, not only that a case is of public or great general interest, but also that error has probably intervened, in order to justify a motion to certify the record of a court of appeals, the judgment of which is otherwise final. As above stated, Opinion, per AVERY, J. the judgment of the court of appeals was entered November 11, 1919. The act in question was passed December 18, 1919, and filed in the office of the secretary of state January 29, 1920. This latter date, it will be noted, was after the motion to certify had been filed in this court, heard and overruled. The act went into effect April 28, 1920, which was after this court had reconsidered and allowed the motion to certify. This court has held that the legislature cannot make a judgment which is final by the laws existing at the time it is rendered subject to review by a statute subsequently enacted (State, ex rel. Young, v. Hinckle, 67 Ohio St., 144), and we are of opinion that the legislature cannot change a rule of law binding upon the court of appeals at the time a final judgment is rendered by it and compel this court in determining whether error has intervened therein to consider or apply that change in a consideration of the record of the case in which such final judgment was rendered. Whether the record discloses error depends upon what the law was at the time the final judgment was rendered. The judgment of the court of appeals was correct at the time it was rendered, and as to such judgment the act in question can have no retrospective operation. We do not find any intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the act itself, that it should have application to a case in which a final judgment was entered prior to its passage. If it be doubtful whether it was intended that this act should operate retrospectively, the doubt should be resolved against such operation. Allen v. Russell, Opinion, per AVERY, J. 39 Ohio St., 336; opinion by Okey, J., pages 338 and 339. But if such an intention could be gathered from the act, it would be, in our opinion, to that extent, unconstitutional and void, as an attempt on the part of the legislature to exercise judicial power, or a conferring by the legislature of appellate jurisdiction upon this court, unwarranted and unauthorized by the constitution. In the case of State, ex rel. Young, v. Hinckle, supra, at page 151, Shauck, J., said: "A statute of this character was considered in Hill et al. v. Sunderland, 3 Vt., 507, and it was adjudged to be void. In the course of the opinion the question was propounded as suggestive of an inevitable answer: 'When will be the end of strife if not when a judgment is rendered which is final by the laws then existing?' A judgment final when rendered is representative of property in its highest form, for there remains no condition or contingency to affect the vested right of the prevailing party. Attention to a few of the many harmonious cases will show that, for the reasons already stated, the act, if permitted to operate retrospectively, would affect rights which are so determined and established that it is not within the function of legislation to disturb them." If the charge of counsel for defendant in error were correct, that the act in question was drawn for the express purpose of meeting the situation created by this case, the act would fall within the prohibition stated by the learned author of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7 ed.), 136: Opinion, per AVERY, J. "Legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon past controversies, and to reverse decisions. which the courts, in the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for this would not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the courts." But on the direct question involved here the case of The Schooner Aurora Borealis v. Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 125, is in point. That case was an action to recover for work and labor done upon a ship, in which the court of common pleas rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the statute under which the action was brought had no extra-territorial operation. After that judgment, and before the matter came on to be heard on error in this court, the legislature passed an act declaring that the statute should have such extra-territorial operation, but this court declined to make that act applicable to the case so pending on error. In the opinion, Read, J., said at page 127: "It is the right of the legislature to enact laws, and the province of the court to construe them. The legislature has no power to enact a law, declaring what construction or decision the court shall make upon acts under which rights and liabilities have already been acquired or incurred. The court have put a construction upon the first acts alluded to, and that construction is binding upon all existing cases. The explanatory act operates prospectively, and has, from the time of its passage, the |