Germany against Russia. The King of Prussia has been obliged to assent to the principle of justice, involved in the defence of Turkey by the Western Powers; has taken part in the early negotiations to avert the horrors of war; has signed the protocols and documents of many kinds, to carry the designs of the several Powers into execution; and then, true to the Prussian perfidy of all past times, has invariably endeavoured, under one pretext or another, to evade his own engagements, and to defeat the action of Austria in Germany. We admire the patience of the latter Power; it has been most exemplary, and, although provoked and thwarted by her rival and, we must say, her betrayer, her language has been most moderate and dignified. No doubt Austria divined, from the beginning, the sort of game her powerful neighbour would play, the jugglery of her diplomacy, the insincerity of her adherence to the opposition against the Czar, the Russian tendency of her policy, the surreptitious correspondence going on with the Court of St. Petersburg, the sycophancy of the King to his imperial brother-in-law, and his readiness to barter the interests of Germany, and the freedom of nations, for a place in the satrapship of prostrate Europe. A diadem is no security against baseness; a high position, no safeguard against meanness of spirit; the traditional honour of Kings, no shield against paltry passions; and even the obligations of religion cannot guard some royal hearts against a craft and deceit, which, if found in private life, would banish its possessor from decent society. We cannot be surprised that the movement of Austria has not been more rapid, when it has had to wind its way in the midst of this Machiavellian antagonism. And now, though she has, it appears, escaped the danger of coming to blows with her German neighbours, she is obliged to act independently of Prussia and her satellite adherents.

But, besides these difficulties, the military force of Austria was not in a condition to take the field. She knew, better than any other country, the character and resources of the enemy, and that this enemy was not to be despised, or met in the conflict with inadequate, ill-appointed forces. Through the whole of the negotiations the Emperor Francis Joseph has been increasing and organizing troops, purchasing horses and equipping a powerful cavalry, perfecting his matériel, and augmenting the artillery and engineer departments, strengthening the fortifications of the empire, and providing provisions and munitions. And all this has so well succeeded, that, on authentic information, Austria is now in possession of one of the most numerous and well-appointed armies in the world. Besides these considerations, the contiguity of the Austrian territories to those of the Czar must have exposed her to his heaviest blows, which, in her unprepared state, she must have been unable to resist. France, and especially England, could take the field at once,

Austria's Obligations to Russia.

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without danger, inasmuch as their geographical position placed them beyond the reach of Russia. This was, however, far from being the case with the Austrian territories; and Transylvania, Galatia, and Moravia, would have been open to the assault of the enemy, and, possibly, a humiliating peace would have been exacted within the walls of Vienna itself. To avert this calamity, time was essential; and, with consummate tact, the Court of Austria has obtained such a respite as to be fully prepared for every emergency.

We have purposely kept for the last consideration the relations, nay, the obligations, of Austria to Russia, on which, as it appears, the Czar confidently relied for the neutrality of Austria in his crusade against Turkey, and the aggrandizement of his own empire. We have no very exalted idea of the disinterested nature of the intervention of Russia in Hungary, and none at all of the gratitude of nations. Nicholas, no doubt, interposed in Hungary as much for Russian, as for Austrian, purposes. To allow Hungary to become a free and independent nation, to fraternize with Poland, to spread liberal principles on the frontiers of his dominions, and thus to become propagandist by example, he well knew, would be as dangerous to himself as to his ally. To arrest the progress of revolution in the Austrian dominions, he was too sagacious not to perceive, was to prevent a revolution in Russia. But this was too fair and good an occasion for the diplomatic finesse of the Chancery of St. Petersburg not to be used for attempting some advantage. It matters not to Russia whether the party is friend or foe; every transaction is improved for the gain of something, if it is only the introduction of a new principle, to be drawn out of the archives of diplomacy at a distant day. The Czar obviously reckoned upon the humiliation of Austria, from her solicitation of his assistance; and this feeling is, indeed, sanctioned by many historical events. One country never helps another but with the expectation of deriving profit of some sort, often its subjugation. Hence, in his conversations with Sir G. H. Seymour, respecting the dying state of the "sick man," and the disposition of his inheritance, Nicholas made no account of Francis Joseph, and said he would answer for Austria. He was egregiously mistaken! Austria, at any rate, was not dead as a nation; and the insulting treatment she received on this occasion led to the fulfilment of Prince Schwartzenburg's memorable declaration, that the Russian intervention would be responded to with "huge ingratitude." The question was one of the most grave and weighty that a nation could have placed before its attention. It amounted to nothing less than this, namely, whether she should sell her dignity, her independence, her greatness, her nationality, to Russia, for the assistance she had received, and for her questionable friendship for the future.

She is now answering this question by the magnitude of her armaments, by the attitude she has taken, and by her alliance with the Western Powers. No doubt it would have been for the interests of Austria to enjoy peace. This seemed peculiarly essential to her well-being. But the state of affairs left her no choice betwixt an ignominious debasement as a nation, or a determination to resist Russian perfidy and aggression. She has cautiously, but firmly, and, as we cannot doubt, in good faith, made her election on the side of justice, truth, and the freedom of nations.

Thus, then, the matter stands in respect to these alliances. In case affairs are not speedily settled, they cannot end where they are. The rest of the nations will have to make their selection betwixt Russian ascendancy and their own freedom. There is, there can be, no alternative betwixt these two conditions of the question. We write in the midst of negotiations for peace, but have slight hopes of its being realized. As if by concert, all the nations are armed to the teeth. There cannot be fewer than three millions of men in arms; whilst all the populations of Europe, having been trained for war, are in a state to be called out at any moment. These military preparations and expensive armaments can augur nothing but war.

As we pen these lines, the startling news of the death of Nicholas has reached us. We indulge in no vindictive feelings; in the presence of death silence is imposed. Nicholas was a great man. His private and domestic virtues were most exemplary; he no doubt conferred many benefits upon individuals, as well as sought his country's glory. The Russian system is power, and the late Czar was its most eminent type. His vices were the vices of the system he inherited. The administrator of a despotism must be a despot. From time immemorial the Muscovite nation has believed in its mission to conquer Turkey, and Nicholas inherited this belief with the possession of the throne itself. We hope his appeals to religion, so fanatical and offensive, had their rise in this inherited faith, and not in hypocrisy. This would not be a full extenuation, but it would save the memory of the Czar from the brand of deceit. What effect the departure of the chief actor from the scene of strife may have on its issue, we cannot pretend to foresee; possibly the very opposite of those anticipated. The new Emperor may be the amiable man, the lover of peace and progress, he has been represented; and yet these qualities of nature may place him more entirely in the hands of the war party than if he possessed a more stern and unbending nature. The iron will of Nicholas, we are told, was employed in balancing parties; but, comparing the latter portion of his reign with the former, we see a great difference; and from the appearance of Prince Menschikoff and the old Russian party on the field of action, followed by the

invasion of Turkey, it may be doubted, whether even the firm hand of Nicholas could control the swelling tide. If this was the case, then his less firm, less experienced, and less influential son must yield himself to the tide, and the war will go on to its issue; that issue being the humiliation of Russia, or her still further aggrandizement.

We pause at this point. We pretend not to prognosticate the future, or to be the interpreters either of prophecy or of Providence. But taking existing facts as the data for judging of the course of events, we cannot hide from ourselves the portentous character of our times, and the certain anticipation that this Eastern Question is destined to lead to momentous results. As believers in Providence, we cannot evade the conclusion that nations are the organs of God in the accomplishment of His decrees. The present war is, doubtless, destined to bring about some high purpose of the Divine Will. We cannot know this purpose; but, from the nature of His dispensations, can have no doubt but that the end will be in mercy to mankind. This, however, does not preclude present and temporary suffering; and it is likely that a period of calamity, on a great scale, awaits the human race. The conflict of passion, of ambition, of injustice, of tyranny, can, it seems, at present only be curbed by suffering, by resistance, by war. Many monstrous evils are found in human society awaiting the judgment of God; and the instrument of His judgment is war. That some of these evils will be swept away by the present contest, we can have no doubt; that a new path for the Gospel will be prepared, we have confident hope; that a great area for the kingdom of our Lord will be cleared, and given to Christianity, we believe; and that the freedom, the industry, and the civilization of distant races will be promoted, we fully anticipate. But "the end is not yet." The storm precedes the calm, the winter the spring, the education of a people the ripe fruits of knowledge.

We wait the issue with calmness, but not without anxiety. Their country is dear to all Englishmen; and her fortunes in this conflict cannot but be looked upon with profound solicitude. We believe her cause is just, her resolve magnanimous, her spirit heroic, her resolution firm. But, in a conflict so important, so full of peril, so moral,—we had almost said, so religious, she especially needs the interposition of God. The basing of her policy on His word, trust in His protection, humility in the confession of national sins, fervent supplication for the guidance of His wisdom, and the blessing of His grace, -let these points be secured, and England is safe. We have outridden many storms; we trust to be safe in this. We have assisted the oppressed in times past effectually; we hope to leave a monument of our justice, as well as of our prowess, as the result of our interference in this Eastern Question.

BRIEF LITERARY NOTICES.

The Sphere and Duties of Government. Translated from the German of Baron Wilhelm Von Humboldt. By Joseph Coulthard, Jun. London: Chapman. 1854.

THE express design of this treatise is "to discover the legitimate objects to which the energies of State organizations should be directed, and to define the limits within which those energies should be exercised." Full of the highest kind of interest, and at the same time attended with peculiar difficulties, this design was quite worthy of the late Baron Humboldt, a statesman and philosopher of all but the highest stamp. If the attempt has not been followed by success, we may suppose the subject would prove at least as intractable in other hands, and yield as little profit in conclusion. We may even suspect that there is something radically faulty in the design itself.

The author endeavours to establish a practical distinction between measures which promote the positive welfare, and those which regard only the negative security or well-being, of the citizen; and maintains that the former are quite beyond the sphere of Government; are restrictive of individual freedom and development, and therefore detrimental to true social prosperity and greatness. We believe this distinction is more plausible in theory than observable in practice, if it be not even rather verbal than real. As a positive restriction is often required to secure a merely negative advantage, so this negative advantage may be valued only for its positive results: it is, at any rate, the expression of a positive opinion on the part of the majority, from whom the enactment of the law proceeds. The parties who may safely be allowed to judge of what is hurtful to the community as such, may surely judge of what is, in the main, desirable and necessary for the welfare of the same; and to refuse the exercise of the latter privilege, is to lose a moiety of the benefits of combination. In regard to the material interests of a nation, this truth is generally understood and acted upon. To erect poor-houses and asylums is as legitimate an exercise of governmental functions, as to provide for the removal of public nuisances, or to establish courts of justice for the repression of public crime. The question, then, occurs, If a people may safely consent to intrust their material interests to a delegated power, may it not further commit certain of its moral interests to the same salutary supervision and control? Are there not measures of the latter kind equal in importance to