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CHAP. IV.

Considerations on the late Negotiation with France, in the House of Peers-Apology by Lord Grenville for the Omission of certain Papers in the Number of those laid before the House. The Ends in view, and the Principle on which the British Ministry acted during the whole of the Negotiation-Review of the Negotiation, in the four different Stages into which Lord Grenville divided it.-Causes of the Rupture of the Negotiation.-Address to His Majesty on the Subject of the Negotiation, moved by Lord Grenville.-Observations on the Address, and the Subject of the Address by Lord Hawkesbury—Lord Sidmouth.-Lord Eldon-And the Earl of Lauderdale-Address carried, Nem. diss.-Address to the same effect moved in the House of Commons by Lord Howick,-Conduct of the English Ministry in the Negotiation vindicated.-Speeches on the present Question by Lord Yarmouth--Sir Thomas Turton-Mr. Montague-Mr. Whitbread-Mr. Canning-Lord Henry Petty-and Mr. Perceval— Address carried, Nem, diss.

THE

HE subject of the negotiation being brought under the con. sideration of the house of peers, according to the order of the day, the 2d of January 1807,

there could be no doubt. There might be cases in which a nation, actuated by views of sound policy, might think it advisable to make great sacrifices for the purpose of Lord Grenville rose, and said, that obtaining a peace that promised the documents in their lordships' to be permanent; nay even, if a hands, were fuller and more ample peace could not be considered as than any that had been presented to permanent, it was worth the mak. parliament on any former occasion ing sacrifices to obtain it, if it of a similar nature. This would not promised a considerable interval of have been necessary, if it had not tranquillity; an interval which might been for the very full, though not then be calculated upon, as serving equally correct statement, published to recruit and increase the business by the French government. It of the country. But those who conwould nevertheless be perceived by sidered the state of Europe for six their lordships, that there were se- years, or, he might say, for thirteen veral omissions in the papers, of or fourteen years past, must be coninstructions given to our ministers, vinced that there was no rational which could not be supplied with. hope of any considerable interval of out the risk of injury to ourselves, tranquillity following a treaty of or our allies.-Lord Grenville pro- peace with France. It became ceeded briefly to notice a few of the therefore, in this negotiation, a neleading principles that characterized cessary object to seek out for an the negotiation which was the equivalent to be set up against that subject of their discussion. want of permanence, which must attend any peace under such circum

That peace was a desirable object,

stances.

stances. He was therefore of opinion, that the only basis on which we ought to treat with France, was that of actual possession. This country being a great maritime and colonial power, and France a great continental power, there would be no reciprocity of cession between the two powers, that could in any degree tend to their mutual advantage. The conquests made by this country, could be of no use to France, unless she would become a great commercial and colonial power: the conquests made by France, could be of no use to this country, unless this country would become a great continental power.

But, though the state of actual possession was the only basis that appeared to his majesty's ministers to be a proper basis for their negotiation with France, it did not follow that such a negotiation was to exclude the necessary discussion of equivalents to be given for certain cessions to be agreed on. And such a discussion became the more necessary where a negotiation involved the interests of allies. When his majesty's present ministers came into office, they found a treaty concluded by their predecessors with Russia, by which each party bound itself not to conclude peace without the consent of the other. That he considered as a wise, and a fair measure. But, even supposing that the treaty, with Russia had not been wisely concluded, still the sacred engage ment of the sovereign having been given to Russia, his majesty's ministers were bound to fulfil its conditions.

Our allies might be divided into two classes: those to whom we are bound by treaty; and those to whom we are bound by the circumstances

which had occurred during the war, and the situations in which they were placed in consequence of the events of that war. Of the former class of our allies were Sweden and Portugal; and of the latter, Naples and the elector of Hanover With respect to Sweden and Portugal, nothing more was required than to guarantee to those powers their state of actual possession, The king of Nap es stood in a different situation. He had been deprived by the power of France of all his dominions on the continent of Europe. Lord Cren. ville had no hesitation in saying, that he would have consented to make sacrifices, not merely valuable in finance, in revenue, or in commerce, but even sacrifices of safety and of strength, to procure the restoration of the kingdom to the king of Naples. But no sacrifices that we could make, could have been an equivalent to France for the restoration of that kingdom. With respect to Sicily, the king of Naples was still in possession of that island, or rather it was in the possession of a brave, and, as it had been proved, an invincible British army. That army had entered the island with the consent of the king of Naples, who had received them there in the full confidence that they would defend it bravely, and that it would not be given up to the enemy. Would it not therefe e, have been an indelible disgrace to this country to have given up Sicily to France on her offer of an equi. valent? It was not for us to harter it away for any equivalent without the consent of the sovereign. As to Hanover, it was sacrificed to in us. tice on the part of France, for the express purpose of injuring this country. Wou'd it not therefore, be disgraceful in us not to insist on E 3

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the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign, from whom it had been taken, solely ou account of its connection with this country? The restoration of Hanover, thus unjustly seized, was therefore insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to the negotiation. The principle on which ministry acted during the whole of the negotiation, was, that of good faith to our allies: that of the French government to effect a separation between us and our allies as clearly appeared from the negotiation from first to last, which was divided into four stages.

The first, when we were offered terms, which might have been considered as the fair price of peace'; had we been concerned for ourselves only, but which were offered as the price of dishonour, as the price of the desertion of Russia, our faith. ful ally.

The second stage of the negoti. ation was, when the French government, partly by threats, partly by promises and inspiring hopes, contrived to persuade the Russian minister at Paris, M. D'Oubril to sign a separate treaty of peace. This being done, there was in the tone of the French government, a very rémarkable alteration. "No," said they to our ministers, we cannot now grant you the same terms we were willing to do before. The sig nature of a separate peace with Russia, is equivalent to a splendid victory" An expression not loosely used in conversation, but forming a part of the written sentiments of the French government upon that

event.

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The French government, finding the treaty would not be ratified, immediately offered the English negotiators better terms, in the hope of be

ing able, though they could not separate Russia from this country, to separate this country from Russia. And this was the third stage of the negotiation.

The fourth and last stage of the negotiation, was, when the French ministers, finding that Great Britain and Russia were inseparable; at length agreed to the negotiation to be carried on conjointly for the interests of Russia and Great Britain. They refused to agree to the terms asked on behalf of Russia, and again offered terms to this country on the principle of a separate nego. tiation. The rupture of the nego, tiation followed of course.

Had Russia insisted upon extravagant terms, or on points trifling and uninteresting, it would have been painful to lord Grenville to have stated, that the rupture of the negotiation arose from any such conduct on the part of Russia. But the very contrary of all this was the case. The terms insisted on by Russia were very moderate, and directed only to the security of her allies. She demanded the guarantee of Sicily to the king of Naples, and that the French troops should eva. cuate Dalmatia, which was not necessary to the vast empire, obtained by the arms of France, and could be held by this power, only as a post of offence towards Austria and the Porte, and of hostility towards Russia. The guarantee of Sicily to the king of Naples was clearly a British object. That Russia, in requiring the evacuation of Dalmatia, confined her demand to that object, and did not make a demand of the territory, was also of importance to this country as well as to our ally. With this good faith and moderation on the part of

Russia, would it not have been an indelible disgrace to this country, if we had violated good faith on our part? And what were the terms that were offered to us, as the price of disgrace and dishonour? We were to keep, what the French could not without a naval superiority take from us-Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, India, and the Island of Tobago!-It had been stated in the papers now before the house, that if we had made peace at the period alluded to in the papers, the treaty of the confederation of the Rhine, would never have been signed, or at least, would not have been published. It appeared however, that supposing peace to have been concluded with the utmost rapidity, after the arrival of our ministers at Paris, the treaty could not have been signed before the publication of the last German treaty. This very confederation must unavoidably have preceded the treaty, and supposing it to have happened the day after, it would have necessarily been a cause for war. Lord Grenville concluded by moving," That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to as sure his majesty that that house had taken into serious consideration the papers relative to the late negotiation which he had been pleased to lay before them, and that they saw with gratitude, that he had employed every means to restore the blessings of peace, in a manner consistent with the interests and glory of his people, and at the same time, with an observance of that good faith with our allies, which this country was bound to retain inviolate. That, while we lamented that by the unbounded ambition of the enemy, those laudable endeavours to his kingdom had been frustrated, no exertion should be

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wanting on their part to support and assist him, in the adoption of such measures as might yet be found necessary, either for the restoration of peace, or to meet the various exigencies of the war in that most important crisis."

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The same motion, introduced by speech to the same effect, was made by lord Howick, in the house of commons, January 5.- Never did any motion meet with more cordial and unanimous support in either house, and yet none, perhaps, ever gave rise to a longer conversation; which turned, for the most part, on the mode and course that had been pursued in the negotiation.

In the house of peers, lord Hawkesbury expressed his complete concurrence with lord Grenville, on the great points he had stated, but at the same time said, that if he did agree to the address, it must be with some qua'ifications. It had been stated in his majesty's declaration, that the French, from the outset of the negotiation, had agreed to proceed on the basis of actual possession, subject to the interchange of such equivalents as might be for the advantage and honour of the two countries. Now, he confessed, that after a careful examination of the papers before them, he found nothing in the whole of them, that could be considered as a certain and unequivocal foundation for such a declaration. Before the arrival of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of actual possession was so far from being actually agreed on, that another, very difierent, was expressly stated to be the grounds on which the French government would enter on a negotiation. Lord Yarmouth, indeed, had given a statement in writing, of a conversation he had

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had with Talleyrand, and he, no doubt, believed that Talleyrand had proposed the basis of actual possession. The words were: "Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas." But in order to affix the pooper and precise meaning to these words, they ought to look at the eentext, and, this shews that the words are not general, and that they refer only to Sicily. Ministry ought to have demanded a precise and patogorical recognition, of the basis of a goitation, before they gave full powers to treat to their negotiator. Yet lord H. most heartily concurred in the general result of the negotiation, and with the above exception joined in the address, and in the assurances of support to his majesty in prosecuting the war, which it had been found impossible immediately to put an end to, on grounds in any degree consistent with the security and honour of this country, or the maintenance of good faith to our allies.

His lordship proceeded to shew both that the war was necessary, and that we possessed the means of supporting it. At the commence ment of the treaty with France in 1801, that country was in a very different situation from what it is in now. At that time, Holland and Switzerland, though subject to the influence of France, were not completely united to it. Naples was entire, and Austria, though she had lost much of her military reputation, was still a great power; and in point of population and extent of territory, equal to what she had been at the commencement of the war with France. Many, there. fore, thought, and lord H. confessed he had joined in the opinion, that if France were to be left to her.

self, her power would sink to its natural level. Now, however, all the states to which he had alluded, had been either completely subdued by France, or reduced within comparatively narrow limits.

In 1801, the British government wished to try the feelings of France, and to find out what would be the policy of its government on the restoration of peace. It might endeavour to acquire confidence at home and abroad, which could be done only by a system of moderation; or it might consider its security to lie in pursuing that system of aggression which had marked the progress of that revolution from whence it had sprung. It had adopted the latter system: so that scarcely three months had elapsed from the time of signing the treaty of Amiens, till the spirit of the treaty was violated by repeated aggressions. Ever since that time, these aggressions had been continued; as an instance of which, their lordships had only to look at the confederation of the Rhine, to which lord Grenville had adverted.-In con. sidering the question of peace or war, they would observe, that while they continued at war they had at least this advantage, that whatever. exertions France might make, they must be confined to the continent of Europe. But peace would open to her the way to Asia, Africa, and America. To these at least, he hoped, her power could not extend. Another thing to be considered was, that while we were at war, we were on perfect equality with our enemies. We were as powerful by sea as they were by land. But if peace should take place, from the very nature of the two cases, their power would not be made less, while

our

superiority

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