tomed; as in the case of Croesus, who opposed camels to his adversaries' cavalry; and Pyrrhus opposed to the Roman horsemen elephants, whose aspect and overwhelming onset spread terror, and threw into confusion their mounted enemies. The Spaniards, in order to vanquish the army of Hamilcar, placed in their front carts laden with straw and drawn by oxen; and the action having commenced, fire was applied to the straw, from which the frightened oxen endeavouring to escape forced their way through the troops of Hamilcar, and opened a passage for the Spaniards. Commanders have in some instances retired their troops, and drawn the enemy into an ambuscade, where the nature of the country was fortuitous for this purpose other generals have dug ditches and covered them lightly with brushwood and earth, leaving spaces between them for their soldiers to retire through during the action, followed by the enemy, who, unaware of the pitfalls, were imbeddel in them and easily vanquished.

Battles, Routs, and Victories.-When an army is broken and begins to fly, it is a most difficult operation to restore the confidence of the troops, and to lead them a second time against the enemy. A distinction must, however, be drawn in this-the army being routed throughout, when it is impossible to reorganize it, or the army being only partially routed, to re-establish which a remedy may be applied. Many Roman commanders, by placing themselves in front of men who fled from the field of battle, have arrested their progress and made them feel shame at their flight. Thus did Lucius Sylla, who, when a portion of a legion was dispersed by the troops of Mithridates, rushed in front of them sword in hand, exclaiming, "If anybody inquires of you where you have left your commander, say you have left him fighting in Boeotia "

Attilius Consul posted some well-disciplined troops in rear of those who had taken to flight, and told them that if they returned not to the field they should be destroyed by their own soldiers, instead of by the enemy. Many Romans, not so much to prevent flight as to increase the impetus of attack, have, during the combat, snatched a banner from the bearer of it, and, hurling it into the ranks of the enemy, have offered a reward to the soldier who would reclaim it.

When a victory is obtained, it should be immediately followed up, imitating in this respect Cæsar in preference to Hannibal; the latter of whom, by remaining stationary after the battle of Cannæ, lost the empire of Rome; the former after a victory never rested, but with increased courage and vigour pursued the routed troops, and prevented their rallying again. When a battle is lost the commander ought to perceive the immediate advantages to be derived from the loss itself, especially if a residuum of the army remains.

A commander should never commence an engagement, unless he has an advantage over the enemy, or is compelled to fight. Advantages are derived from the nature of the ground occupied by the combatants, from their discipline, and from their numerical strength. Necessity arises from the perception that, by not engaging the enemy, the army will be sacrificed, either from want of provisions or money, &c., &c. In the latter case it is always better to fight even apparently

at a disadvantage, because it is far better to risk the chance of fortune being favourable, than by not running any risk to incur certain ruin ; and it is a greater disgrace for a commander not to engage the enemy when there is a necessity for doing so, than there is in losing a battle for want of science, or by the cowardice of the troops. Advantages sometimes are gained from the enemy, and sometimes result from prudence. Sometimes, in the passage of rivers, troops may be attacked midway by an active and resolute enemy, and severe losses may be caused thereby. At other times, after following up your enemy closely and rapidly, his troops may become wearied: should yours, on the contrary, be fresh and equal to the attack, no time should be lost in carrying it into effect. Or, should the enemy, early in the day, draw up his army in battle array, you may retain your troops in their encampment for some hours, and when the enemy has been some time under arms, and his ardour is consequently damped, then is the most favourable time to commence the action. Thus acted Scipio and Metellus in Spain-the one opposed to Asdrubal, the other to Sertorius. Should the efficiency of the enemy's troops be diminished, either from having neglected their exercises, or from any other cause, a battle should be risked. The chief portion of prudent commanders are more disposed to receive the onslaught of the enemy than to attack with vigour; because impetuosity is sustained without danger by bold and resolute men, and, when sustained, is readily converted into defeat. Some commanders, who were apprehensive of the overpowering strength of the enemy, have commenced the action at the approach of night, in order that their troops if defeated might derive some advantage from the darkness, and effect a safe retreat. Others, having learnt that the enemy's superstition was opposed to a battle taking place at a particular time, have selected that period for the attack, and, in consequence, have obtained a victory: this was exemplified by Cæsar when opposed to Ariovistus, and Vespasian opposed to the Jews. It is of the utmost importance for generals to have around them faithful, prudent, and highly experienced officers, with whom they may consult at all times, and converse on the efficiency of their own troops, and also of those of the enemy; whether as regards their greater numerical strength, their better equipment, being stronger in cavalry, or better disciplined, which are more ready to endure hardship, in whom most confidence can be placed, cavalry or infantry. Consideration should then be given to the position itself, whether it is better adapted for the general's forces, or for those of the enemy, which has the best means of obtaining provisions; whether it is advisable to attack the enemy at once, or to defer doing so, as sometimes by prolonging the war the enemies become wearied of it, and finally abandon the field. Above all, the character of the commander of the enemy should be well known, and the staff around him; whether he is rash or cautious, whether timid or bold. Moreover, an army should not be led to battle if under apprehensions of being defeated, for the first step towards losing a victory is the thought of not being able to conquer.

Orations. To persuade or dissuade a small body of men is very easy,

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because if words are not sufficient for the purpose, authority and force may be used; but the difficulty is to remove from the minds of a multitude a false opinion, whether with reference to the public good, or your own judgment; therefore the desired effect must be produced by words which must be heard by the whole army, as the whole army is to be persuaded by them. Celebrated generals have, therefore, been good orators, as, without being able to speak with effect to the soldiers, they would not have been able to accomplish their great undertakings. Read the life of Alexander the Great, and observe how often it was necessary for him to harangue the army, without which, notwithstanding all the plunder obtained by his troops, he would never have led them through the the deserts of Arabia and into India. An army may be sacrificed if the commander has not the power of publicly addressing his troops, or does not avail himself of that power; for an appropriate harangue banishes fear, animates minds, increases resolution, disperses all doubts, promises rewards, manifests dangers and the mode of escaping them, admonishes, cautions, threatens, fills with hope, praises, and censures; and effects all that influences or excites human passions.

Religion and military oaths had material influence over the minds of ancient soldiers, when they were led to battle; for in any misconduct they were threatened not only with the punishment to be inflicted by men, but also with those they might expect from God. Similar religious acts have often rendered easy of accomplishment the undertakings of ancient commanders, and will also produce the same effect wherever religion is inculcated and feared. Many commanders have asserted that God appeared to them in a dream, and directed them to commence the battle. There are also other modes to be adopted when in face of the enemy: witness that of Agesilaus the Spartan, who exhibited to his soldiers some naked Persians, in order that they might have no fear from such delicately formed bodies. Some commanders have obliged their troops to encounter the enemy, depriving them of every hope of safety except in victory; and this is the best mode of rendering the soldiers courageous and firm. This firmness is based on the confidence they have in their commander, and in the love of their country. Their confidence arises from their knowledge of their arms, their discipline and order, their victories, and good opinion of their leader. The love of our country is the gift of nature, that of the commander is caused by his noble and scientific qualifications, more than by any benefits conferred. A powerful effort may be expected from the demands of necessity, but what can exceed that which leaves us only the choice of victory or death?

Armies on the March.-Let me now make known to you the movements of an army in the territory of the enemy, who, though not in actual presence, is still near enough to cause apprehensions of an attack. The following mode was adopted by Roman armies when on the march-Small bodies of cavalry led the advance to reconnoitre the ground; these were followed by the right wing of the army, having all their carriages, &c, in their rear; legion thus followed legion, and the left wing similarly moved on, the remainder of the cavalry form

ing the rear of the column of route. This was the usual order of marching; but if the army was attacked suddenly on the road, either in front or on a flank, the carriages were immediately withdrawn from their position, and placed either on the right or left side, whichever might be most suitable, according to the nature of the ground; and the combatants, having thus a clear front for carrying on their movements, advanced to the attack of the enemy.

Provisions, &c.-One of the main difficulties in campaigning arose from the necessity of providing food and wine for the troops. The latter, however, was not absolutely required, as in its absence they were satisfied with water, slightly flavoured with an acid, therefore in the supplies for the soldiers acid was always included instead of wine. Bread was not baked for them in ovens, but flour and lard were issued to each man and cooked together, forming a savoury and strengthening diet. Thus the provisions for the troops merely consisted of flour, acids, and lard; and barley for the horses. Droves of cattle and smaller animals generally, however, followed an army, as these required no transport, and caused but slight impediments on the march. Thus provided, ancient armies oftentimes traversed barren and desolate countries for many consecutive days, without suffering from hunger, as they carried with them, without any difficulty, the requirements for the support of the men and horses. The contrary to this is manifested in the movements of modern armies, which require for their sustenance wine and bread, baked as in their houses; deprived of these, the men are often famished, or if provided with them it is effected at a great expense, and often with much difficulty. Comparing together the ancient and modern system, I would adopt the former mode of supplying the troops, and would only allow them the food they cooked for themselves. With respect to wine, I would not prohibit it, but would not be at any trouble or expense in providing it; and in other respects, with reference to the supply of provisions, I would be guided by the customs of the ancients. Giving due consideration to this subject, how many difficulties, losses, and impediments would be removed from a commander and an army, by carrying into effect the ancient system of procuring food, &c., for the troops.

Marching in an enemy's country.-In traversing the territories of the enemy, there are greater perils even than in the day of battle; and therefore the commander of an army should adopt every possible precaution; in the first instance, providing himself with good descriptions and maps of the country, so that he may know thoroughly every locality, the towns, relative distances, roads, mountains, rivers, marshes, and their several qualifications. To acquire perfectly this knowledge, he should obtain information from those who reside in and are conversant with the nature of the country, &c.; and he should make notes of their communications with him he should send, in advance of the army, light cavalry under the direction of efficient and observing officers, not so much to watch the movements of the enemy, as to notice well the country itself, comparing it with the plans, and the descriptions obtained. Guides are also to be procured, and well U. S. MAG., No. 344, July, 1857.

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guarded, encouraging them with the hope of reward, and causing them to be faithful by the fear of punishment. Above everything, precautions should be taken to prevent an army being aware of the intentions of the commander, "perchè non è cosa nella guerra più utile che tacere le cose che si hanno a fare." I must pause in my extracts from the observations of our astute Italian instructor in the art of war, in order to draw your attention to the contrast between his mode of carrying on operations, and that exhibited in the Crimean campaign, during which the mere rumours of anticipated movements of any portion of the British troops were bruited throughout the length and breadth of the land, by the too numerous correspondents of the press, and incautious officers, and soldiers. Much good no doubt did arise from the public exposure of the privations and miseries of the gallant and unflinching soldiers; and had the penmen, who were carping for matter to bring themselves prominently into notice, confined their remarks to the inournful picture of pestilence, suffering, and death, they would have deserved well of their country; but, not contented with this, when they stepped out of the right path, and made known even the most minute movement, or preparation for attacking the enemy; when gifted powers of description were employed in magnifying evils; when inexperienced minds were permitted to dictate, as it were, to men far superior to themselves in military science; when, in short, a mephitic intellectual vapour hung around the British army, it was indeed time that some steps should be taken to banish from the campaign the ill-judging and babbling men, who, from interested motives in many cases, represented matters worse than they really were, or anticipated evils that existed only in their prurient and ignorant imaginations. It is to be hoped that in our future campaigns the race of babblers, whether military or civil, will be banished from the field of warfare, and that our commanders, and their subordinate officers, will be able to execute their duties unwatched, uncensured, and undictated to by injudicious soldiers, or fame-greedy members of the press.

TROOPS FOR INDIA.-The ships Sir George Seymour, Seringapatam, Owen Glendower, and Ramillies, have been chartered by the Government to embark the 7th Fusiliers for Kurrachee; the Bacchante, Sutlej, Ulysses, Surrey, Calabar, Aliquis, and Cambodia, will convey the Connaught Rangers and 3rd battalion Rifle Brigade to Calcutta. They are expected to sail early in July. The following is a list of the ships at present engaged, and the dates for embarking troops for the East Indies:-Gravesend to Calcutta-Bucephalus, July 1st; Ellenborough, 8th: Cressy, 11th; Octavia, 25th; Monarch, 25th; Blenheim 25th. Portsmouth to Calcutta: Barham, July 1st; Ulysses, 9th; Surrey, 15th; Calabar, 17th; Cambodia, 22nd; Aliquis, 25th; Sutlej, 25th. Portsmouth to Kurrachee: Sir George Seymour, July 14th; Seringapatam, 21st; Ramillies, 21st; Owen Glendower, 21st. Gravesend to Kurrachee: Bombay, July 21st; Albuera, 21st.

SIR JOHN PENNEFATHER has presented the French war-medal to those British soldiers in garrison at Malta on whom the French Emperor had bestowed it. The general called the men out, and personally pinned it on their breasts. He also assembled with them all those who had previously received it, and addressed them in a spirited speech.