men in command. To prevent railway accidents it has been proposed to hang a director occasionally, and we must think that it would be attended with good effect if a minister who shows himself careless of the country's honour and interests were to meet with a similar fate.

We will conclude our remarks on the present occasion, by reminding the country, that, in urging the question of military education, we have in view the necessity of preparing officers for commanding in the field, as well as for the performance of secondary duties. We object to a special corps of staff officers, from considering an alternation between infantry service and the staff as infinitely the best preparation for high command. The mere staff officer we object to, for the same reasons which led us to exclude both engineer and artillery officers; but unless due care be taken that officers of the army at large, or at least a considerable portion of them, be required to study and master an amount of military acquirements at least equal to what is usually found amongst those of the engineers and artillery, we would willingly see both superior staff appointments and military command in the hands of the latter; since it is infinitely to be preferred that our forces should be directed by men who have had the advantage of a military education, and who may be supposed to possess some acquaintance with military science, than by officers whose professional knowledge does not extend beyond the drill-ground. Alas! we have seen enough in our day of ignorance in command, and have far too often had occasion to tremble for our military character and the national interests when they have been confided to incompetent hands. The press has perhaps done something towards remedying the evil of which we complain; but it is hydra-headed, and the monster must be pounced upon and denounced, if it cannot be destroyed, whenever it reappears.

WANTED, A HARBOUR OF REFUGE.

THERE are few subjects having for their aim a great national good upon which so many first-rate men have given such opposite opinions as upon Harbours of Refuge. Eminent engineers not only differ as to the best localities for asylum barbours for ships to run to in gales of wind, but, strange to say, seamen are also in doubt upon this great question. Opinion seems to be as variable as the winds, and indeed, as harbours of refuge have to be constructed with a view to sheltering ships from the storm, we suppose that the variety of opinions as to the different eligible spots may have something to do with this variable element. But the squabble is not confined to mere position or site it is extended to the mode of construction. Some engineers are for the long slope, some for the vertical wall, and some for the two systems united. Then the whole theory of the tides, silt, shingle, the action of the waves at depths and upon the surface of the sea, have to be taken into consideration, and the general result is that we have very learned and puzzling theories advanced by rival interests,

productive of two things, viz., a confusion of ideas, and harbours of refuge in the wrong places.

Let us see if we are borne out in our view of this most important national subject, and to assist us in the attempt we will refer to a debate made in the House of Commons, a few days back, for information. The question before the house was that a sum of £120,000 be granted on account of works at the New Packet Harbour and Harbour of Refuge at Holyhead. This little sum, for it is little in comparison with grants made for harbour works, acted like the spear of Ithuriel, for it brought out in its true proportions the great evil of granting money for very questionable works of national utility.

The debate began with Holyhead harbour, extended to Dover harbour, and then very naturally took a flight to the expensive works now in progress at Alderney and Portland, which latter-named port was the only one that escaped the censure of the house. As for Dover harbour, it was considered by Sir Charles Napier a failure as a harbour of refuge. "Ships running up channel," said the gallant admiral, "with a westerly or south-westerly wind, would either pass the Forelands and run up the Thames, or would seek shelter in Margate roads, and would no more think of going into Dover than of going to the moon. He believed that Dover harbour, as a refuge harbour, was utterly useless." However, the Admiral, at the conclusion of his short speech, calling things by their right names, pronounced the situation a good one for a harbour of aggression, in the event of a war with France. This remark, followed by another from Mr. Henley to the effect that Dover ought to be struck out of the category of harbours of refuge, brought forth a reply from the First Lord of the Admiralty, who admitted that the title of Harbours of Refuge, under which head the votes for Dover and Alderney had for some years been taken, was not appropriate. "The fact is," said the right honourable gentleman, "they ought to be considered as harbours of military defence."

This was, to say the least of it, a very singular admission on the part of the most prominent authority upon naval matters in this great maritime nation; for it is to be inferred from the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, that both Dover and Alderney harbours are not intended for harbours of refuge at all; although it must be admitted that this knowledge comes to us a little too late, as will be readily understood if the reader will run his eye over the subjoined little bill, which includes the sums voted for harbours of refuge from the year 1840 up to the present time.

Holyhead harbour,

Ditto ditto,

Dover harbour,

1840 to 1845

£819,748

Harwich harbour,

To this sum must be added the estimate of the money required for the various harbour works this year (1857), which is as follows:For Dover £34,000, and subsequently £304,000; for Alderney £100,000, and subsequently £638,000; for Jersey nil this year, but subsequently £395,000-making a total of £1,471,000, which, if added to the above sum of £2,985,053, amounts to the formidable item of £4,456,053. Surely it would have been as well to be certain whether Dover and Alderney were proper situations for asylum harbours before so many millions of public money had been wasted in providing these places with questionable shelter at such an enormous cost.

And, further, it is an open question with respect to Alderney, whether it can be converted into what the First Lord of the Admiralty now intends it for, viz., a harbour of military defence. We have, in

a previous number of this Magazine, alluded to the shortcomings of the present harbour, and although it is not our intention to enter into any lengthened details upon the blunders already committed there, yet neither is it our intention to be quite silent on that head. As a harbour of refuge, for which so many hundreds of thousands of pounds have been voted, Alderney is worse than useless. It would be the most perfect ship-trap ever devised, even if it were possible to persuade captains of ships to run into that part of the Channel. Fortunately it lies out of the track of our ships, and so, as a refuge harbour, would be useless yet, admitting that the harbour at Alderney is ever extended to the dimensions now proposed (for it appears that the proper authorities have seen that the cooped-up area of the original plan would never do), what in all probability may be the consequences? And as this is a question of the very gravest national importance, we cannot let the subject pass without offering a few remarks upon what seems to us as great a blunder in a military point of view as the first notion was in a commercial one. We have a right to expect that the enormous outlay attending the construction of the harbour of defence at Alderney will justify the expectations of the country; but we fear this will never happen, for when the votes hitherto taken for the money necessary for the construction of harbours of refuge (as admitted by the First Lord of the Admiralty in the debate on this subject on the 3rd of July last), it was deemed desirable not to attract the attention of neighbouring nations, and consequently the harbour at Alderney has been formed under the more pacific designation of a harbour of refuge.

Now, whether Alderney could ever have been considered an eligible spot for a harbour of refuge by any seaman acquainted with the navigation of the Channel, we cannot pretend to say, but admitting that this flimsy pretext shut the eyes of our neighbours at that time, it is useless to suppose that they are ignorant that it is now our intention to construct a war harbour at Alderney, capable at least of watching the great naval depôt and arsenal at Cherbourg, and holding it in check. This is the aspect of affairs at this moment, and our intentions are as well understood by the French as by ourselves; and to this condition of things we must now address ourselves, for it is no use mincing matters, as every one knows that, in the event of war with

our gallant ally, Alderney would become a battle-field of no minor importance.

Without stopping to discuss the propriety of converting a barren rock like Alderney, without fortifications and harbour, and consequently valueless to any nation as an offensive position, into a tempting bait for our gallant neighbours to make a dash at when we have finished our harbour and its protecting batteries, we will just take a glance in this paper at what may be the result if Alderney is not fortified so as to make it a second Gibraltar. Better by half have left Alderney a bare rock than leave it even a respectable fortification; that will not do, it must be impregnable. It would be a bold thing to say that the present works could not be carried, for the island is only at its nearest point about nine miles from the coast of France, and within a couple of hours' steam of the powerful port of Cherbourg, now the Portsmouth of that coast.

The above are the leading outlines of the position of Alderney and Cherbourg; and now as to the capacity of the two places for offensive operations. And first as to Cherbourg. A good naval authority, Sir Charles Napier, has stated that it is capable of holding in its roadstead thirty sail of the line; and this is not improbable, for the quieting effect of its gigantic breakwater of 4,120 yards in length shelters about 2,000 acres of sea space, or about double that of Plymouth Sound; so that it would easily afford shelter to thirty sail of the line, as well as frigates and small craft. The breakwater is armed with batteries at certain intervals, besides which movable artillery traverses it from end to end, rendering it very difficult of approach.

Now as to Alderney. We are afraid that the available space for ships of the line would be so insignificant, that we forbear to give utterance to its scanty dimensions; but as we have already published a small plan of this intended harbour in this Magazine for Dec. 1856, with depths of water and area, we beg to draw the reader's attention to it, incidentally remarking that the greatest width of the harbour, as originally intended, is less than 4,000 feet at low water spring tides; and this space includes a large area of water of two and three fathoms, that would, of course, be perfectly useless for harbour purposes to ships of war of any dimensions beyond gun-boats. But we are told that the original plan is to be abandoned, and that the harbour will ultimately be all that can be desired. We wish that we had something more than this to satisfy our anxiety upon this matter. We should prefer to see a plan of the new harbour, its area, depth of water, &c., &c. We have no objections to a becoming degree of mystery where it is useful, but here there can be none; for even engineers cannot perform impossibilities, and we believe that if the reader refers to the Admiralty Chart of Alderney, he will find it impossible to construct a harbour of sufficient dimensions to contain a force capable of meeting the fleet that may be sheltered in Cherbourg.

At any time, then, a fleet of screw line-of-battle-ships may issue from the roads at Cherbourg, and in three hours be opposite to Alderney harbour. Let us suppose that a dozen frigates and heavy corvettes are in the cooped-up area some day to be a harbour; if the

French squadron is numerically strong enough to confine them in the harbour, they would, of course, stand a good chance of being shelled and destroyed without much difficulty. They would, in fact, be excellent fixed targets for the French squadron to practise at from a broad and scattered position, while they are shut up in a narrow space. They would have the batteries to assist them, it is true, yet we saw enough during the last war with Russia to convince us that a vessel in motion has a great advantage at a long range with shells; we cannot, therefore, hope that a dozen small ships shut up in Alderney would have much chance at a game of that sort. Our impression is, they would be destroyed. We shall be happy to hear any one prove to the contrary, and we will acknowledge our error with the greatest pleasure, if it be one.

But, supposing the ships destroyed, and 10,000 or 20,000 French soldiers landed on Alderney,-for it must be remembered that a new motive power has considerably altered all naval operations,-what would the two or even the three thousand men we should have in garrison on this barren rock be able to do? Fight like Englishmen-to be sure they would. They would not fall in a day; no, we should send reliefs-admitted. So would the French with greater facility. Alderney would then be a terrible battle-field; and for what purpose? A doubtful one at the best.

The conclusions we come to, then, are, that Alderney must be made so strong as to render attack hopeless and success impossible, and to do this the whole island must be fortified. It had better be a bare

rock without a gun than half fortified. There must be a large expenditure or there ought not to have been any. We believe, however, that we express the opinion of many eminent engineers as well as seamen when we say that any expenditure of money at Alderney is injudicious. It is too near Cherbourg-too near the French coasttoo liable to be surprised. Make it a Sebastopol, and then Alderney would be too insulting and too aggressive in its aspect to suit the sensitive feelings of the French in time of peace; and in the time of war they would never rest till they took it. However, as we are somewhat digressing from the main object of this paper, and as we intend to devote a separate article to the works at Alderney on a future occasion, we will drop all further discussion upon it and proceed with our subject.

After the admissions of the First Lord of the Admiralty that neither Dover nor Alderney is to be considered as a harbour of refuge,-what shelter have we obtained for our millions?

A consideration of this sort induces us to inquire upon what part of our coast are harbours of refuge most needed. And it is somewhat singular that they have been constructed or have been attempted to be constructed, where they are least wanted; and, as we dislike making mere assertions, we append a statement taken from the wreck register of the year 1855, not being able to refer to that of last year. Of the total number of wrecks in that year, amounting to 1,141, on the shores of the United Kingdom, 576 happened on the east coast; 251 on the west coast; 117 on the south coast; 127 on the Irish