This on dit or dream realized, the qualified captains would fill the vacancies on the active list of rear-admirals as at present, and the unqualified those on the reserved list in the vacancies on the permanent number 75, and the unqualified captains on the 12s. 6d. list of halfpay still have the advantage of retiring on 18s. per diem, increasing to 20s. and to 25s. as they succeed to the promotion of the senior retired rear-admirals, of whom there are 25.

As the plan of promotion and retirement is now working, there are actually more captains promoted to flag-officers, than there are commanders to captains. Proof since the 1st January :—

Also, since the 1st January, 2 captains have succeeded to the salary of naval aides-de-camp, and 6 to good service pensions; 17 have justly increased their half-pay from 12s. 6d. to 14s. 6d., and 24 from 10s. 6d. to 12s. 6d., even then a mere pittance for the half-pay of naval colonels of from ten to sixteen years' seniority; and 4 from 12s. 6d. half-pay have retired on 18s. per diem; in all 80 captains have been deservedly rewarded with pensions and aide-de-campships, promotion and retirement, and increase of half-pay.†

With the crown's grace, and the Admiralty plan of promotion and reward for these 80 meritorious and faithful post-captains, let the Admiralty's consideration for the commanders' claims for reward be compared from the 1st January. Only 11 commanders of twelve years' seniority have increased their half-pay from 8s. 6d. to 10s., which number, added to the 17 promoted to active, reserved, and retired captains, gives 28 rewarded with promotion and increase of half-pay, being 52§ less than the captains. But were the Queen's order in council carried out by the promotion of 14 commanders to reserved captains, to complete their number to 80, equally with the reserved commanders, of which 14-probably 12 selected from the 10s. list, as more than that number have served as commanders-and the now 8|| vacancies on the reserved captains' list, filled up by some of the venerable commanders who have not served as commanders--20 would receive an increase of half-pay; which 42 so promoted or benefited, added to the 28 previously promoted, would give 70 commanders advanced-a number approximating to the 80 captains advanced in six months, and as great as could be expected from their promotion being limited to one in three vacancies on the list of active captains.

However, the repugnance of the senior commanders on the active

* Three more captains have since been promoted to rear-admirals.

+ Six captains have since increased their half-pay by the promotion of three captains to rear-admirals.

|| A junior retired captain has lately deceased, and three others since.

U. S. MAG., No. 345, AUG., 1857.

20

list to accept of the extra sixpenny retirement, with the rank of retired captains; the non-completion of the reserved captains' list to 80, in accordance with the order in council; the active commanders' list being clogged by 80 above its permanent number, and which impedes the promotion of lieutenants to active commanders; the increase of the reserved flag officers from 41 to 86 since June, 1851-are separate cases which have caused the contrarieties in the Navy Estimates and the Navy List, and they all prove simultaneously what Sir Francis Baring stated in the House of Commons in 1851, that, “in the retirement of April, 1841, the commanders and lieutenants were hardly treated, especially the commanders," and the worthy ex-First Lord of the Admiralty may now in 1857 justly repeat the words "especially the commanders," in the successive plans of retirement and promotion authorized by orders in council, "with a view to the general benefit of the naval service, and at the same time the ultimate reduction of the present charge for half-pay."

That a revision of the several plans of promotion and retirement is imperious, is a fact unanswerable either at the Treasury or the Admiralty. The exchequer requires it for state economy; the Admiralty desire it for the general benefit of the naval service; and the veteran officers' claims irresistibly plead for that revision which will distribute an equitable proportion of retirement to the ranks inclusive from the reserved flag-officers down to lieutenants-a proportion which will bear the honest stamp of Sir Charles Wood's impartiality in the next Navy Estimates.

8th July, 1857.

TRISTRAM.

NOTES ON MILITARY SCIENCE.

ADDRESSED TO CANDIDATES FOR COMMISSIONS.

(Continued from page 414.);

LECTURE XIII.

I WILL now resume my extracts and annotations from "Libro Quinto dell' Arte della Guerra.”

In order that an unexpected attack may not disconcert or throw your soldiers into confusion, they should be cautioned to be prepared at all times, as anticipated assaults are far less detrimental than those against which no precautions have been taken. Some generals, in order to avoid confusion on the march, place their carriages and campfollowers in rear of the armed men, so that no impediments may arise on the march or halt of the troops. Care must be taken to prevent any separation of the divisions or wings of the army on a march; the pace must not be at one time slow, at another time rapid, but the advance must be made in a uniform manner; otherwise great disorder will arise. The leaders of divisions must be instructed to restrain the impetuous, and to urge on those who are not sufficiently active; and the march of an army cannot be better regulated than by

the sound of instruments. The frontage should always be kept wide and open, so that, if it becomes necessary to form the troops in battle array, there may be no difficulty in doing so. The habits and the qualifications of the enemy's troops must be taken into consideration, whether they are likely to commence the attack in the morning, at mid-day, or in the evening; whether they are most strong in cavalry, or infantry, and, according to the information you can obtain, well disciplined and well provided with arms and food.

Passage of Rivers, &c.—Some particular circumstances may occasionally arise in campaigning: for instance, when facing the enemy. you may find yourself inferior in strength, and may therefore be unwilling to engage; or, having the enemy closely following you, your troops may arrive on the banks of a river, the passage of which would occupy some time, during which the enemy may close in on your troops, and commence the attack. Commanders who have been placed in this peril have, in some instances, covered their troops by a ditch filled with straw, to which fire being applied on the approach of the enemy, the retreating army was able to cross the river in safety, their opponents being arrested in their progress by the flames, the smoke, and the depth of the ditch. Some commanders, in crossing a river without a bridge, have ordered a portion of the men to stand in it breast high, thus enabling another portion to cross lower down without any difficulty. When rivers are very rapid, to enable infantry to effect the passage safely, the heaviest cavalry should be stationed in the water above the passage, and other cavalry below it, to diminish the strength of the current, and to succour any soldiers who are unable to support themselves against it. Rivers that are not fordable are passed by means of boats, rafts, &c.; and it is desirable to have with the army the means of constructing bridges. It sometimes occurs that the enemy occupies the opposite side of the river, and prevents the passage of it. To overcome this difficulty I know of no better example than that of Cæsar, whose passage across a river was opposed by Vercingetorix. For some days Cæsar moved his army along the banks of the river, and was followed by his adversary on the other side, until, arriving at a woody position, he there concealed three cohorts with directions to construct a bridge, and fortify it as soon as the armies moved forward. Vercingetorix, observing the advance of the Roman troops, similarly moved forward his forces; and Cæsar, when he had allowed sufficient time for the construction of the bridge, &c., returned with his army to the selected spot, and crossed without difficulty to the opposite side.

The foregoing instructions and observations are culled from imaginary dialogues between a master in the art of war and his scholars; and, as I before mentioned, the conversation is carried on in a most interesting and improving manner. As, however, you might have some difficulty in translating the old Italian, I have not inserted passages in the original language, but I cannot refrain from quoting the following portion of a dialogue (modernized to a limited extent):Zanobi. Io credo che sia bene, poiche si debbe mutare ragionamente, che Battista pigli lo ufficio suo, ed io depongo il mio; e

verremo in questo caso ad imitare i buoni capitani, secondo che io intesi già qui dal signore; i quali pongono i migliori soldati dinanzi, e di dietro all' essercito, parendo loro necessario havere davanti chi gagliardamente appichi zuffa, e chi di dietro gagliardamente la sostenga. Cosimo per tanto commincio questo ragionamento prudentamente e Battista prudentamente lo finira, Luigi, ed io, l'habbiamo in questi mezzi intrattenuto. Et come ciascuno di noi hà presa la parte sua volentieri, cosi non credo che Battista sia per ricusarla.

Battista.-Io mi sono lasciato governare infino à qui, cosi sono per lasciarmi per l'avvenir. Per tanto, signore, siate contento di sequitare i ragionamenti vostri, e se noi v' interrompiamo con queste prattiche, habbiateci per escusati.

Fabritio.-Voi mi fate, come gia vi dissi, cosa gratissima; perchè questo vostro interrompermi non mi toglie fantasia, anzi me la rinfresca.

Quarters, &c.-Pursuing our discourse, it is now time that we place our troops in winter quarters, because, as you are well aware, everybody requires not only to have repose, but to have that repose in safety; for to rest, and not to rest securely, is not perfect repose. Possibly you may have imagined that we should first have given our attention to quarters for the army, next to marches, and finally to battles, whereas we have reversed the mode of procedure. This has been advisable, as, being desirous to show how an army changes its formation on a march, and is drawn up in battle array, it was necessary, in the first instance, to describe the order of march. But returning to our observations on quarters: these should be secure, strong, and well arranged. The position and the application of military art give strength; the science and skill of the commander cause good results from the arrangements. The Greeks sought out strong positions, and never posted themselves where there were not gullies, banks of rivers, thick woods, or other natural advantages contributing to defence. But the quarters of the Romans were not so much dependent for their safety to the positions, as to the military art employed on them; nor would they ever station themselves in localities where they were unable, according to their mode of organization, to form a front of the whole army. On this account, the quarters of the Romans were always of the same description, as they made the position conform to their arrangements, instead of their arrangements conform to the position. The Greeks could not effect this, as, conforming their encampment to the position and nature of the ground, the site and form of which was, of course, variable, they were consequently obliged to vary the mode of pitching their camps. The Romans, therefore, when the position was not sufficiently strong in itself, supplied that deficiency by manual labour and artificial defences. And as, in all my narrations and observations, I have been desirous to induce you to imitate the Romans, I will include in these their system of encampment, not, however, confining yourself to a strict observance of their arrangements, but availing yourself of those portions which are suitable to the present system of warfare.

Wives and female Camp-followers.-Both were forbidden; and there was not much difficulty in preventing their access to the camp, as the soldiers were so constantly engaged in their exercises, sometimes in a body, at other times individually, that they had not time either to think of Venus, of frivolous pursuits, or of other indulgences of indolent and useless soldiers.

Exercises, Health, &c.-Nothing is more efficacious in rendering an army healthy than exercise, and therefore the Roman troops were daily exercised; the value of this was apparent, as the men were healthy in quarters or camp, and victorious in battle. With regard ̧ to famine, not only is it necessary to prevent the enemy interfering with your supply of provisions, but attention must be given to the means of obtaining them and preserving them. Food for a month should always be in store; and this supply should always be kept up from friendly inhabitants of the seat of war. The provisions should be kept in a secure place, and, above all, should be issued judiciously, giving to each man a regulated allowance; and being very cautious in this, because in warfare every other obstacle may in time be conquered, but this in time may conquer you. Nor will your enemy endeavour to vanquish you with arms, if he can effect this by famine; for, although victory by the latter may be less honourable, it is more certain and secure. Famine will prevail in an army that is not well regulated. One cause of this will arise from not judiciously procuring the necessary supplies; another cause, from the improvident and extravagant consumption of them. To avoid this, the ancients ate what was issued to them at the time ordered, the commander himself acting similarly. Whether this mode is practised in modern armies you can each of you judge; and, indeed, in these, regularity and sobriety do not prevail as they did in ancient armies, but, on the contrary, licentiousness and drunkenness are too apparent.

Precautions, &c.-Should you suspect anybody in your army of conveying to the enemy secret intelligence of your designs, you cannot turn his treasonable transactions to better account than by communicating to him operations, &c., you do not intend to execute, concealing those you purpose to adopt; mentioning your doubts on subjects of which you have no doubt, and concealing those of which you have any doubt. This will cause the deceived spy to make known to the enemy some anticipated movement, thinking he knows your designs, and you will thus be enabled to deceive and damage your enemy. Should you propose (as did Claudius Nero) to diminish the strength of your army, sending aid to your coadjutor without the knowledge of your adversary, it is necessary not to diminish the extent of the quarters, &c., but to maintain the same ground, &c., lighting similar fires, and posting similar guards throughout. Also, should fresh troops join your army, and you should be desirous that this increase be not known by the enemy, the extent of the encampment should not be enlarged, as it is always judicious to conceal your actions and intentions.

Metellus, when with the army in Spain, being one day asked what movements he intended to execute the following day, replied, "If his shirt knew them he would burn it." Marcus Crassus, in answer to a