questioner who wished to know when the army would commence its march, exclaimed, "Do you imagine that you alone will not hear the trumpet sound?" Some commanders, in order to discover the intentions of the enemy, have sent as ambassadors or messengers experienced and observant officers, disguised as men of lower rank; and these have thus been enabled to examine the army of the enemy, and, perceiving its weak and strong points, have made known the means of obtaining success.

Punishments, and Pay.- It is of the utmost importance for a commander to take care that the troops are justly punished, and duly paid; for whenever pay is withheld, punishment ought to cease. You cannot punish a soldier for robbery, if he is not properly paid; nor can he live without robbery, if unpaid: but, if he is paid and not punished, he will become insolent, and consequently you will be but little respected; for when the dignity of rank is not maintained, tumults and disorder necessarily follow, and these are the utter ruin of an army.

Deceitful Operations.-A commander, whose troops were in the vicinity of those of the enemy, has derived great advantage from sending his soldiers (with the colours, &c., of the enemy) to pillage and lay waste, apparently, their own country; for the enemy, believing these troops to have come to their aid, have gone out to meet them, and, discovering their mistake, have become confused and disordered; thus affording their adversaries a good opportunity for overcoming them. Some commanders have vanquished the enemy by giving them the means of committing an excess in eating and drinking, feigning fear, and leaving the camp well supplied with wine and provisions; the enemy, rushing into the tents and perceiving these luxuries, have incautiously gorged themselves, and, being subsequently attacked in their almost defenceless condition, have been easily defeated. Other commanders have poisoned or drugged wine, and other articles of food, to enable them the more readily to conquer their enemies.

Wars.-"Io vi dico di nuovo che gli antichi faceano ogni cosa meglio, e con maggiore prudenza di noi, e se nelle altre cose, si fà qualche errore, nelle cose della guerra si fanno tutti." There is not a more imprudent or a more dangerous operation than carrying on war in the winter; and far more peril attends the commander who is the aggressor than he who defends his country. The reason is this,all the exemplification of good military organization and discipline should tend to the bringing on of an engagement with the enemy, for that is the object the commander ought to have in view, because on a battle gained or lost may hang the fate of the war. Who, therefore, knows how to carry it on in the best manner and has the best disciplined army, has the greatest advantage and may expect to conquer. On the other side, there is no greater opponent to good order and discipline than rugged and barren sites, or frosty and wet seasons; for the rugged sites prevent the forces being extended and drawn up in well-disciplined array: frost and rain will not permit the assemblage of the troops, nor can they present themselves before the enemy

in a compact form; but they are obliged to be quartered far apart, and without order, occupying castles, suburbs, and towns; in consequence of which all efforts made to keep the army in a good state of discipline are of no avail. Do not be surprised at war being now carried on in the winter; for the soldiers, being without discipline, are not aware of the injury they sustain by not being united, and it therefore causes them no annoyance, nor do they care for those orders, or observe the discipline to which they are strangers.

Countries and Fortresses. It is necessary for you to learn how countries and fortresses are strong by nature, or rendered so by art and industry. Those are strong by nature which are surrounded, or partly so, by rivers or marshes, as Mantua and Ferrara. Generally in constructing a fortress, a plain is selected, the first care being given to form the wall in such a manner that the enemy cannot approach one part without being readily assaulted in front as well as in flank. Should the wall be high, it is too much exposed to the fire of the artillery; if it is constructed low, it is open to escalade; should a ditch be dug in front to render escalading difficult, it can be filled up, especially by a strong body of assailants, and thus the ascent of the wall is open to the enemy. Taking all into consideration, I think that to provide against each of the foregoing objections the wall should be high, and the ditch formed within instead of outside the works: this is the strongest mode of construction, because it is a defence against cannon-shot and escalade, and deprives the enemy of the power of filling up the ditch. The wall should therefore be of the height most suitable to the site, and of the thickness of three arms' length to resist artillery fire; the towers should be erected with intervals between them of two hundred arms' length; the ditch should be in breadth at least thirty arms' length, and in depth twelve; and all the earth excavated from the ditch should be thrown towards the city, and be supported by a wall which is not connected with the foundation of the ditch, and is of sufficient height above the level of the ground to cover a man; by this construction the depth of the ditch will be increased. At the bottom of the ditch, every two hundred arms' length, a covered battery should be erected for guns to play upon troops attempting the passage. The heavy ordnance for the defence of the city should be mounted within the interior wall, smaller guns being posted for the exterior defences. Should the enemy attempt an escalade, the height of the exterior wall forms a good defence; should he bring up his guns to the attack, the wall must be breached, and, when demolished, must fall towards the ditch, the depth of which towards the exterior would be thereby increased by the demolition of the masonry; thus the means of approach would be rendered very difficult, impeded by the ruins of the wall, by the ditch, and by the fire of the enemy's artillery, which, well covered itself, would be able to fire with deadly eff ct. The only probable means of obtaining success will be by filling up the ditch; but this will be a very difficult operation, as its depth will be very great, and the access to it rendered dangerous by the flanking and flanked formation of the works: for these reasons the entrance into the ditch will

not be easily effected, but even if so, then will a successful escalade and the passage of the ruins have to follow before the town can be entered: all these together form such impediments that a fortress thus constructed may be considered almost impregnable. With reference to wet and dry ditches, opinions on these subjects are various; the former description prevents the construction of subterraneous passages, the latter cannot be filled without much labour. Altogether I consider the dry ditch preferable and most secure, especially in winter, when the wet ditch might be frozen over, and the capture of the place easily effected.

No fortress can be called strong in which there is not sufficient interior space for the construction of additional works; for the fire of artillery is so powerful that the city which trusts for safety to a single line of defence, or to a successful reparation and maintenance of it, will be deceived in its expectation of resistance to the attacks of a vigorous enemy.

Assaults and Storming.-It is considered that these should be influenced by the first impetus of the troops, in a manner similar to that of the Romans, who on several occasions obtained possession of cities by assaulting them on all sides at the same moment, " Aggredi urbem coronâ," as Scipio did when he captured New Carthage in Spain. Should this impetus be well opposed, there will be great difficulty in its effecting success; but even should the enemy have forced an entrance into the city by scaling the walls, still terraces and embankments may be of some utility if well defended; for many armies, even after their entrance into a fortress, have been either destroyed or discomfited. The means of resisting the stormers will arise from the terraces thrown up on elevated spots, from the houses, and from the towers, all of which should be resolutely defended. To overcome these obstacles the assailants have two modes, one being by opening the gates of the city to afford an opportunity for the defenders to escape without danger, the other by making known by word of mouth that war will only be waged with armed men, and that those who lay down their arms will be pardoned. Many cities have thus been captured. Some commanders, being aware that succour would soon be sent to the besieged, have clothed their own soldiers in the uniforms of the expected troops, and, having introduced them into the city, have taken possession of it. Other commanders, having killed the troops composing a sortie, have clothed their own troops in the uniform of the besieged, and, thus obtaining an entrance into the town, have captured it. Other commanders have, by means of deceit or treason, taken possession of territories by corrupting in different ways the inhabitants of the country. Some commanders have sent one of their own soldiers, under pretence of being a fugitive, to pretend to serve under the enemy; and this man, having obtained authority and power, afterwards turned it to the benefit of his own countrymen. Some generals have thus learnt the number of troops employed in defensive operations, and, availing themselves of this knowledge, have conquered the country. Some, by blocking up the gates of a city with carts, &c., have prevented their being closed, and have thereby

been able to force an entrance for their troops into the place. Hannibal persuaded a governor to surrender his castle to the Romans; who, to effect this, pretended that he must hunt during the night, as the presence of the enemy deterred him from doing so during the day; and thus the governor, having quitted the castle with his huntsmen, returned to it accompanied by some of the Roman soldiers, disguised as huntsmen, who killed the guards, and took possession of the castle.

Duties of the Besieged.-The besieged ought to be more circumspect and watchful when the enemy is at a distance, than they would be were he close at hand; and they should the more strictly guard the positions least liable to attack, as many places have been taken possession of by assaulting the parts supposed to be secure. The besiegers should therefore use great caution to avert this, and at all times, especially during the night, should have faithful guards posted on the walls, not only men, but savage and watchful dogs, who, by their sense of smelling, may become aware of the approach of an enemy, and by their barking give an alarm.

Correspondence.-Those besieged have adopted different modes of communication with their friends outside the fortress, who were desirous to aid them, and, to avoid the risk of verbal messages, have written them in ciphers, &c., these being various, in conformity to arrangements between the parties, and concealed in different manners, some being written in the scabbard of a sword; some enclosed in dough, afterwards baked, and given as food to the bearer of it; some have been concealed in the most secret parts of the body; some have been written in the collar of a dog who followed his master. Officers have sometimes sent letters on ordinary subjects, and between the lines have written with water, which being damped and warmed has caused the writing to appear. This system has been extensively carried on in our own times; for, when it was necessary to make secret communications with friends at a distance, these were written in a common form, but interlined, as I have above mentioned, and hung up on gates, &c., where they were readily perused and understood by those persons for whom they were designed. This mode of communication is most excellent, as there is no risk attending it; and the bearer of it may even be ignorant of the contents of the intended publication. There are many other plans for carrying on correspondence, which each person can form for himself, and carry into effect. There is, however, less difficulty in writing to the besieged than in these sending letters to their friends outside the fortress, because such communications can only be forwarded through simulating fugitives, an undertaking very hazardous when the enemy is watchful and cautious.

General Rules. Whatever is advantageous to the enemy is detrimental to you; and, contrariwise, whatever is beneficial to you is injurious to the enemy.

He who in warfare manifests the most diligence in observing the designs and movements of the enemy, and endures the most fatigue

in exercising and disciplining his own troops, will incur the least risks, and may confidently anticipate a victory.

Never lead your troops to battle, if they are not well prepared for it, if they are not without apprehensions of the result, and if they are not well disciplined; and never commence an attack unless there are reasonable hopes of success.

It is better to conquer the enemy with hunger than with the sword, in which victory good fortune may do more than courage and strength.

No plan is better than that which conceals from the enemy your intentions until they are carried into execution.

In war, to perceive the critical moment, and to take advantage of it, is above all value.

Nature forms few men brave; discipline and exercise render many so.

Discipline in war is more advantageous than impetuosity.

When your enemy's troops desert, and enter your service, and are faithful, they will be a great acquisition to you, for the virtual strength of your opponents will be more diminished by the loss of those who desert than by those who are killed.

In forming the order of battle it is better to have a reserve to cover the front, than by extending the front to weaken the army. There is great difficulty in obtaining a victory over a commander who knows not only the actual strength of his own army, but also that of his opponent.

Bravery in an army is of more value than numerical strength.

A well-selected position is sometimes more beneficial than courage. New and unexpected movements cause despondency in an army; slow and customary operations are little prized by soldiers: it is advisable to prepare the troops by minor attacks to know and meet their new enemies, previous to risking a general engagement.

The troops who follow in a disorderly manner a discomfited army will lose more than they gain by victory.

The commander who provides not sustenance for his army is conquered without being struck by the sword.

He who trusts more to cavalry than infantry, or more to the latter than to the former, should be thoroughly conversant with the nature of the position.

Change your intended operations should you ascertain that the enemy is aware of them.

Consult with many relative to the steps necessary to take; confide to few those you intend to take.

Soldiers when in quarters are ruled by fear and by punishment; but when in war by hope and by reward.

Good commanders do not fight a battle unless forced to do so by necessity, or to derive benefit by the opportunity offered.

Precautions should be taken to prevent the enemy becoming aware of the intended mode of your attack on the day of battle; and your second and third lines should support the leading one.