to raise itself out of measure; and to that no indulgence ought to be given in words that may flatter, for we ought to subdue this temper by all means possible, both in ourselves and others. On the other hand, though we confess that there is a disorder and weakness that hangs heavy upon us, and that sticks close to us, yet this ought not to make us indulge our selves in our sins, as if they were the effects of an infirmity that is inseparable from us. Το consent to any sin, if it were ever so small in itself, is a very great sin; we ought to go on, still cleansing ourselves more and more from all filthiness, both of the flesh and of the spirit, and perfecting holiness in the fear of God. Our readiness to sin should awaken both our dili gence to watch against it, and our humility under it for though we grow not up to a pitch of being above all sin, and of absolute perfection, yet there are many degrees both of purity and perfection to which we may arrive, and to which we must constantly aspire; so that we must keep a just temper in this matter, neither to ascribe so much to our own works as to be lifted up by reason of them, or to forget our daily need of a Saviour, both for pardon and intercession; nor on the other hand so far to neglect them, as to take no care about them. The due temper is to make our calling and election sure, and to work

out

out our own salvation with fear and trembling; but to do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, ever trusting to him, and giving thanks to God by him."

The following extract from a form of baptism, used in the church of Rome before its corruption, will show how much that church, in its doctrine of the merit of good works, has departed from its antient principles: "Credis non propriis meritis, sed passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi virtute et merito, ad gloriam pervenire? Credo.-Credis quod Dominus noster Jesus Christus pro salute nostrâ mortuus sit? et quod ex propriis meritis vel alio modo nullus possit salvari, nisi in merito passionis ejus? Credo." This form of baptism was forbidden by the Indices Expurgatorii, which were drawn up by order of the council of Trent. We also find the following passage in the works of Gregory the Great, who lived at the end of the sixth century, and was one of the most learned among the popes: "Quinetiam si habuero quippiam justum, non respondebo, sed meum judicem deprecabor; ut enim sæpe diximus, omnis humana justitia injustitia esse convincitur si districte judicetur. Prece ergo post justitiam indiget; ut, quæ succumbere discussa poterat, ex solâ judicis potestate coalescat (u).”

(u) Moral, &c. cap. 2.

ARTICLE THE THIRTEENTH.

Of Works before Justification.

WORKS DONE BEFORE THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AND THE INSPIRATION OF HIS SPIRIT, ARE NOT PLEASANT TO GOD, FORASMUCH AS THEY SPRING NOT OF FAITH IN JESUS CHRIST, NEITHER DO THEY MAKE MEN MEET ΤΟ RECEIVE GRACE, OR (AS THE SCHOOL AUTHORS SAY) DESERVE GRACE OF CONGRUITY: YEA RATHER, FOR THAT THEY ARE NOT DONE AS GOD HATH WILLED AND COMMANDED THEM ΤΟ BE DONE, WE DOUBT NOT BUT THEY HAVE THE NATURE OF SIN.

EVERY action which men perform by their own unassisted powers must necessarily partake of the general imperfection and corruption of their nature; and therefore their WORKS DONE BEFORE they are strengthened by THE GRACE

CHRIST, and guided by THE INSPIRATION OF HIS SPIRIT, cannot be PLEASANT TO GOD, FORASMUCH AS THEY SPRING NOT OF

FAITH IN JESUS CHRIST, the only principle which can render them acceptable in the sight of God. "Without faith it is impossible to

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please

please God (a)."-" They that are in the flesh (that is, who are not purified by the spiritual religion of Christ) cannot please God (b)."

Bishop Burnet makes a distinction, which sets the doctrine of this article in a clear point of view: "A great difference is here to be made between an external action, as it is considered in itself, and the same action as it was done by such a man. An action is called good from the morality and nature of the action itself: so actions of justice and charity are in themselves good, whatsoever the doer of them may be; but actions are considered by God with relation to him that does them in another light; his principles, ends, and motives, with all the other circumstances of the action, come into this account; for unless all these be good, let the action in its own abstracted nature be ever so good, it cannot render the doer acceptable or meritorious in the sight of God."

Nor can these works possess such degree of merit, as of themselves to MAKE MEN MEET, or worthy, TO RECEIVE GRACE, OR (AS THE SCHOOL AUTHORS SAY) GRACE OF CONGRUITY. All grace is the free gift of our heavenly Father, for "the love of God our Saviour towards man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved

(a) Heb. c. 11. v. 6.

(b) Rom. c. 8. v. 8.

saved us by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost (c)." The school divines, or schoolmen, as they are called, speak of two sorts of merit, the merit of condignity and the merit of congruity; the former they ascribe to works which men do by the assistance of grace, and to which they assert that a reward is in justice due; the latter they ascribe to such works as men do by mere strength of free will, and which are to be rewarded only out of liberality (d). We find no such distinction in the Scriptures; they teach us in general to consider man as incapable of doing any thing which shall be entitled to reward, except through the mercy of God, and for the sake of Christ.

Indeed, so great and universal a depravity is introduced into the dispositions of men in consequence of the fall of Adam, that they can in no instance of themselves act as their Creator originally commanded; and therefore, as in all their works performed without divine assistance, there is a departure from the will of God, we

(c) Tit. c. 3. v. 4 and 5.

DOUBT

(d) Mereri ex condigno, est mereri sic, ut secundum justitiam sibi debeatur, ita quod injustum esset non reddi mercedem merito ex condigno. Opus cui ex justitia non debetur merces, sed tantum ex congruitate quadam, vel ex sola acceptantis liberalitate. -Caietan.