Page images
PDF
EPUB

Thefe are fome of the niceft, most curious and furprifing works of art; but let us examine any of them with a good microscope, and we fhall be immediately convinced, that the utmost power of art is only a concealment of deformity, an impofition upon our want of fight; and that our admiration of it arifes from our ignorance of what it really Obfervations on the Quality or Virtue in Sonidered as a fenfation, feeling, or MELL, by the modern philofophy, impreffion upon the mind; and in this fenfe it can only be in a mind, or fentient being : But it is evident, that mankind give the name of smell much more frequently to fomething which they conceive to be external, and to be a quality of body: They understand fomething by it which does not at all infer a mind; and have not the least difficulty in conceiving odoriferous plants fpreading their fragrance in the deferts of Arabia, or in fome uninhabited ifland, where the human foot never trod. Every fenfible day-labourer hath as clear a notion of this, and as full a conviction of the poffibility of it, as he hath of his own existence; and can no more doubt of the one than of the other.

Suppofe that fuch a man meets with a modern philofopher, and wants to be informed, what fmell in plants is. The philofopher tells him, that there is no smell in plants, nor in any thing, but in the mind; that it is impoffible there can be finell but in a mind; and that all this hath been deThe monftrated by modern philofophy. plain man will, no doubt, be apt to think him merry: But, if he finds that he is ferious, his next conclufion will be, that he is mad; or that philofophy, like magic, puts men into a new world, and gives them different And thus faculties from common men. philofophy and common fenfe are fet at variance. But who is to blame for it? In my opinion the philofopher is to blame. For, if he means by finell, what the reft of mankind most commonlymean he is certainly mad. But if he puts a different meaning upon the word, without obferving it himself, or giving warning to others; he abufes language, and difgraces philofophy, without doing any fervice to truth: As if a man fhould exchange the meaning of the words daughter and cow, and then endeavour to prove to his plain neighbour, that his cow is his daughter, and his daughter his cow.

I believe there is not much more wisdom m many of thofe paradoxes of the ideal philofophy, which to plain fenfible men appear

be palpable abfurdities, but with the

is.

Such a comparison muft tend alfo towards humbling the felf-conceit and pride of man, by giving him a more reasonable and modeft opinion of himself; and at the fame time may in fome degree conduce towards improving his imperfect conceptions of the fupreme Creator.

Bodies, avbich we call their S MEL L.

adepts pafs for profound discoveries. I re-
folve, for my own part, always to pay a
great regard to the dictates of common
fenfe, and not to depart from them without
abfolute neceffity: And therefore I am apt
to think, that there is really fomething in
the rofe or lily, which is by the vulgar called
fell, and which continues to exilt when it
is not finelled.

Let us therefore fuppofe a perfon begin
ning to exercife the fenfe of fmelling: A
little experience will discover to him, that the
nofe is the organ of this fenfe, and that the
air, or fomething in the air, is a medium of
And finding, by farther experience,
it.
that, when a rofe is near, he has a certain
fenfation; when it is removed, the fenfation
is gone; he finds a connection in nature be-
The
twixt the rofe and this fenfation.
rofe is confidered as a caufe, occafion, or an-
tecedent, of the fenfation; the fenfation as
an effect or confequent of the prefence of the
rofe: They are affociated in the mind, and
conftantly found conjoined in the imagina-
tion. In order to illuftrate farther how we
come to conceive a quality or virtue in the
rofe which we call finell, and what this fiell
is, it is proper to obferve, that the mind be-
gins very early to thirft after principles,
which may direct it in the exertion of its
powers. The fmell of a rofe is a certain at-
fection or feeling of the mind; and, as it is
not conftant, but comes and goes, we want
to know when and where we may expect it,
and are uneafy till we find fomething which,
being prefent, brings this feeling along with
it, and, being removed, removes it. This,
when found, we call the cause of it; not in
a ftrict and philofophical fenfe, as if the feel-
ing were really effected or produced by that
caufe, but in a popular fenfe: For the mind
is fatisfi d, if there is a conftant conjunction
between them; and fuch caufes are in
reality nothing elfe but laws of nature.
Having found the finell thus constantly con
joined with the rofe, the mind is at reft,
without inquiring whether this conjunction
is owing to a real efficiency or not; that
being a philofophical inquiry, which does
not concern human life. Put every dif

E

COVETY

covery of fuch a conftant conjunction is of real importance in life, and makes a strong impreffion upon the mind.

So ardently do we defire to find every thing that happens within our obfervation thus connected with fomething elfe, as its cause or occafion, that we are apt to fancy connections upon the flighteft grounds: And this weakness is most remarkable in the ignorant, who know leaft of the real connections established in nature. A man meets with an unlucky accident on a certain day of the year; and, knowing no other caufe of his misfortune, he is apt to conceive fomething unlucky in that day of the calendar; and if he finds the fame connection hold a fecond time, is strongly confirmed in his fuperftition.. I remember, many years ago, a white ox was brought into the country, of fo enormous a fize, that people came many miles to fee him. There happened, fome months after, an uncommon fatality among women in child-bearing. Two fuch uncommon events following one another gave a fufpicion of their connection, and occafioned a common opinion among the country-people, that the white ox was the caufe of this fatality.

However filly and ridiculous this opinion was, it fprung from the fame root in human nature, on which all natural philofophy grows; namely, an eager defire to find out connections in things, and a natural, original, and unaccountable propenfity to believe, that the connections which we have obferved in time paft, will continue in time to come. Omens, portents, good and bad luck, palmiftry, aftrology, all the numerous arts of divination, and of interpreting dreams, falfe hypothefes and fyftems, and true principles in the philofophy of nature, are all built upon the fame foundation in the human conftitution; and are diftinguished only according as we conclude rafhly from too few inftances, or cautioufly from a fufficient induction.

As it is experience only that difcovers thefe connections beiween natural caufes and their effects; without inquiring farther, we attribute to the cause fome vague and indiftinct notion of power or virtue to produce the effect. And in many cafes the purposes of life do not make it neceflary to give diftinct names to the caufe and the effect. Whence it happens, that, being clofely connected in the imagination, although very unlike to each other, one name ferves for both; and, in common difcourfe, is most frequently applied to that which, of the two, is moft the object of our attention. This occafions an ambiguity in many words, which is common to all languages, having the fame

caufes, and which is apt to be overlooked even by philofophers. Some inftances will ferve both to illuftrate and confirm what we have faid.

Magnetifm fignifies both the tendency of the iron towards the magnet and the power of the magnet to produce that tendency: And if it was atked, whether it is quality of the iron or of the magnet? One would perhaps be puzzled at firft, but a little attention would difcover, that we conceive a power or virtue in the magnet as the caufe, and a motion in the iron as the effect; and, although these are things quite unlike, they are fo united in the imagination, that we give the common name of magnetifim to both. The fame thing may be fiid of gravitation, which fometimes fignifies the tendency of bodies towards the earth, fometimes the attractive power of the earth, which we conceive as the cause of that tendency.

Heat fignifies a fenfation, and cold a contrary one. But heat likewife fignifies a quality or ftate of bodies, which hath no contrary, but different degrees. When a man feels the fame water hotto one hand, and cold to the other, this gives him occafion to diftinguish between the feeling, and the heat of the body, and, although he knows that the fenfations are contrary, he does not imagine that the body can have contrary qualities at the fame time. And when he finds a different taste in the fame body in sickness and in health, he is eafily convinced, that the quality in the body called tafte is the fame as before, although the fenfations he has from it are perhaps oppofite.

The vulgar are cominonly charged by philofophers with the abfurdity of imagining the fmell in the rofe to be fomething like to the fenfation of finelling: But, I think, unjúftly; for they neither give the fame epithets to both, nor do they reafon in the fame manner from them. What is finell in the rofe? It is a quality or virtue of the rofe, or of fomething proceeding from it, which we perceive by the fenfe of fmelling; and this is all we know of the matter. But what is fmelling? It is an act of the mind, but is never imagined to be a quality of the mind. Again the fenfation of fmelling is conceived to infer neceffarily a mind or fentient being; but fmell in the rofe infers no fuch thing. We fay. This body fmells fweet, that stinks; but we do not fay, This mind fmells fweet, and that ftinks. Therefore finell in the role, and the fenfation which it caufes, are not conceived, even by the vulgar, to be things of the faine kind, although they have the

fame name.

Cur fenfations have very different degrees of

of ftrength. Some of them are fo quick and lively, as to give us a great deal either of pleasure or of uneafiness: When this is the cafe, we are compelled to attend to the fenfation itself, and to make it an object of thought and difcourfe; we give it a name, which fignifies nothing but the fenfation; and in this cafe we immediately and readily acknowledge, that the thing meant by that name is in the mind only, and not in any thing external. Such are the various kinds of pain, fickness, and the fenfations of hunger and other appetites. But where the sensation

is not fo interesting as to require to be made an object of thought, our conftitution leads us to confider it as a fign of fomething external, which hath a conftant conjunction with it; and having found what it indicates, we give a name to that: The fenfation, having no proper name, falls in as an acceffory to the thing fignified by it, and is confounded under the fame name. So that the name may indeed be applied to the fenfation, but moft properly and commonly is applied to the thing indicated by that fenfa

tion.

Thoughts and Reflections on the ill Effects and Tendency of Arbitrary Power. REAT and noble ideas are never but to the difgrace of human nature, reafon

by

corruption,

Juxury, and effeminacy, become fubject to arbitrary power; they are never animated by an opinion of their own importance; fo that every one, keeping his eyes fixed on private intereft, never turns them on that of the public.

It frequently happens, that those who are intruffed with the education of Princes, or the Minifters that furround them, being fond of governing under their name, have an intereft in rendering them ftupid. Lewis XIII, in one of his letters, complains of the Marthal D'Ancre. He oppoles, fays he, my walking in the streets of Paris, and allows me no pleasures, but those of hunting, and taking a few turns in the Thuilleries: He has forbid the Officers of my houthold, as well as all my fubjects, to converfe with ne on ferious affairs, and to speak to me in private. Whence it may feem, that in molt countries, pains are taken to render Princes but little worthy of the throne, where they are called to it by birth.

If critics were banished the republic of letters, it is obvious, that authors being freed from the falutary fear of cenfure, which compels them to take pains in improving their talents, would then prefent the public with only rude and imperfect pieces: In like manner, if State-minifters had none to put them in mind of their duty, most of them would be continually hatching schemes inconfiftent with the principles of true government. It will not therefore be unreafonable to doubt of the juftice of their decifions, and repeat af. ter Grotius,That every decree or law, which the people are forbid to examine and cenfure, can never fail of being unjuft.'

Thofe in power will be always unjuft and vindictive. M. de Vendome faid pleafantly enough on this fubject, that in the march of armies he had often inquired into the quarrels between the mules and the muleteers;

In defpotic States, people care, and indeed cannot avoid caring but little for glory and pofterity, fince they do not love esteem for its own fake, but for the advantages it procures; fince nothing is granted to merit, and there is nothing which they dare refufe to power.

I ex

Lord Bolingbroke, obferving the incapacity and ignorance of moft of the leading men in his time, fays on this fubject: 'When young, I at first confidered those who governed the nation, as fuperior intelligences; but experience foon undeceived me." amined those who were at the helin of affairs, and foon found that the Great were like thofe gods of Phoenicia, on whose fhoulders were fixed the head of a bull, as a mark of fupreme power; and that, in general, men were governed by the greatest blockheads among them.'

In States where the laws only difpenfe pu nifhments and rewards, and where obedience is paid to none but the laws, the virtuous, dwelling in fafety, contract a boldness and firmness of foul, that cannot fubfift in a country which is the feat of arbitrary power, where property, life, and liberty depend on the caprice of a King or his Minister. In thefe countries it would be as imprudent to be virtuous, as it would have been to be vicious in Crete and Lacedemon. There no man would be the abettor of injuftice, and, rather than applaud it, would cry out with the philofopher Philoxenes, Let me be carried back to the quarries.'

It seems the Scots were formerly ignorant of our maxim, The King can do no wrong;' for their laws might punish the Sovereign for an act of injuftice committed againft a fubject. At Malcolm's accellion to the throne of Scotland, a Nobleman prefented to him the patent of his privileges, intreating his Majefty to confirm them; but

E 2

the

.

the King took the patent, and tore it in pieces. The Nobleman complained of this to the Parliament, who decreed, that the King fhould fit on his throne, and in the prefence of the whole Court ftitch the Nobleman's patent together with a needle and thread.

All bad Kings and wicked Minifters refemble Tiberius, in whofe reign the fighs and cries of the unhappy wretches under oppreffion, were conftrued to proceed from a factious fpirit, becaufe every thing is criminal, fays Suetonius, under a Prince, who is constantly stung with his own guilt.

There are few Prime-minifters under arbitrary Princes but would reduce mankind to the condition of thofe ancient Perfians, who, being cruelly whipped by the order of their Prince, were obliged to appear before him: We come, faid they, to thank thee for having condefcended to remember us.'

Among a flavish people, the name of factious is given to a generous citizen; and fome are always found to approve his punishment. There is no crime on which praife is not lavished, in a State where abject meannefs is become the mode. If the plague, fays Gordon, had garters, penfions, and ribbons to bestow, there are churchmen vile enough, and civilians bafe enough, to maintain, that the plague reigns by divine right; and that to withdraw ourselves from its malignant influences, is a fin against God. It is then more prudent in thefe countries to be the accomplice, than the accufer of knaves; for virtue and talents are always the butt of tyranny.

In countries fubject to a defpotic government, the love of the efteem and acclamations of the people is fo criminal, that the Prince always punishes thofe who obtain them. Agricola, after having triumphed over the Britons, in order to escape popular applaufe, as well as the fury of Domitian, paffed through the freets of Rome in the night, in his way to the Emperor's palace. The Prince embraced him coldly; Agricola withdrew; and the conqueror of Briton, fays Tacitus, was inftantly loft in the croud of other flaves.

In thofe unhappy times, one might have cried out at Rome with Brutus: O Virtue Thou art but an empty name! How can we expect to find it amongst a people who live in perpetual agonies, and whofe minds, being broke with fear, have loft all their force and vigour? Among fuch people, we only meet with powerful infolence, and abject, daftardly flaves.

What picture can be more humbling to human nature, than the audience of a Vifir, when, with a grave and ftupid air of impor

tance, he advances into the midst of a croud of clients, who, grave, mute, and immoveable, with their eyes fixed and caft down, wait, trembling, for the favour of a look, nearly in the attitude of thofe Bramins, who, with their eyes fixed on the end of their nofes, wait for the blue and divine flame, with which Heaven is to bestow its illuminations, and whofe appearance, according to them, is to raise them to the dignity of a pagod.

We can easily account for the aftonishing rapidity, with which the Greeks and Romans fubdued Afia. How could flaves inured to the frowns of a master itifle, at the fight of the Roman fwords, the habitual fenfations of fear they had contracted from arbitrary power? How could men, fo debafed, without elevation of mind, accustomed to trample on the weak, and to cringe before the powerful, avoid yielding to the magnanimity, the policy, the valour of the Romans, and fhew themfelves equally daftardly in counsel, and in the field of battle?

If the Egyptians, as Plutarch fays, were fucceffively the flaves of all nations, it was owing to their being fubject to the most fevere defpotic power; and thus they almost conftantly gave proofs of cowardice. When King Cleomenes, being driven from Sparta, took refuge in Egypt, he was imprisoned by the intrigues of a Minifter, named Sobifius but having killed his guard, and broken his fetters, he prefented himself in the streets of Alexandria: Yet in vain did he exhort the citizens to revenge him, to punish the injuftice of his treatment, and shake off the yoke of tyranny. Every-where, fays Plutarch, he found only immoveable admirers. Thefe bafe and cowardly people had only that fpecies of courage which made them admire great actions, but not that which could excite to imitate them.

We muft, fays Montefquieu, begin by being bad citizens, in order to become good flaves.

It is faid, notwithstanding, that the virtuous have fhone with confpicuous luftre in States fubject to arbitrary power. This may be true, when it has happened, that the throne has been fucceffively poffeffed by feveral great men. Virtue, benumbed by the prefence of tyranny, revives at the appearance of a virtuous Prince. His prefence may be compared to that of the fun, when his light pierces and difperfes the black clouds that cover the earth. Then all nature revives, every thing glows with new life, and the plains are peopled with induftrious husbandmen. Still the property of arbitrary power is to stifle the paffion When the people be

come

1

« PreviousContinue »