such end they will terminate, unless, by some means or other, this established connexion is broken, or interrupted. This direct course of things to some ultimate end or point, according to established connexions, is their tendency. Now, according to established connexions in the moral world, the direct tendency of holiness, in all its operations, is ultimately to happiness.

This is what I mean by its tendency. And the direct course of sin is, in all its operations, to the destruction of happiness ultimately. And this is what I mean by its tendency. And there is no way, of which we have any knowledge, by which a sinner can avoid being ultimately miserable, except by becoming holy. And a holy character, continuing holy, cannot be finally miserable; unless a different order of things should be established in the moral world.

Also, though arsenic may be a means of restoring health to the sick; yet, in order to this, its direct course or operation must be destroyed, or interrupted. Hence, though it may, by interrupting its course, or compounding it with certain other things, be a means of health; yet, we do not view this to be its natural tendency. So, although sin may occasion good to the universe, yet its direct course or operation is to make the sinner finally miserable. So all will say, its tendency is to evil, and not to good, ultimately. Having explained what I mean by the tendency of things ultimately, whatever their present immediate effects are; it may be said, that the reason why we call some things good is, because they tend to absolute good ultimately; and the reason why we term some things evil is, because they tend to the destruction of absolute good ultimately, or to absolute evil. Or, we call some things good, because their ultimate tendency is to happiness; and we call things evil, because they tend ultimately to misery. Here I would just observe, that whatever tends to misery, tends to destroy happiness; and whatever tends to happiness, tends to prevent misery. Hence to say, that a thing tends to destroy happiness, is the same as saying it tends to misery; and to say, it tends to destroy misery, is the same thing with saying it tends to happiThe preceding illustrations lead to the following important conclusions.

ness.

1. We judge all relative good, whether natural or moral, to be a good, for one and the same reason.

Why do we consider the sun, the rain of heaven, a good constitution, and health, to be blessings? Because they conduce

to happiness. For the same reason we view every thing in the natural world to be be a good thing, or a blessing.

Why do we consider holiness, with all its operations and exercises, to be good? Because they promote happiness. This is their motive and tendency. If the question were asked respecting every individual thing, whether natural or moral, why we consider it to be a good thing, or a blessing; in answer, we must assign one and the same reason. We should say, because it tended ultimately to the promotion and increase of happiness. It is presumed no other reason but this can be given, why we judge things to be good, whether natural or moral.

I

If we should say, we consider one thing good on account of of its utility; another on account of its excellency; another for its beauty, or on any other account; still this is only saying, in other words, that we esteem things good, because they tend to happiness ultimately. For can any thing with propriety of speech be called useful, excellent, amiable, beneficial, or profitable, which does not tend to happiness? It must be granted, that évery thing has a tendency, either to happiness or misery. Accordingly, things which do not tend to happiness, tend to misery. Can we with any propriety apply to such things the terms useful, or excellent, or amiable, or any other epithet of similar import? If not, then they are designated by such qualifying epithets, because they tend to the happiness of the universe; mean, to the greatest sum of happiness. Indeed it must be obvious to every person, who reflects candidly on the subject, that things are called good on account of their tendency. And if on account of their tendency, it must be for their tendency to happiness. For no one will call any thing good, which tends to misery, unless he views it in some other, very different relation. The same thing, it is granted, may be viewed in different relations; and be called good or evil, according to the relation in which it is viewed; still it will be termed good or evil according to its tendency, in that relation, in which it is viewed. That is a good, which does good; and that does good, which promotes happiness, or absolute good. And nothing else can be termed good, without an abuse of words.

As every thing is called good for the same reason, on account of its tendency to happiness; natural and moral good are not distinguished by the terms natural and moral because they have different tendencies. If however all things are viewed good for the same reason, it may be asked, why are they divided into

two classes, and marked with the words natural and moral? There must be a difference, which is the ground and reason of this distinction. To this I purpose to attend in the next Essay; but now proceed to add,

2. That for the same reason one thing is termed evil, every thing is so called, whether it be a natural or moral evil. Why are earthquakes, wars, famines, pestilences, and all bodily diseases, viewed as evils? Because they destroy happiness. This is their tendency. If these evils were to prevail constantly, universally, and eternally, could created beings be happy? Could a holy being, if always tortured with an acute disease, be considered a happy being? Natural evils, if they were to prevail universally, would destroy happiness as certainly as moral. So far as they do prevail, happiness is destroyed. Why is sin considered an evil? For the same reason; because it destroys happiness. This is its invariable tendency. And so far as it prevails in this world, misery abounds. In hell, where sin reigns uncontrolled, the inhabitants are perfectly miserable, It is then true, that natural and moral evils, are evils for the same reason; because they tend to misery, or absolute evil. Accordingly, the reason, why evils are distinguished by the epithets natural and moral, is not on account of their different tendencies; for their tendency is precisely the same.

Some may object and say, according to the above reasoning, the same thing may be both good and evil. For instance, moral evil tends to misery, and for this reason is an evil; it is also an occasion of happiness, and for this reason it may be termed good. Hence the above reasoning proves too much; and therefore proves nothing.

Answer. 1. We say, poison tends to destroy life; and is, therefore, an evil thing; yet it is sometimes the means or occasion of preserving life; and when viewed in this relation, it is a good thing. Still, is it the tendency of poison to preserve life? Does it not naturally destroy life? Whenever it is the occasion of preserving life, its tendency is counteracted, by being connected with other ingredients. Let a person feed upon it constantly, and it will soon put an end to his life. We say, the tendency of sin is to the misery of the sinner; yet we say it is the occasion of good to the universe. But is it not true, that its tendency is to misery; and is it not for this reason called an evil? But,

2. The words occasion and tendency have different mean

T

ings. When we say sin is the occasion of good, what do we mean? We mean; that it is not the cause of good; it is not its nature to produce good; it is not owing to sin, but to the wisdom of God, that it is ever the means of good. God makes use of it to promote an end, which it tends to destroy. Hence its tendency is counteracted. A man in anger makes use of his hand, or some other instrument, to put an end to a person's life. Here the instrument is not the cause, but the occasion of death. The person, who used it, is the cause of the death. When therefore we say, sin or any other evil is the occasion of good; we mean, some agent has made it a means of good, contrary to its nature and tendency, Hence, though evil may be made the occasion of much good; yet its proper tendency and nature is to evil. And we do not judge of the nature or tendency of any thing, by the good or evil it may occasion; but by the good or evil it will produce in its operation, if not counteracted.—Religion has been, not the cause, but the occasion of many sore persecutions; and sin is, not the cause, but occasion of much good; yet the tendency of religion is to happiness, and the tendency of sin to misery. And we judge things to be good or evil according to their tendency, but not by the good or evil which they may occasion. Hence the objection has no force, to invalidate what has been said to show, that we denominate all things good or evil for precisely the same reason.

3. It follows, that all kinds of good and evil, natural and moral, have the same nature; which is either good or evil. Natural and moral good have the same nature; natural and moral evil have the same nature. We learn the nature and tendency of things by the effects they produce. If misery is the awful effect all created beings would suffer, in case, nothing but natural evil universally prevailed, then its nature and tendency is to produce misery. But if every created being was to be constantly afflicted with the excruciating pains of an acute disease, then it is the nature of that disease to produce nothing but misery. The same will hold true with respect to every other natural evil.

The nature of sin is to produce misery. Ifevery being in the universe was to live forever under the entire dominion of sin, universal misery would prevail; this is the effect it would produce. Hence it is the nature and tendency of both natural and moral evil to produce misery, or absolute evil. then are precisely the same.

Their natures

1

In like manner, if nothing but natural good universally prevailed, universal happiness would be the result: and if every being were perfectly holy, universal happiness would be the result. So that natural and moral good, if they universally prevailed to the exclusion of all evil, would produce the same effect. Of course, their nature is the same. It cannot be denied,

therefore, that natural and moral evil have the same nature; also, that natural and moral good have the same nature. Whether the nature of moral evil is not more destructive, than that of natural evil; and whether moral good is not more conducive to happiness than natural, are questions which do not in the least affect the above reasoning. For two things may have the same nature, although one may be more destructive, or salutary in its operation, than the other.

I have been more particular on this head, than I otherwise should have been, with a view to detect an error which many have embraced; which is, that evils and goods are distinguished by the terms natural and moral, because their natures and tendencies are totally different. But, I apprehend it has been fully proved, that their natures and tendencies are the same; and that natural and moral evils, are evils for the same reason; and that natura' and moral goods, are good also, for the same reaWe must, therefore, search for other differences, as the ground of the division of good and evil into natural and moral. This will be the subject of the next Essay.

son.

Of the Reasons, why good and evil are distinguished by the terms natural and moral.

Where there is no difference, there is no ground for a distinction. The distinction therefore, which is under considera

tion, and has long prevailed, implies a difference.

The person, who first made this distinction, had in his own