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because it is the cause of the death of his neighbor. To sum up the whole; moral good and evil belong to moral agents; and natural good and evil to natural agents But what is the difference between these two agents? One has all the

properties necessary to render it a proper object of praise and blame, or a designing agent; and the other is destitute of them. But why is not every thing in a moral agent, which may be denominated good and evil, to be considered a moral good or evil? Because they do not proceed from a primary, active, principle of action. Accordingly, no good or evil is to be considered moral, but that which proceeds from the heart of man; because this is the only primary principle of action. The heart then, and its various operations, constitute the only class of moral good and evil. Every other good and evil belongs to the class of natural good and evil.

It is a general opinion, that exercise, action, activity, &c. are essential to vice and virtue. Hence voluntary exercises have by many been considered as holy or sinful, because they have been viewed as being exclusively active. Since it is proved, that the mind is endowed with that faculty called the taste or heart; and that this is the only primary, active, principle in men or moral agents; all, who consider activity essential to vice and virtue, will now see why the heart is the only moral faculty; and why it with its operations include all holy and sinful exercises, by considering the subject in connexion with what is advanced in this Essay. Such are, hence, desired here to give the subject a reconsideration.

ESSAY XX.

On the nature of moral evil, or sin.

1. John, 3, 4. Whosoever committeth sin transgresseth also the law; for sin is the transgression of the law.

The moral law is the rule of duty, given by God to man. It is a perfect rule; and binding on all intelligent, created beings. It never can be repealed or disannulled, any more than either moral good or evil can cease to exist; or their natures, in the

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present system, be so altered, that virtue may become vice, and vice virtue. Hence the moral law is immutable, and will be eternal in all its requirements and prohibitions. In this passage, sin is expressly declared to be a transgression of the law. Of course, every transgression of this law is a sin. And the moral law, according to scripture, extends to the heart, as well as life and conduct. It will be natural then,

I. To inquire what may be considered as a transgression of the moral law.

1. Requirements.

This law contains two general branches. And-2. Prohibitions. The first respects what we ought to do; and the second what we ought to omit doing. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself. This contains the sum of all that is required of men. Thou shalt not do any evil. This contains all that is prohibited. These two constitute the whole rule of duty given to men. Here it is proper to consider how this rule may be transgressed. And,

1. How may the requirements of the law be transgressed. So long as men have in their hearts and lives all that is required of them, they certainly do not transgress this branch of the divine rule. If they love God with the whole heart, and their neighbor as themselves, they fulfil all that is required in their hearts. They have the heart and the affections required of them. On this ground they cannot be blamed. For they do not transgress. The only way then by which men can transgress divine requirements is by defects, by omitting to do what is required. When the heart is destitute of love to God, that temper and affection are wanting, which are required. Here is a deficiency, a want of the thing required; a defect. The person does not come up to the rule of duty, but falls short of it. not a total want of love to God a great imperfection? Is it not a transgression of the law? Who can deny it? It is then evident, that this defect, this privation, this want in the heart of what is required, is a sin, a transgression of the law. Hence any deficiency in this particular is a sin. We are required to love God with the whole heart. Nothing short of this comes perfectly up to what is required. Accordingly, if a person has love in his heart to God, so far as he comes short of the measure required, or of loving with the whole heart, there is a want in him of the affection required. This want is a sin. And so far as any holy affection, whether it be love, repentance, humility,

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or any other grace, is wanting in strength or in equalling the power we have for such affections, it is deficient; there is a want of more life, and a greater measure. And this defect of strength in any holy affection, is a sin, a transgression of what is required. So far as this want prevails, the christian character is deficient, or imperfect. Hence a total want or deficiency, in any holy affection, is a sin. And this is the primary imperfection in every moral character. Did not this in the first place exist, there would be no irregularity, no sin in the heart or life of any moral agent. This will be proved in its proper place.

But as many deny there is any sin in a mere want, deficiency, or defect in the moral character of man, it will be necessary to attend some further to this subject.

Suppose the heart and life of a person is perfectly what it ought to be, in all respects but one; and that is a want of holy affection. Would not this want be considered a great imperfection in his character? Would it not be viewed as sinful? Could he be considered as keeping the law perfectly? Would not the divine law condemn him? Could he, without any love in his heart to God, supposing every thing else be right, be admitted into heaven? And when he stands at the bar of God for trial, destitute of any love, would not his Maker blame and condemn him? The answer to these questions is easy; and proves that this want is a sin.

Again. Do not all christians feel worthy of blame, so far as they know there is a deficiency in them? Do they not consider the want of more love, more humility, greater conformity to God, and more intense desires after holiness, a sin in them, a moral imperfection? Do they ever expect to be perfect, until every grace arrives to perfection in its measure? And is not this want a grief and burden to them daily? Does not this accord with the experiences of all christians? And fully prove that this want, in their view, is a sin? This want is the very thing intended by stupidity, and barrenness. And for this want of more love, zeal, fervency, engagedness, and fruitfulness, they are condemned in the sacred oracles. Why do they cry, my leanness, my leanness; why are they condemned for their stupidity in scripture, if such a want be not a sin? Holy affections are the fruits of the spirit. ing, there is a want of fruit ing in fruit, they are barren. wanting, they are wanting in

And so far as these are want; and so far as christians are wantAnd so far as their affections are life, zeal, and fruitfulness. And

so far as they are wanting in life, and zeal, they are stupid. And for such stupidity and barrenness, which we now see is only a want of a greater measure of holy affection, they blame and condemn themselves; and also the word of God blames them. Why else are they condemned for their barrenness, stupidity, and deadness? This fully proves, that this want or deficiency of holy affection is a sin, in the view of christians, and according to the word of God.

Further. In what way can divine requirements be transgressed, but by a deficiency? Nothing but a want of what is required, can be a transgression of requirements. Need any thing more be said to make it evident, that this want of right affection is a sin? In like manner, all external neglects of duty are sinful. We are required to pray. If this be neglected, the thing required is not done. This neglect, which is nothing but an external deficiency, is sinful; is so considered by men generally, and is thus represented every where in the word of God. The same is true of all external neglects of duty. A neglect of any duty is a deficiency in a person's life, a want, a defect. And there is no way by which a person can live contrary to divine requirements, only to neglect to do what is required. If a person neglect to give to the poor, when it is his duty to give, he has omitted a duty, and has done no more; fo he has not stolen from the poor. Hence a neglect of duty But if he steals from the

implies no more than a mere want. poor, when it was his duty to give, he has both omitted his duty to them, and done what is prohibited. Hence all acts, which are forbidden, imply a breach of the whole law in its requirements, and prohibitions. But omitting a duty is a transgression only of what is required; it does not imply a transgression of what is forbidden. It is now evident, that a want or deficiency in the heart, and a neglect externally of what is required, are each of them sinful, a breach of what the law requires. But as love is the sum of all the law requires, it may afford some light to reflect on what the term implies. Love certainly implies a pleasedness with the object beloved. To say we love an object, is saying we are pleased with it. Pleasure is an agreeable sensation. But what is the foundation of this pleasure; or what is it, which is pleased? It must be something. For we can no more conceive how pleasure, or any affection, can exist without a subject, than we can conceive of an action without an agent. Ifit be said the agent is the subject of the pleasure, and

of every affection; still this is not sufficiently definite. For every moral agent has faculties, different in their nature. The understanding is one faculty. And all agree it is not a feeling faculty; therefore, it is not the subject of pleasure. And the taste, or heart is another faculty; and the only feeling one, which belongs to the human mind. And the sensations of this faculty are always antecedent to voluntary exercises. This faculty then is the subject of that pleasure, which is ever implied in love. As we are required to love God, and this love implies a pleasedness with his character, and such pleasedness cannot exist without a disposition or heart to be pleased, God requires us to have this disposition. Indeed, that we ought to have a disposition or heart to be pleased with the divine character, is a truth so evident, it is presumed no one will deny it.

Another thing implied in love, is a desire for the honor and happiness of the person beloved, and a desire to enjoy his society. This all know to be a fact by experience. Do not all wish well to the object beloved, and wish to possess and enjoy it? Now, when God requires us to love him with all the heart, he requires us to have a disposition at all times to be pleased with his character; and he requires us to be pleased with it, and to have desires for the glory and honor of his name, and to enjoy him forever. For as God requires love, he requires every thing implied in it. But a disposition to be pleased with him, and to desire his glory, and the enjoyment of him, is love. This shows how much is implied in the command, to love God with all the heart. And I here make no other distinction, than what is made in the command itself, by him who knows all things. He considers the heart a distinct thing from love, and antecedent to it. Thou shalt love, with what? With thy heart. The heart then, or what I mean by disposition, is distinguished from love, which is only an operation of the heart. Hence, to require us to love with the heart, is requiring us to have a heart or disposition to love, if we have it not.

And if men have not a disposition to love God, the most essential thing in the requirement is wanting. And if this is wanting, the command is violated; and the person never will love his Maker, till this disposition is created in him. And this want of a disposition to love, or be pleased with the character of God, is the primary imperfection in the moral character of men. I am now ready to attend,

2. To the prohibitions of the moral law,

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