Here the case is parallel with that of selfishness; and for the same reason we must view selfishness sinful, we must consider the appetite of hunger sinful.

Again, to indulge or gratify self to a certain degree, is a duty. But to indulge selfbeyond a certain degree, is sinful; it is indulging self too much. Here its sinfulness consists in an excess of indulgence. So it is no sin, to indulge hunger to a certain degree. But to indulge it beyond this degree, is sinful. And its sinfulness consists in an excess of indulgence. Here the cases are parallel. And for the same reason we view selfishness sinful, we must consider the appetite of hunger sinful.

Again. When a principle of selfishness is indulged, in using unlawful means to obtain the objects which are agreeable to self, it is sinful. Here its sinfulness does not consist in using lawful means to obtain its desired objects, or ends; but in using unlawful, unjust means. So it is not sinful, for hunger to use lawful means to get food; but when it uses unlawful means, it is sinful. Here the cases are parellel.

Again. Will selfishness give rise to a thousand desires, such as a desire for money, cattle, land, elegant houses and furniture? And will a multiplicity of such desires take off the attention too much from religion, and place it too much on the world; and is this sinful? In like manner, hunger will give rise to a train of such secondary desires for money, land, cattle, and every thing necessary to procuring food, and enjoying it in an elegant manner. These desires will perplex, take off the attention too much from religion, and place it too much on the world. Here again the cases are parallel.

Again. If a selfish man is opposed in his pursuits by others, this will produce in him anger, hatred, revenge, and such malignant passions; a principle, which will give rise to such malignant passions, is sinful. In like manner, if others oppose a man in his pursuits to gratify his hunger, the same malignant passions will rise in his heart. And if selfishness is sinful, because it will give rise, if opposed, to such malignant passions; then the appetite of hunger is sinful; for it will operate in the same manner, and give rise, if opposed, to the same passions. And this is what we daily see in fact. So that here the cases are parallel.

And there is no light in which this subject can be viewed, I believe, but we shall find that every reason, which can be as

signed to prove selfishness to be sinful, but what will equally prove the appetite of hunger to be sinful; and every other appetite, or natural affection, with which we are born.

I have under this particular granted, for the sake of light, that there is such a principle of selfishness in all men, as many contend for, which is the root of all sin.-At the same time, I do not believe in such a principle. I suppose every appetite with which we are born is selfish. The man, for instance, who is governed by the appetite of hunger, has no other or higher end in view, than the gratification of this personal appetite. In doing this, he has no regard to the happiness of other persons, unless near relatives whom he considers as part of himself. Whether others are benefitted or injured, he will gratify himself by indulging this appetite. And can we conceive of any thing more highly selfish than this? In like manner, every other appetite in men is selfish. So that selfishness does not consist in one single individual principle of action. It may be predicated of every appetite, with which we are born. They are all in this sense selfish, that men under the influence of them will not seek any higher good than the gratification of their appetites; and in doing this they have no regard to the happiness of others; and will, by unlawful means, injure them to gratify their appetites. And this is proved by daily and numerous facts.

Furthermore. If a man had a principle of self-love in him, according to the opinion of many; at the same time was constantly governed by a principle of benevolence, his selfish principle would never be gratified in any of the above cases to an excess, and no further than it ought to be indulged. This is certain, if he is governed in all he does by benevolence. In this case his self-love would not do any hurt, or produce any evil effects. And the same is true of all our appetites, so long as we are governed by benevolence. Hence, no appetite will produce any evil effects in any man, until benevolence is wanting wholly, or in such a degree as not to be all the time the governing principle. So that the privation of holiness wholly, or in part, must take place, before any principles in men will produce any evil effects; except in cases where they are so far deceived as to believe that is right, which is wrong.

It appears to me that enough has been said to show what sin is; or in what total depravity consists. And according to the doctrine advanced in this essay it is evident, that the depravity of the heart consists-1. In the entire want of a principle of

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And

benevolence, or holiness. And this want is the primary deficiency, or imperfection in the moral character of man. this privation of holiness must take place, previous to the existence of any positive acts of sin, except in cases of deception. And

2. In the existence and operation of those appetites with which we are born. The tendency of these is to sin, to excesses in all the ways described, where there is no principle of holiness. Then these appetites prefer this world to God and heavenly things; lead men to indulge them to an excess in the objects they love; and to the use of unlawful means to obtain such objects. And these two principles, the want of holiness, and the appetites implanted in us, will account for all the sins and crimes ever perpetrated in this world. And this scheme is fully taught and supported by the word of God. Why will not men come to Christ? Because they see no beauty in him to attract them; and because they love this world, and prefer it to Christ and to heaven. Why will they not come to the gospel supper, when so often invited? Because that supper contains nothing which is agreeable to any other, than a holy heart. They refuse to come, and go after the world, their farms and merchandize; because those objects please and gratify their appetites. They serve the creature, and not the Creator, for the same reasons. And with this representation the whole word of God harmonizes. So that we have both scripture and reason, to vindicate the sentiments advanced in these sheets.

This manner of accounting for the passions and actions of men, is more satisfactory to my mind than the scheme which imputes to man a principle of positive malignity. Disinterested malevolence; or that disposition which takes pleasure in the misery of others, independently of our own interest, is too diabolical to be admitted as existing in the human breast. It is the perfect opposite of the spirit of holy and disinterested benevolence. And when the love of God and man is wanting, all the other principles of our nature become devoted to transgression, and arrange us on the side of rebellion, and lay us under wrath with the devils themselves. But it is not necessary to suppose, that a cruel and fiend-like disposition is the ruling principle of fallen man. Departing from God, he becomes selfish; and all his affections are indulged for the gratification of selfishness, and contrary to the divine prohibitions and requirements. Meeting with opposition in his favorite pursuits, both from his fellow

wen, and from the providence and word of God, his passions become malignant, and he indulges in deeds of injustice, cruelty, and revenge. This mode of accounting for such malignancy appears to me to agree with facts that pass under our observation, even including the deliberate cruelties of savages and of despots.

ESSAY XXI.

On the subject of praise and blameworthiness.

We ought, in the first place, to have clear and distinct ideas of what is implied in praising and blaming persons.

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If a person sustains a good character, we say he is worthy of praise. What does praising him imply? It implies-1. That we judge his character to be what it is, really good. This is an act of the understanding. This is the faculty, which judges concerning truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and bad characters. 2. That we approve of a good character, justify it, are pleased with it. This is an act of the heart. It is the heart, which likes, or dislikes, is pleased, or displeased. So it comes to pass often, from the influence of a bad heart, that good characters are disliked. 3. That we treat the person well; so that our conduct corresponds with his real character. treat him well, is to make him happy as far as we are able. This is not always done; good characters are often treated very ill. But this is a great inconsistency. If we judge a character to be good, which really is; and approve it; and treat the person accordingly, we do every thing implied in praising him. In this sense God the Judge will praise good men at the judgment day. He will judge their characters to be what they are, really good. He will approve them, and love them. And he will treat them well, or make them happy. This is praising and honoring them before an assembled universe; greater honor cannot be done them.

Blaming is the reverse of this. If a character is really bad, a sinful character, it deserves blame. And judging it to be what it really is, disapproving or hating it, and treating it according to what it is, is blaming the person. In this sense God will blame the wicked at the judgment day. Their characters are bad; he will judge them bad; he will disapprove and hate them; he will make them miserable. This will be blaming them in the highest sense. Greater censure cannot be shown a person, than to pronounce him wicked, hate him, and treat him accordingly. These are the things implied in praising and blaming men.

And now the question arises, what properties are requisite, to render a being a proper object of praise and blame, in this sense? For we do not consider all beings, or existences, worthy of praise and blame. The sun may be termed a good being. It is daily doing good in many ways, and diffusing happiness through the world. But we do not consider the sun a proper object of praise. We consider a pestilence, or plague as a great evil. Yet we do not consider it a'proper object of blame, or censure. But we consider good men as proper objects of praise; and bad men as objects of blame or censure. Why do we make this distinction? Because we view man as endued with every property, necessary to render him a proper object of praise or blame. But the sun, and the plague, we consider as devoid of all these properties; and hence they are not proper objects of praise and blame.

Then we ought to inquire, what properties are necessary to render a being a proper object of praise and blame; and why they are requisite? This we have done in previous lectures. In order to have them now distinctly in view, it may not be amiss to enumerate them. These properties are the faculties of the understanding, taste and will. It has been shown why each one of them is requisite, and the reasons have been assigned.

To be brief in a recapitulation; the understanding is necessary, because it is the only perceiving faculty, the eye of the mind, and its only eye. This faculty can see ends, and means; it can arrange, and connect means, in the best manner adapted to the end we wish to seek; or it can form plans of operation; show us the right and wrong way; and thus prepare us to act with aim and design in all we do; and it can discern the wisdom or folly of every being's conduct.

The taste is a faculty which feels; is the subject of all our