thing we mean by the heart or taste. If there be this capacity, not only pleasure and pain, but all the affections or desires, must be its operations, distinct from, and antecedent to, volitions.

Their other way to support an apparent consistency is, by making their distinction between immanent and imperate acts. According to this distinction, all the operations of the mind are formed into three distinct classes-perceptions, affections, and volitions. Then, if they deny the existence of faculties, yet they are obliged to admit three distinct classes of operations or exercises. And these are so different from each other, that the class, which they call immanent acts, which includes all our affections or desires, includes also all vice and virtue, and all the principles and springs of action. Hence, on their own ground, they make all vice and virtue, and the moral character of man, to consist in operations or exercises, which are antecedent to that class, which they call imperate acts. In this way the only grand difference between them and us is this; we admit faculties, to which these classes of operations belong; and they deny their existence. For if they admit faculties, they must embrace our system; or refer classes of operations, very different from each other even in their moral nature, as well as in other respects, to the same faculty. This is very unphilosophical, and creates confusion in the study of the human mind. In fact they have no way to maintain a plausible consistency, only in some form or other to admit the very fundamental sentiments, for which we contend; yet, while they in fact admit them, they in words deny them. Whereas, if they only granted the existence of such a faculty as the heart, distinct from the will, they might then with ease and consistency be on Calvinistic ground.

Objection 5th. Some may say. the system advanced in these essays represents the appetite of hunger, and all the appetites with which we are born, as being in their nature sinful, in all who are unrenewed, and even in christians. But this cannot be true. For almost every person,in every age, has considered such natural appetites as innocent and harmless. Hence the system advanced must be radically erroneous.

Answer. The particular ends and purposes, for which these appetites were created and implanted in us, has been already shown. Hence there is no need of repeating here any thing to answer the objection. Something also has been said which is connected with this subject, in the essay on the nature of sin.

Accordingly, but few observations more are needful, to answer the present objection.

It will be necessary for the reader to keep steadily in view the idea often expressed, what constitutes the primary imperfection in moral characters. That is, the total privation of the moral image of God, or of all supreme love to God, and that love to our neighbor which the law requires. A character, perfectly destitute of that love to God and man which the law requires, is an imperfect, sinful, character. In this sin primarily consists. For, until there is a want of this love, in whole or in part, it is impossible for sin in any sense to exist in the heart of man; unless we consider as sinful those seeds or principles, which may become corrupt, when the moral image of God is lost.

It will be well also to reflect, that every thing is good or evil in its nature, according to its tendency. Hence, although a particular principle, in one condition, does not by its tendency produce any evil; yet in a different condition, and under different circumstances, its tendency is to evil daily. When this is the case, if we judge correctly concerning the nature of things by their tendency, we must consider that principle to be sinful, which tends daily to a transgression of the law. If no rain were to fall and water the earth, and the sun should continue shining with all its burning rays, would you predicate good of it? Would you say, a sun in this condition was a great blessing, or a great evil? If no water replenished the earth, heat would tend to the production of evil. Here, the primary fault consists in the want of rain.

Before Adam sinned, his appetite of hunger was under the influence of benevolence, or love to God. It would, then, never be indulged to excess in eating or drinking, nor in using any unlawful means to obtain food. Hence its operation would be harmless, and harmonize with the influence of benevolence.

But when he was wholly deprived of the moral image of God, then food was one of the supreme objects of his heart's desire. Food now occupied the same place in his heart, which God had filled, when his supreme affection was set on him. Now hunger has the entire government. He seeks food for no other end or purpose, than to remove the pain of hunger, preserve his life, and enjoy the pleasure which eating affords. He has nothing to restrain him from eating and drinking to excess, or from using unlawful means to obtain food. For, however much he may

dishonor God, or injure men, in gratifying this appetite; yet this does not restrain him, or give him any uneasiness, in case he can do it with impunity. For he has no love for God or man; and hence no desire to honor his Maker, and do good to men. So far as other appetites do not interfere, and fear of future punishment in this world do not restrain him, there is nothing to prevent his eating to excess, and using any means however unlawful or injurious to others in obtaining food, which is now the supreme object of his heart, and his god. And while men continue in this condition, with hearts unrenewed, the tendency of this appetite is to evil only, to excess in eating, and the use of unlawful means to obtain food. And how often has it, in fact, prompted one to steal; another to rob men on the highway; another to commit murder to get money; and another to lie, defraud, and oppress, when the end has been no other than to obtain food to eat, and feast this appetite. So long as he lives within the bounds of temperance, and uses only lawful means to acquire food, this appetite in its operations is innocent and lawful. But the appetite itself will never keep men, long at a time, within such limits. Its tendency is to exceed them, and indulge itself in riotous living. As it does in fact operate in this manner, where there is no love for God or men, who can say it is not sinful, but always innocent in its nature? And the observations now made, with regard to this appetite, will apply to all the other appetites with which we are born. They all seek their respective objects as their supreme good, and seek them often to great excess, and by unlawful means; so they are daily transgressing the divine law, and disturbing the peace and happiness of society.

These sentiments must be received as true; or we must admit, that when Adam lost the moral image of God, He created in him a positive, sinful principle, such as some term selfishness. Let it be admitted this was the fact, for the present. What will be the tendency and operations of this selfishness? Will it love and regard self supremely, and place its affections supremely on this world ? This is the very fact with respect to our other appetites. Will it seek this world as its only portion? This is true of our appetites. Will it seek the world to excess, and by unlawful means? Thus our appetites in fact operate. Will it move a man to commit crimes, crimes of the deepest stain? This our appetites move us in fact to do. View this selfishness in what light we may, its tendency, nature, and op

erations are the very same with the tendency, nature, and operation of our appetites, as has been represented. Its nature then is the same; and there is no difference between the two, only in words. Call then our appetites principles of selfishness, as they really are; and then these appetites constitute the only selfishness we are in fact acquainted with, or any where see in operation. Hence the only difference between the systems advanced, and a principle of selfishness for which some contend, is merely concerning the nature of selfishness. And concerning this, from what has been said, we see there is in reality no difference. Andis it not more consistent with the moral character of God, to believe he created in Adam all the principles of action he would need, and all he ever designed to create in him, when he first gave him being; than to suppose, that when the image of God was lost, He then created in him a sinful, active principle? Our system supposes no alteration took place in Adam, but the loss of the divine image; in consequence of which, all his other appetites were placed supremely on this world, and led him and his posterity away from God the living fountain of waters. If this be admitted, then the objection be fore us is fully answered. I have now replied to all the objections, worthy of particular notice, which have come to my knowledge.

An Examination of the ideas of Rhetoricians, concerning a Taste for beauty, novelty, & grandeur.

Rhetoricians commonly define Taste, to be a power of deriving pleasure or pain from objects of nature and art; and consider beauty aud sublimity to be sources of the greatest pleasures afforded to it.

I believe they have never considered this power, as they call it, a distinct faculty of the mind; nor attended to its operations in this light. When we read what authors have said on this

subject, their taste, and what we call taste or the heart, are evidently the same property of the mind. Pleasure and pain, emotions, affections, passions, desires, are the operations of what they call taste. In this they agree with us. To me it appears very clear, that their taste, and what is called by the same name in these essays, are the same power, property or faculty. They have reflected great light on this branch of intellectual philosophy, But they have treated the subject, as it appears to me, in a too restricted and limited sense. The deficiencies of writers on the subject of taste, as far as my reading has extended, it is proposed here to point out.

1. They have not attended to it as a distinct faculty of the mind, with sufficient precision. Hence a reader, after he has perused all they have to say, is ready to ask such important questions as the following; do they consider taste to be one of the faculties of the mind, as they do the understanding, or not? Do they consider it a power belonging to some faculty? If they do, to what faculty do they view this power as belonging? The reader might say, I find no answer to these questions so definite as to afford conviction, and still have doubts concerning the answers they would now give to them. This deficiency clouds the subject with greater or less obscurity. They exhibit a train of thoughts connected with each other, but to what general system do they belong? How can I connect them with other branches or parts of intellectual philosophy, so as to retain them, and see the place they occupy in a system?

The several parts or branches of any particular science, form one general system. And when all the parts are so arranged, that the place each part occupies, with their relation to, and connexions with each other from the beginning to the end, are easily and clearly seen, then the whole appears more plain and convincing, is far more easily remembered and reviewed, when occasion requires it, and lays a foundation for a further improvement of the system. Taste is one branch of the philosophy of the mind. In order for us to see its connexion with the other branches of this subject, so as to have our ideas systematically arranged, it seems to be necessary to determine clearly, whether taste is, or is not, á faculty of the mind. This point not being fully settled, presents a deficiency, which must render all that is said by writers, in certain respects, very obscure. And this will appear more evident, as we pass along in our observations.