adore Him, who doeth, all these things; must rejoice with humble gratitude, and divine joy, in all the stupendous displays of his goodness; must tremble at the terrible things, which he doeth in righteousness, when his judgments are abroad in the earth; and must, on every occasion, be ready to exclaim: Who is like unto thee, O Lord: glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders?

SERMON VIII.

BENEVOLENCE OF GOD PROVED FROM THE WORKS OF CREATION AND PROVIDENCE.

1 JOHN iv. 8.-For God is love.

HAVING considered the existence, and the natural attributes, of God, at some length; I shall now proceed to the next subject of theological inquiry; viz. his moral attributes. In the order, best suited to the method of discussion, which I have preferred, that, which first offers itself for examination, is his Benevolence.

This perfection is ascribed to God in the text, in a singular manner. It is not asserted, that God is benevolent, but that he is Benevolence; or that Benevolence is the essence, the sum, of his being and character. The force, and beauty, of this assertion, will be felt by every one, who attends to it, without any remarks from me.

That Ayan signifies the kind of Love, which in English is called Benevolence, will not, I presume, be questioned. If any one is at a loss concerning this fact; he may be satisfied by reading St. Paul's extensive definition of this word, contained in the 13th chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians.

In canvassing this important subject, I propose to inquire in what manner it is exhibited to us, in the

I. place, by Reason; and

II. by Revelation.

I. I propose to inquire in what manner it is exhibited to us by Rea

son.

In examining this part of the subject I shall

1st. Allege several arguments, furnished by Reason, in proof of the Benevolence of God; and

2dly. Answer the principal Objections to this Doctrine.

The importance of the question, Whether God is a Benevolent Being, is no less than infinite. Every thing, therefore, which seriously affects it, must be of high moment to every Intelligent creature. The decisions of Reason on this subject, undoubtedly affect the question in a serious manner; and are of course very interesting to us. Although I can by no means admit, with many of my fellow-men, respectable for their understanding and worth, that the Benevolence of God is not capable of being completely proved, or that it is not in fact completely proved, by the Scriptures, independently of all other sources of argument; yet I cannot help believing, that, if the proof furnished by Reason be satisfactory also, and can be fairly exhibited as satisfactory, the minds of many men,

at least, will rest on this subject with a conviction more unmingled, a confidence less exposed to danger and disturbance. To compass this object, if it can be compassed, will, then, be very desirable.

It is hardly necessary for me to observe, that the question, concerning the amount of the evidence, which Reason gives concerning this doctrine, has long been, and is still, disputed. It is well known to many of this audience, that Divines and other Christians, as well as other men, differ in their opinions about it; and that the proofs of the divine benevolence from Reason are regarded by many persons of reputation as insufficient. I have myself entertained, heretofore, opinions on this subject, different from those, which I now entertain. As I have not seen it discussed in such a manner, as satisfied my own wishes; I shall now consider it with more particularity, than might otherwise be necessary.

The Self-existence, Eternity, Immutability, Omnipresence, Omniscience, and Omnipotence, of God have, I flatter myself, been clearly proved by arguments, derived from Reason. From these attributes it has, I trust, been unanswerably evinced, that God is absolutely independent; that all things, which can be done, or enjoyed, are in his power and possession; and that he can neither need, nor receive any thing. From these considerations it is evident in the

1st. place, That God can have no possible motive to be malevolent. It will not be pretended, that the nature of things can furnish any such motive. That to be malevolent is a more desirable character or state of being, than to be benevolent, cannot be asserted, nor believed. Nor can any motive to this character be presented to God from without himself, or from other beings. As all other beings, together with every thing pertaining to them, are, and cannot but be, just what he pleases; it is certain, that he can gain nothing to himself by the exercise of malevolence. Finite beings may discern good in the hands of others, which they may covet, and at the same time be hindered from possessing, unless by the indulgence of fraud, injustice, or unkindness; or by attacking, and injuring, such, as prevent from gaining the beloved object. Those who possess it, they may envy, or hate. Those, who hinder them from gaining it, they may regard with resentment or anger; and, under the influence of these malignant passions, may be induced to disturb their rights, and invade their happiness. But it is plain, that these considerations can have no more application to God, than the circumstances, which give them birth. All good is actually in his possession: there is, therefore, nothing left for him to desire. All beings and events are exactly such, as he chooses either to produce, or to permit; and such as he chose, antecedently to their existence. He can, therefore, have nothing to fear, or to malign. As he gave all, which is possessed by other beings; he can evidently neither gain, nor receive any thing. If he be malevolent, then, he must sustain this character without a motive.

2dly. An Omniscient Being cannot but see, that it is more glorious to himself, and more beneficial to his creatures, to sustain, and to exhibit, a benevolent character, than its contrary: or, in other words, in every respect more desirable.

The glory of the Creator and the good of his creatures involve every thing, that is desirable. That this character, in its existence and exercise, is on both these accounts more desirable than its contrary, cannot be questioned. We, narrow as our faculties are, perfectly know this truth. It is, therefore, absolutely desirable. That this truth must be seen by an Omniscient Being, in a manner infinitely superior to that, in which we see it, hardly needs to be asserted.

The desirableness of this conduct, arising from the glory of the Creator and the good of his creatures, seems to present, when we consider it as extending through Eternity, an infinite motive to the Creator, to cherish a benevolent character, and to manifest it in all his conduct. To the power of this motive there is at the same time, no motive opposed. On the contrary, we know, and the Creator, in a manner infinitely more perfect, knows, that the existence and exercise of a malevolent character would be infinitely dishonourable to himself, and in the progress of Eternity infinitely injurious to his creatures. Each of these considerations presents to the Creator an infinite motive to exercise Benevolence on the one hand, and not to exercise malevolence on the other. If, then, he has in facɩ exercised malevolence; he has done it without any motive, and against the influence of both these: each of them of infinite importance.

Thus it is I think clearly certain, that God cannot be induced to exercise a malevolent spirit, because malevolence is in itself a desirable character; nor because the nature of things offers any enjoyment, which, upon the whole, is good, to the indulgence of this disposition; nor because He does not perfectly know these truths. If he is malevolent, then, he is so from an original, inherent propensity in his own nature; a propensity, uninfluenced by truth, and immoveable by motives.

How far such a character can be rationally supposed to be possible in a being, who has all things in his power, it is difficult to determine. The observations, already made, clearly prove, that such a being must discern with absolute certainty the infinite disadvantage of indulging this spirit. The difference between rejoicing in all his works, as means of glory to himself, with a consciousness, that he has formed and conducted them to this exalted end, and feeling the gloomy, dreadful pain of boundless malice, is in itself obviously boundless. If, then, God has not chosen this enjoyment; he has failed to choose it, with a clear discernment, that it was in his power, and under the influence of a disposition, which would not yield to conviction, nor to motives, infinite in their magnitude. That he has not exercised this disposition I shall now proceed to show; and for this purpose observe,

3dly. The only conduct, which a Creator can receive with pleasure from his creatures, must plainly be attachment, reverence, and the voluntary obedience which they produce.

Whether the Creator be benevolent, or malevolent; it is impossible, that he should not choose to be loved, reverenced, and obeyed. But the real Creator has so formed his works, and so constituted his Providence, that the minds of men, irresistibly, and of absolute necessity, esteem a benevolent being more than one of the opposite character. I do not mean, here, that this is the dictate of the heart; but I mean, that it is the unavoidable dictate of the intellect; of the conscience and understanding. The intellect is so formed by the Creator, that it is impossible for it to think otherwise. Any person, who will make the attempt, will find it beyond his power to approve of malevolence at all. If, therefore, the Creator be malevolent, he has so formed his Intelligent creatures in this world, that they cannot possibly esteem his character. In other words, he has made them incapable, by a natural necessity, of rendering to him that regard, which in itself, or in its consequences, is the only possible conduct, on the part of his Intelligent creatures, which a Creator can have proposed, when he gave them

existence.

Should it be objected, that Benevolence is estimable in the nature of things; that to see its nature is the same thing as to esteem it; and that, therefore, Intelligent creatures cannot avoid experiencing this esteem: I answer, Should it be granted, as I think it must, that all this is true, still an Omnipotent Creator might, for ought that appears, have formed Intelligent creatures with such optics, with powers of understanding so directed, that they might have seen his character in an estimable light. Hypochondriacal and insane minds are direct proofs, that minds can exist, with directly opposite views to those, which Intelligent creatures in this world usually experience. Nor is there any evidence, that an Omnipotent being could not so form Intelligent creatures, as to vary their modes of perception in any manner, and to any extent, which pleased him. At the same time it is perfectly obvious, that, as we are wholly passive in receiving ideas and impressions, he might, with entire ease, have given us just such ideas as he pleased, by presenting to us only those objects, from which they would be derived. In this manner he might have prevented us from forming any conceptions of his moral character; and led us only to admire his Omniscience and Omnipotence, in the stupendous works, which they are capable of producing. This, it is believed, involves no contradiction; and every thing, which does not involve a contradiction, such a Being can confessedly perform.

Should the scheme, which I have here suggested, not be admitted; I answer again: There was no necessity, that he should create Intelligent beings at all; and there is no conceivable motive, which could induce an infinite Being to form Intelligent creatures,. VOL. I.

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