to three commanding hills on the right, which rise abruptly, and form strong points; but the ground again beyond is open, intersected by roads in all directions, and I can see no impediment to the enemy moving round us here, if their columns of infantry can cope against our masses of cavalry in the plain.

Reports of their movements are contradictory and vague. Yesterday I heard, from an intelligent prisoner, that Buonaparte was in person in the camp opposite Bautzen, that Beauharnois' corps, Marmont's, and troops of the Rhine Confederation, were with him, and that he meditated an immediate attack. To-day, from the reports of one of our reconnoitring parties, they do not imagine that more than 30,000 men are immediately opposite in our front. This calm, however, is the forerunner of some great event; and, before you receive this, the destinies of many may be decided. I am not satisfied with the interior of things in the Russian army. The Emperor should do one thing or another-either command or keep entirely out of the way. As it is, both his Imperial Majesty and the King mar and confound the arrangements, and this is visible. Wittgenstein, having failed in carrying things as triumphantly as was expected when he assumed the command, has a strong party against him, being so junior an officer to others serving under him. Barclay de Tolly, who commanded at Borodino, and under whom Wittgenstein served, arrived yesterday, and is placed en sécond. This is a strong case, and cabal is not surprising.

The Prussians are in good order under their Allies, as the Portuguese are in the Peninsula with us, and the King may be compared to our Portuguese Marshal, who attends on the great Star, which puts the whole in motion. Depressed both from public and private misfortune, the King lives much secluded with his aide-de-camps and staff; and Hardenberg, as I have already told you, is in the hands of Stein and Nesselrode, and remains with the Bureaux now at Görlitz. Since Stadion's arrival, these Ministers have been hard at work,

forming new notes, in which the terms of pacification and mediation are laid down. Lord Cathcart being, I conclude, au fait at all that is going on, and having the intention of writing to you fully, it is better for me, not knowing anything officially, not to enter into any detail imperfectly. Lord Cathcart seems confident of Austria; and accounts from Vienna, after the battle of Lützen, (knowing the retreat of the Allies) make no difference.

Stadion, in the interview I had with him, talked of Prince Schwarzenberg having very much expedited the preparations. Their two armies in Italy and Bohemia he estimated at 150,000 men. He regretted the necessity of the Allies having passed the Elbe; declared it his opinion they should now fight the enemy, and gave me the impression that he conceived that the more battles that were fought the better for Austria.

The 1st of June is the time fixed for the Austrians moving. Still the fate of the armies may be decided before that period. It is a curious game for a great nation to play-to procrastinate, I fear, by futile negociations, which, to judge from the past, will never avail, and thus lose the only opportunity ever afforded her of acting with effect. If her troops were to débouch now-and why should they not? for it is absurd to suppose a large force must not be ready-the French dare not advance. What policy but a deep game can keep her from acting instantaneously, if she really desires to be effectual? It is troops in the field that will procure peace, and not Stadion with the gout at our head-quarters, and Count Bubna in Buonaparte's camp. (I understand he arrived at Dresden on the 15th with a similar mission to Stadion's.) I may calculate all this erroneously, and those behind the curtain may know more. But it is so like the game Austria played before, it is difficult not to have doubts.

Our subsidiary Convention proceeds slowly. I send you, in a separate private letter, the substance of what has occurred since my last. last. I do not foresee that my ideas, as before detailed

to you, will not be borne out and warranted by the ultimate issue. I have the points with Prussia chiefly to fight myself, as Lord Cathcart thinks them less momentous; indeed, the whole of this has been very dilatory, and I see no end to it; but this is not my fault.

A report, received last night at the outposts from an officer who was made prisoner, states that the main body of the enemy has passed on routes that bear upon Cüstrin and Frankfort.

May 19th.

Lord Cathcart having delayed Mr. Rouse Boughton enables me to add the intelligence of yesterday. The enemy have moved on different routes towards the Oder. The corps of Regnier is at Lückau and Lübben. Buonaparte himself, with Victor, is stated to have marched on Berlin. If this intelligence is correct, and it came from the King of Prussia's aid-decamp, I do not comprehend our remaining long here. We should march to our right, and attempt something offensive, or ensure our communications. The amount of our force in position is not more than 70,000 effectives; we have from 600 to 900 pieces of cannon.

The Russian and Prussian note contains, I hear, a good deal of mummery. Hardenberg has not yet given it me: it is to be sent to Paris, and then to Buonaparte, and on its return the Austrian declaration is to be issued. This, however, will take a fortnight or three weeks, and much may happen in the interim. It is rumoured that General Sacken has had an action with the Poles, and it would argue that that country is in insurrection, and would join France.

Your news from the Lower Elbe you will have more direct from Mr. Cockburn, so I shall not touch upon it.

May 20th.

I am enabled, by the further detention of Mr. Boughton, to send you in an official letter the accounts of Barclay de Tolly's

success on the evening of yesterday. Au reste, we are in statu

quo.

Another conference on our Convention took place yesterday evening. The points of contention that principally exist

are

1st. As to the force to be kept up by Russia and Prussia. The latter would accede to 100,000 men. The former wishes to confine her number to 150,000 men. I know not how her quota will be approximated in the discussions to 200,000. Lord Cathcart with every exertion will not get it up, I fear, to more than 170 or 180,000 men. Prussia will then only agree to be pledged to the half. They both wished to take the numbers of the Treaty of Kalish as their mark.

2nd. Our two millions are specified to be payable in London. They urge the payment on the Continent, and insist on knowing how and where they are to be paid, whether in pièces sonnantes, or in paper. We have no detailed instructions on this head. I instanced Sweden, and said I conceived the subsidy not taken in effects would be paid in a similar manner.

3rd. The differences I have already mentioned in my letter of the 17th on the federative paper. They press the solidaritè and credit of the whole five millions to be taken by Great Britain, she having the separate guarantee of the other Powers for their quota: and this they say has been intimated by Count Lieven; "the returning the paper on our market against bills of Exchequer" they have given up.

4th. The Hanoverian objects. Hardenberg withdrew his first unofficial projet of a secret and separate article, and presented another, of which I enclose a copy (A). I strongly remonstrated, and urged against his having gone to a certain length, and that he now was retreating instead of advancing. He declared he had at first not consulted the King; having done so, he found him quite impracticable. I declared I must be so too. He then took back this article, and presented me No. 2 (B), and this is the shape in which it stands. Nessel

rode says Russia has done all she can, nor do I believe it can be brought nearer our wishes.

Hardenberg pressed me again on a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, and said, if we have not been at war, the restitution of Prussian ships taken must take place; besides, other arrangements were necessary. To all I replied I had no authority; but anything he gave me in a formal shape I would transmit home.

I have gone into these details privately, and perhaps unnecessarily, indeed before any joint mode of communication and representation with Lord Cathcart has been fixed on. But they will mark out the course of proceedings, and enable you the earlier to send your ideas on points that may not ultimately be carried through as we wish; and, if I have touched in any degree on any part of the Russian arrangements with which I have no concern, it has arisen entirely unintentionally, and merely to give you, privately, as much information as possible.

I hope my having foreseen and written very early from Dresden on all the chief difficulties we are now coping with will furnish instructions from home so much the sooner. Ever, my dearest Castlereagh,

Yours most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-General.

[Enclosure A.]

Article Séparé et Secret.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant dans ses transactions avec la Prusse mis expressement en réserve les droits de la maison de Brunswie-Lunebourg sur le Hanovre, s'y engage encore d'une manière plus positive par le présent article secret. Il promet en outre de s'employer efficacement au moment de la paix, de procurer en Allemagne à la dite maison une aequisition territoriale d'une population de 250 à 300 mille âmes,