recognised by the French nation in that character, these discussions will be pursued to their legitimate conclusion.

Whatever Great Britain might feel of increased confidence in signing a peace with the ancient family restored to the throne of their ancestors, it belongs not to her to excite or originate a change, which, to be stable, must be the act of the nation; and from the result of which, involving, as it must do, the personal safety of individuals, as well as the fortunes of a great nation, it is not for her to make herself responsible. So far as the British Government may be entitled, without an unbecoming interference, to express an opinion, or a wish, upon an event of such a nature, they would most strongly deprecate a recurrence, on the part of the French nation, (if Bonaparte should cease to rule) to any intermediate system, whether of Regency, or of substituting another military chief in his room.

Such a state of things would, in all human probability, be merely transitory, probably troubled, and most certainly weak. It might again divide Europe, as apparently tending to connect France too closely with one of the greater military Powers, and ultimately lead, through new convulsions, to the return of the ancient family, as the only remedy to rival and conflicting pretensions.

You may, at your discretion, open these views of this question to the Prince Royal; and I trust that, if there is to be a change, his Royal Highness, from a regard for the repose of the nation which gave him birth, would be disposed to employ his influence to give it a direction which could occasion umbrage to none of the Cabinets of Europe. Such would be the effect of the return of the Bourbons-such is likely to be the effect of Bonaparte's dreaded authority; namely, to preserve, as a defence to Europe, the system of union that has saved it.

You may state that no peace is looked to by Great Britain which does not substantially reduce France within her ancient limits, and that, to facilitate such an arrangement in favour of

the Continent, Great Britain will be disposed to act most liberally towards France, being desirous to give such a peace stability, by rendering the arrangement at once honourable to France, and such as may promote her prosperity.

You may also apprize his Royal Highness that it is the intention of the Allies to annex the Low Countries, at least as far as the Meuse, to Holland. Less of territory would be insufficent to uphold the army requisite to defend her barrier, which is indispensable for her own security and that of the North of Germany. The experience of former times sufficiently proves how feeble that line of defence must be for any country, which is held by confederates of clashing interests.

I am not aware that any further explanations are at present called for. Sweden may, as heretofore, rely upon a friendly support from Great Britain in the pending negociations: the point of Guadaloupe may make some difficulty; and it is highly satisfactory to me to know that the Prince Royal is disposed to afford facilities. It may possibly be necessary to propose some exchange on this point. The British Government will not fail, however, to use its good offices to render the concession made by them to Sweden in this instance conducive to her future interests.

In giving you authority to open yourself upon these points, you will understand that it is not meant as an injunction, but a permission. You will do it with caution, and, as far as you can, upon a previous knowledge of the system of measures in which the Prince Royal may be at the moment embarked. I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, February 8, 1814.

The

My dear Lord-The accompanying papers will acquaint with all that I can inform you of since I last wrote. you draft of the despatch No. 29, sent to England by the last

packet, and the draft of that, No. 32, which will go to-morrow to your address in London, will show you that I have been obliged to have a little brush with this Government.

There is an unfortunate besoin de faire in his Royal Highness which is to be compared to nothing I have ever seen, except the same disposition in his Minister, M. de Hogendorp; added to which, the latter seems to be unfortunately impressed with the erroneous notion that trick and ruse form the principal qualifications of an accomplished Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that these are to be used equally towards those who are struggling to accomplish, as towards those who are endeavouring to counterwork, the object they may have in view.

I hope the effect of what has been endeavoured to be done through the instrumentality of the rabble in the Low Countries, will not embarrass your negociations; that you will think I have been right in the line I have taken; and that, if so, these attempts will not again be furtively made: indeed, against this I am tolerably well guarded by the information I shall receive through Mr. Johnson and others now present in those provinces.

From Graham I have heard nothing since the morning of the 4th. At that time, little effect had been perceived from the bombardment of the day before. All that Graham conveys in his note of the 4th you will find in the accompanying draft of my despatch No. 31, and at the close of my private letter to Liverpool of the 5th, both herewith sent.

Yours, my dear Lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Since writing the above, the despatch of which I enclose a copy has reached me from Graham. He adds, in his private note to me, that he has agreed to take up a line in front of Breda, in order to assist in keeping up the line of communication with General Bülow for some time; at least, till he shall be strong enough to act alone. I understand that

it is proposed that the Saxons are to co-operate with Graham; but this, I fear, will not raise his force to the amount capable of operating offensively against Antwerp, as long as they consist only of those already advanced into the United Provinces, which, as I am informed, only reach 7,000 men.

Adieu! many thanks for your permitted perusal of your interesting despatches.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Clancarty to Lord Liverpool.

The Hague, February 5, 1814. My dear Lord-I most sincerely congratulate you on the capitulation of Gorcum, which, now that I am informed of the outline of the terms, I the more rejoice at, in consequence of some conversation which I had on Thursday last both with M. Fagel (the Ambassador) and the Prince of Orange. The former called upon me at an early hour on that day, stating that he came to me directly from the Prince, in order to represent to me that hostilities had been renewed, after a short cessation of arms, between the troops blockading that place and the garrison of Gorcum; that the power of overflooding the whole of the rich country of the Albasser Waert was in the hands of the enemy; that an exertion of this power would ruin thousands, and necessitate advances from the State, which must necessarily cramp their exertions in the common cause, unless aided by us; that the tenacity of the garrison could only be attributed to their fear of being made prisoners of war; and that he was commissioned by the Prince to consult me on the propriety of offering terms to the garrison, by which, upon their surrender, they should be allowed to return to France.

I told M. Fagel that to admit of this would be highly objectionable; that he must be aware how anxious the Allies had shown themselves, and with great reason, to prevent the return of troops composing the garrisons of blockaded places to France, there again to make efficient head against them; that, how

ever much it was the Prince's duty to watch over the interests of those immediately confided to his care, these interests would be best consulted by acting on the general principles of the Alliance; and that if he had a duty to perform to those immediately under his care, he had also one of a no less pressing, and in my mind more important, nature to perform to the Allies, without whose means the liberation of these countries could never have been effected or obtained.

M. Fagel seemed to enter completely into my arguments upon this subject, and, as I was just going to his Royal Highness's audience, he told me that the Prince would probably address me upon this point, and requested me to state the argument I had urged in conversation with him to his Royal Highness. Almost immediately upon my entering the room, the Prince of Orange asked me whether I had seen M. Fagel, and what the result had been. I answered by stating, among others, the arguments I had urged to M. Fagel, and the conclusion which I was of opinion ought to be drawn therefrom. He replied that, in that case, I was responsible for all the losses which might be incurred by his people, and all the damage they must sustain from the inundation, which would necessarily oblige his Treasury to make advances from his funds to indemnify the sufferers, and thereby prevent those funds from being applied in aid of the general cause. To this I observed that it was a little hard to place me thus between a double responsibility; that, in the one case, if I should admit the offer of the terms suggested to the garrison of Gorcum, his Royal Highness would ride off on my responsibility vis-à-vis the Allies; that, in the other case, my responsibility might also be eventually brought forward to exempt his Royal Highness from those efforts which I am sure a moment's reflection would sufficiently persuade him ought, under every circumstance, to be made by his Government for the general cause; that the Russian, the Prussian, the British Governments, had all made sacrifices sufficiently great, of which the Dutch Go