libre, soit pour recevoir des secours, soit pour être retirée, si sa présence ne produit pas une insurrection assez considérable pour être soutenue. Une fois cette tête de pont établie, on aura le tems d'y renvoyer ou l'armée d'Alicant, ou des troupes d'icy même. L'effet de cette diversion inquiétera Buonaparte en répandant la désertion dans ses troupes Italiennes, tant en Allemagne que dans la Peninsule: elle sera utile surtout à Lord Wellington. Son effet sera considérable aussi en faveur des coalisés. Si sous peu de jours Mr. Lamb peut partir avec plein pouvoir pour Lord William] B[entinck] de suivre ses plans, surtout si on peut envoyer quelques transports, ou d'icy, ou de Lisbonne, ou de Cadiz, ou même d'Alicant, le plan est infallible en Juillet, et d'avance, en l'annonçant aux puissances coalisées on leur rendra leur énergie, si elle est diminuée par leurs revers, et on rompra toutes les mesures de médiation et de pacification qui leur sont présentées comme une amorce pour les paralyser, ou les desservir, et qui seraient leur perte absolue, si elles produisaient une armistice, dont Buonaparte profiterait pour avancer ses places d'armes et ses magazins, se faire renforcer par tous les membres de la Confédération du Rhin, à qui cette faiblesse des Alliés donnerait une nouvelle force, et dicter ensuite ses loix, ou conquérir avec de plus grands moyens. Si, en même tems que cette diversion s'opérerait en Italie et que la campagne se ferait avec vigueur en Espagne, on adoptait le plan que j'ay proposé hier (qui n'est pas de moy, mais de Scipion l'Africain), si on transportait subitement, et d'une manière inattendue, l'armée Suédoise sur les côtes de Hollande ou de Normandie, le théâtre de la guerre se trouverait entièrement changé ainsi que ses chances; l'Allemagne serait délivrée presque sans coup férir; et la France se trouverait ou menacée ou attaquée sur toute sa frontière orientale, depuis les bouches. du Rhin jusqu'à la Seine. La diversion en Italie prendrait encore plus de consistence; l'Espagne serait nécessairement évacuée. Notre armée dans la Peninsule serait réduite de moitie; et ce qui reviendrait at home serait disponible pour partout où on aurait besoin. Ce plan sublime, en opérant le salut de l'Europe, la rentrée des Français dans leurs limites naturelles, et la chûte du tyran, qui, soit par la guerre telle qu'elle est conduite, soit par la paix telle qu'elle peut être faite au milieu de ses victoires, augmente sa force et sa soif de conquêtes et de déstruction-ce plan procurerait le bien de notre patrie, et une gloire aussi immortelle que juste à notre Gouvernement. Il répondrait à toutes les attaques que le Cabinet va éprouver de ses détracteurs sur le traité de la Suède, qui est très attaquable, si son subside est dépensé sans une utilité qui balance sa cherté. Certainement ce sera le cas, si cette armée reste nulle en Allemagne, où elle ne peut rien changer aux circonstances, et ne peut que fournir des victimes de plus, surtout vû l'éloignement continué des armées Russo-Prussiennes, et l'interruption absolue de toute communication entr'elles et l'armée Suédoise. Ce plan est simple, facile, et grand-Lord Caselreagh a souvent fait l'éloge public de ma sagacité, nommément en 1805. Hé bien, je lui réponds sur mon expérience de la réussite, si on se détermine sur le champ, et si on exécute la descente en Hollande ou en France d'icy au 15 de Juillet. Mandez moi, non vos secrets ministériels, mais ce que vous en pensez, et rendez justice à mon zèle ardent. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh. Reichenbach, June 19, 1813, midnight. I think, my dear friend, your table will be pretty well covered with despatches by this conveyance; but, unless you give me some free agency and a messenger or two to be under my control, you will have all your news two or three weeks later than you ought to have. Lord C[athcart] takes two days to consider a despatch, and two to write one, and he never begins to think till other people have done. Now this Now this may send you the wisest results, but certainly not the most expeditious details. If I were to send a despatch unknown to him, and he were to discover it, there would be an end to our harmony. I hope you will get us through our Treaties; it is best to show something done, even under doubtful circumstances. Had we finished as we ought, and as I would easily have accomplished a month since, we should have been able throughout to play a higher game, and the armistice might have been more combated. I read Lord C. my despatch. He objected to my statements of Russian disinclination to numbers, but he could not controvert them, or make me alter them. He also said he should give his detail, as he is not quite satisfied. I have worked of late to forward their measures by myself. It will, I hope, however, all be right. I suppose you will say, as heretofore, that my views are gloomy. God be with you! Write to me, and don't abuse me, for your cuts go deep. Ever yours, CHARLES STEWART. The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh. Berlin, June 28, 1813. My dear Castlereagh—I have your note of the 11th. I am sorry to be so much in the dark. But believe me it is not for want of exertion. I see you have not my originals and Cathcart's from Colberg; this may prove to you, as well as other circumstances, that, if I had free action, I should be of more use to you in sending early intelligence. You may reckon. with certainty on my accounts of numbers. I think it best policy to tell you the truth. Our weakness in force is our only excuse for the armistice. Lord C. is desirous of being as agreeable as possible to the Emperor of Russia. This, in the long run, will be seen. As long as you employ me, I will do my duty conscientiously. The results will always prove where I am in error. I send you a publication of Stein's as to the new state of things for Germany. I think you may like to get it translated and published in England. In haste, ever most affectionately yours, CHARLES STEWART. Draft. Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart. Foreign Office, July 6, 1813. My dear Lord-After my public despatch of yesterday was signed, Captain Charles arrived with the treaties and letters to the 17th inclusive. In the present conjuncture, I deem it of so much importance that your lordship and Sir Charles Stewart should be in possession of the sentiments of the Government upon the great outline of our policy, that I do not detain the messenger, and shall reserve what relates to your last communications to accompany the ratifications by another courier. Not having yet had time to bring the subject regularly under the consideration of my colleagues, I can only now state that your lordship's and Sir Charles Stewart's conduct in concluding the treaties at the period they were signed is fully approved I must leave to your joint discretion what use it may be ad visable to make of the instruction herewith sent: much mus depend upon the circumstances of the moment. If negociation is not at an end, and hostilities renewed (which if determined or in the spirit of concert and exertion, and especially with Austria would, I am satisfied, prove the wisest as well as the safes policy for Europe in the long run), you must guard against Continental peace being made to our exclusion. Impracticability on our part might hazard this, notwithstanding our treaties which might not have the force to resist the menace both o French and Austrian hostility; for this purpose, our readines to treat with our Allies must be avowed, that they may have no reproach to make against us. The four points on which we must separately insist as sine quá nons must be distinctly put forward, nor can they complain of any one of these; they were notorious from the first both to Russia and Prussia; and, in good faith and fairness, all their assurances as well as their engagements not to make a separate peace must have been made in full contemplation that we had no possible option as to the points in question. With respect to others, which, in truth, involve the whole question of Continental policy, we must contend for as much as the Allies can be brought to stand to with firmness and spirit. But it is in vain to suppose that we can inspire the determination, if it does not exist. We may animate by our counsels as well as by our example, but we must avoid the appearance of idly pressing them against the grain. Such a line might weaken our influence, and would incur the responsibility of whatever disunion or failure followed. The great practical question is a renewal of hostilities or a prolongation of armistice. When our Allies know what is indispensable on our part, and have made up their minds on what is essential to themselves, they must then consider what is the prospect of France agreeing to these demands, and, if agreed to, of observing her engagements. If the accomplishment of a reasonably solid peace, through negociation, is not clear, hesitation in recurring to hostilities will damp and disunite the confederacy, and the resources of the Allies will be wasted in inactivity; better in that case try the fate of war for the remainder of the campaign, and let future policy be governed by the result. The recent successes in Spain have put us on strong ground. We can now with honour evince a disposition to concur with our Continental Allies in negociations; having done so, we shall act our own part with more effect, if fortune or our friends should forsake us. Lord Wellington's successes may now give |